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(1) This Act may be called the Maharashtra Preventive Detention Act, (2) It extends to the whole of the State of Maharashtra. (3) It shall be deemed to have.
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Toggle navigation. II, Section 3 ii. Enforced in Sikkim w. Statement of Objects and Reasons. There is, however, no independent legislation applicable to motor transport workers as a whole or for regulating the various aspects of their conditions of employment, work and wages. It is considered desirable to have a separate legislative measure for motor transport workers which would cover matters like medical facilities, welfare facilities, hours of work, spread-over, rest periods, overtime, annual leave with pay, etc. The present Bill is intended to achieve this object. In its application to the Union territory of Delhi , in S.

In some cases, a detenu may be given a hearing, but such a hearing is often, if not always likely to be ineffective, because the detenu is deprived of an opportunity to cross examine the evidence on which the detaining authorities rely and may not be able to adduce evidence before the Advisory Board to rebut the allegations made against him. Having regard to the nature of the enquiry which the Advisory Board is authorised or permitted to hold before expressing its approval to the detention of a detenu it would, we think, be entirely erroneous and wholly unsafe to treat the opinion expressed by the Advisory Board as amounting to a judgment of a criminal Court.

Lakhanpal v. Union of India , their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the scheme of the Defence of India Rules and that of the Preventive Detention Act, observed at page as follows In the first place the scheme of the Preventive Detention Act is entirely different from the Act and the Rules before us.

Section 3 of the Act confers power of detention. Section 7 requires the detaining authority to furnish grounds of detention to the detenu to make a representation. Section 8 requires the setting. Section 9 requires reference of the order passed by the authority to such Advisory Board together with the representation if any, made by the detenu. Under Section 10 the Board has to make a report to the Government and the report would be whether there is sufficient cause for detention or not. Under Section 11 the Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention where the report is that there is sufficient cause.

But where the Board reports that there is no such sufficient cause, the Government has to revoke the detention order. It is clear from Section 9 and the Section: following it that the Government has to make the reference to the Board: within 30 days from the order and the Board has to find whether there is sufficient cause for detention or not.

The review of the Board is thus almost contemporaneous.

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If, therefore, the Board finds that certain grounds furnished to the detenu did not in fact exist, it means that it did not make up its mind to pass the order. It is for that reason that the courts have held that since the order is based on subjective satisfaction it is not possible to say whether or not the grounds found not to have existed affected the process of satisfaction of the authority or not and to say that those only which existed had made up the satisfaction would be to substitute the-court's objective test in place of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.

Where an order is made under Rule 30 1 b its review is at intervals of periods of not more than six months. The object of the review is to decide whether there is a necessity to continue the detention order or not in light of the facts and circumstances including any development, that has taken place in the meantime. If the reviewing authority finds that such a development has taken place in the sense that the reasons which led to the passing of the original order no longer subsist or that some of them do not subsist, that is not to say that those reasons did not exist at the time of passing the original order and therefore, the satisfaction was on grounds which did not then exist.

It is easy to visualise a case where the authority is satisfied that an order of detention is necessary to prevent a detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to all the objects set out in Rule 30 1. At the end of six months the reviewing authority on the materials before it may come to a decision that the detention is still necessary as the detenu is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to some but not all the matters. Provided such decision is arrived at within the scope of Rule 30A the decision to continue the detention order would be sustainable.

There is thus no analogy between the provisions of review in the two acts and therefore decisions on the Preventive Detention Act cannot be availed of by the petitioner. In view of these authorities, we are unable to accede to the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Advisory Board is a judicial or a quasi judicial body.

That apart, there is no provision in the Preventive Detention Act requiring that an opportunity should be given to the detenu by the Board for making a representation to it. In this connection the following passage occurring in the aforesaid ruling of the Bombay High Court i. The last contention of Mr. Sule is that after the case of the detenu was referred to the Advisory Board by the Government of Bombay under Section 9 of the Act no opportunity was given to him for making a representation to the Advisory Board.

