Radical Process Change: A Best Practice Blueprint (CBI Fast Track)

Radical Process Change: A Best Practice Blueprint (CBI Fast Track) by [ . with how to successfully implement radical, process-based change in an evolving.
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If you are suspect of any unauthorized use of your intellectual property rights on this webpage, please report it to us at the following: How to Help People Change: The Four-Step Biblical Process. The Process Improvement Handbook: Adaptive capacity and human cognition: The process of individual adaptation to climate change [An article from: Managing The Change Process: Fed up with finding suppliers?

Request for Quotation Get quotes for custom requests Let the right suppliers find you Close deal with one click Apperal Processing customization. Up to speed with workflow- How to choose a business process improvement methodology for your organization and measure the positive change. Improvement Executive Guide Series Book 3. Member States that effectively address corruption within their own borders often face challenges regarding the behaviour of their companies abroad, especially in countries where corrupt practices are widespread.

The OECD conducts strict monitoring in this field, highlighting in its regular evaluations both good and less satisfactory results of enforcement. There are good practices in a number of Member States, either in relation to a significant number of successful prosecutions and a high level of sanctions, in prioritising foreign bribery cases or in the recent adoption of a comprehensive bribery act strengthening the legal and procedural tools for preventing and prosecuting corruption, especially foreign bribery.

The Bribery Act , which came into force on 1 July places the UK among the countries with the strongest anti-bribery rules in the world. It not only criminalises the payment and receipt of bribes and the bribing of a foreign official but also extends criminal liability to commercial organisations that fail to prevent bribery committed on their behalf.

Provisions on extra-territorial jurisdiction allow the Serious Fraud Office SFO to prosecute any company, or associated person, with a UK presence, even if the company is based overseas. Commercial organisations are exonerated from criminal liability if they had adequate procedures to prevent bribery. The accompanying Guidance to Commercial Organisations GCO by the SFO promotes awareness of the new legislative framework and guides businesses in a practical manner including case studies regarding their obligations under the Act to prevent or detect bribery.

In line with a previous OECD recommendation, the GCO makes it clear that facilitation payments are considered illegal bribes and provides businesses with criteria to differentiate hospitality from disguised forms of bribery. The SFO has wide powers to investigate and prosecute serious and complex fraud, including corruption. In certain circumstances, the SFO can consider civil recovery orders and settlements in accordance with previous guidelines.

The OECD has criticised other Member States for insufficient or non-existent prosecution of foreign bribery, considering the corruption risks their companies face abroad. In some Member States, shortcomings exist regarding the supervision of state-owned companies where legislation is unclear and politicisation impedes merit-based appointments and the pursuit of the public interest. Moreover, there are insufficient anti-corruption safeguards or mechanisms to prevent and sanction conflicts of interest. There is little transparency regarding the allocation of funds and, in some cases, purchase of services by these companies.

Recent investigations into alleged misuse of funds, corrupt practices and money laundering linked to state-owned companies indicate the high level of corruption-related risks in this area, as well as the weakness of control and prevention. For a few Member States, the report highlights the need for more transparency and efficient checks on accelerated privatisation processes that may raise the risks of corruption. In the Member States where organised crime poses considerable problems, corruption is often used as a facilitator.

In one Member State, numerous cases of alleged illegal party funding at central or regional level were also linked to organised crime groups.

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Links between organised crime groups, businesses and politicians remain a concern for those Member States, particularly at regional and local levels, and in public procurement, construction, maintenance services, waste management and other sectors. Research has showed that in another Member State organised crime exercises influence at all levels, including in politics.

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Political corruption there is often seen as a tool for gaining direct or indirect access to power; that country was considered to have the highest level of shadow economy among EU Member States. Overall corruption remains a serious threat as a means for organised crime groups to infiltrate public and private sectors, as stated by the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment carried out in by Europol.

There are a number of background issues which — although not in themselves necessarily linked to corruption — can have an impact on the extent to which an environment opens the door to corruption. Effective policies in these areas can have the effect of reducing the opportunities for corruption. Openness and transparency can act as a disincentive to corruption, and can help to reveal transgressions when they occur.

While most Member States have adequate legislation in this field, and some are on the way to adopting laws, implementation of transparency standards is uneven. One Member State has developed an online application that offers an overview