Now we have carefully considered the combined effects of Sections 9 and 10 of the Act and we find that the said sections do not contemplate that apart from the opportunity which the Act requires to be given to a detenu to make a representation under Section 7 any further opportunity is to be given to him to make a representation to the Advisory Board after his case is referred to the said Board by Government. If on his own accord the detenu makes another representation before the matter is put before the Advisory Board by Government, that representation has of course to be forwarded by Government to the Advisory Board under Section 9 of the Act, Section 9 says that in every case where a detention order has been made under the Act, the appropriate Government shall within six weeks from the date specified in Sub-section 2 place before an Advisory Board the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order.

It is clear, therefore, that whatever, the number of representations which the detenu might have made to Government before his case is sent to the Advisory Board, Government is bound to forward them to the Board for consideration and examination. The Board is not called upon to ask for any representation from the detenu.

Section 10 savs that when the case is referred to the Advisory Board, the said Board shall after considering the materials placed before it and after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate Government or from the person concerned and if in any particular case it considers it essential after hearing him in person, submit its report to the appropriate Government. It is clear, therefore, that the question whether the Advisory Board should call for any further information from the detenu or should give him an opportunity of being heard in person is left entirely to the discretion of the Advisory Board.

It is not incumbent upon the Board to give an opportunity to the detenu to make a representation to them, nor is it incumbent upon them to hear him in person. The following observations made in Jagan Nath Sathu v. Union of India , are also worth perusing in this connection Coming now to the submission that the respondent's case was heard before the petitioner's case and in his absence and that copies of further materials placed before the Advisory Board by the respondent were not supplied to the petitioner, it is necessary to refer to the procedure to be adopted by the Advisory Board under the provisions of the Act.

Under Section 9 in every case where a detention order has been made the appropriate Government must within thirty days from the date of detention place before the Advisory Board the grounds on which the order has been made, and the representation, if any, made by the detenus and in a case where an order has been made by an officer, also the report by such officer under Sub-section 3 of Section 3.

Section 10 sets out the procedure which the Advisory Board must follow when reference has been made to it under Section 9. Section 10 1 states The Advisory Board shall, after considering the materials placed before it, and after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate Government or from any person called for the purpose through the appropriate Government or from the person concerned, and if in any particular case it considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned desires to be heard, after hearing him in person submit its report to the appropriate Government within ten weeks from the date of detention.

It is clear from these provisions that the Advisory Board after considering the materials placed before it under Section 9 can call for further information from the appropriate Government, and that thereafter if in any particular case, it considers it essential so to do or if the detenu desires to be heard, after hearing him submit its report to the appropriate Government, In such a situation the Advisory Board must of necessity obtain further information from the Appropriate Government before it hears the detenu.

In our opinion, there is nothing in Section 10 which offends against the principles of natural justice. Keeping in view the procedure to be adopted by the Advisory Board and the principles enunciated in the decisions set out above, we need not dilate on this point any further. Tassaduq Hussain, learned Counsel for the petitioners, has urged that the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in supra are obiter dicta and as such are not binding on this Court.

After carefully going through the authority, we regret we are unable to accept this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Moreover, it is well settled that the observations of the Supreme Court even if obiter dicta are entitled to the highest respect,. The learned Counsel has also referred us to a ruling of the Supreme Court reported as , but that ruling in our opinion does not help the petitioners. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were, therein, considering a case where the State Government acting in exercise of its revisional powers under Section 7-F of the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act , , had issued a direction to the Commissioner to revise his order refusing permission to file a suit for ejectment against the tenants without issuing a notice to or giving an opportunity to them to place their version before it.

After examination of the scheme of the Act and its relevant provisions their Lordships came to the conclusion that in revisional proceedings under Section 7-F of the Act, the State Government must adopt a judicial approach, considering the matter in a quasi judicial manner and follow the principles of natural justice before reaching its conclusions.

Maharashtra Preventive Detention Act, 1970

In the instant case as already pointed out after examination of relevant provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, the Advisory Board does not discharge judicial or quasi judicial functions. In connection with the contention regarding principles of natural justice to be followed by the Advisory Board, it would be relevant to refer to a ruling of the Supreme Court reported as , where their Lordships quoted with approval their earlier observations made in Nagendra Nath Bora v.

Commissioner of Hills Division , that, "the rules of natural justice vary with varying constitutions of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function; and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice had been contravened should be decided not under any preconceived notion but in the light of the statutory rules and provisions. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that under Section 12 of the Preventive Detention Act two notices one before making a reference to the Advisory Board and the other on receipt of the report from the Advisory Board, ought to have been given to the detenus is equally without any substance.

Section 12 of the Act which sets out the procedure to be followed by the Government after the receipt of the report from the Advisory Board does not contemplate any such notice. The Preventive Detention Act merely provides for one opportunity to the detenu to make a representation to the Government against the order of detention.

There is no statutory provision or rule which prescribes that the Government has to make a judicial approach or discharge judicial function while confirming the order of detention. The preventive detention as distinguished from punitive detention as observed in has necessarily to proceed in all cases to some extent on suspicion or anticipation as distinguished from proof.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners has also referred to a ruling of the Supreme Court P. Union of India , to show that in confirming the order of detention the Government has to act judicially and the aforementioned notices ought to have been issued to the detenus before reference of their cases to the Advisory Board after the receipt of the reports from the Board but the authority is clearly distinguishable as their Lordships were therein considering the scope of the power of review under Rule A 9 of the Defence of India Rules, after the detention of a detenu has gone on for a period of six months, which has no analogy to the question of confirmation of detention under Section 12 of the Preventive Detention Act.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners also tried to reinforce his submission by reference to Article of the Constitution but here again there is no analogy between the provisions of Article of the Constitution and Section 12 of the Preventive Detention Act.

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The fourth contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners must also therefore, be rejected. The 5th contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is also based on a misconception of the true constitutional position. Legislation with respect to preventive detention for defence of India no doubt falls within the competence of Parliament as it is covered by Entry 9 of the Union list but preventive detention for reasons connected with the security of State falls within the concurrent list and as such is within legislative competence of a State Legislature as well.

It is also to be borne in mind that unlike other States of India, the residuary power of legislation vests in our State legistature and in peace times our State Legislature alone is competent to enact a law with respect to preventive detention for reasons of security of the State. All this would be evident from a combined study of Article and Chapter 1 of Part XI of the Constitution of India read with Schedule 7 thereof as applied to the State.

A reference to that part of the Constitution of India which relates to the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States and to the Constitution Application to Jammu and Kashmir Order would show that whereas in the rest of India, the Union and the State Legislature have both concurrent powers of legislation with respect to preventive detention for reasons connected with the security of a State i.

The provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act in so far as they relate to detention for reasons of security of State cannot therefore, be struck down as ultra vires of the State Legislature. The Fifth contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners therefore, also falls. We now pass on to the sixth contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. It will be seen from the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State by the Secretary to the Government Home Department, that the detenus were initially detained under the Defence of India Rules, inter alia for reasons connected with the defence of India and the maintenance of public order.

Now the expression 'Defence of India' in times of emergency appears to us to have a very wide connotation and is comprehensive enough to include within its sweep the security of the State as well. This is so because war or external aggression definitely affects and undermines the external and internal security of a State.

Again the term 'public order' as held in is of wide amplitude and comprehends within its ambit everything that may be connected with public safety and tranquillity.

Preventive detention

In this sense the security of State is closely allied to public order as well as any activity prejudicial to the security of the State is bound to jeopardise the public safety and tranquillity. In some decided cases it has also been held that the two objectives, maintenance of public order and the security of the State overlap to a certain extent. We are, therefore, unable to accede to the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the detenu having been previously detained for reasons connected with the defence of India and the maintenance of public order could not now be detained for reasons connected with the security of State and the maintenance of public order,.

The next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that since the activities referred to in the grounds of detention could be the subject matter of prosecution, the State should not have resorted to its extraordinary powers of detaining the detenus also does not appear to be sound.

The fact that the Government can launch prosecution against a person for his unlawful or prejudicial activities, does not debar it from detaining a person if it is satisfied that the step will be more expedient and fruitful. As held in , a habitual criminal is not exempt from the operation of the Act and the mere fact that he can be amenable to ordinary law does not preclude the exercise of power under Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act. Again in , it was held that there is no law which precludes the State from invoking the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act in respect of a matter as to which a criminal prosecution has been launched or can be launched.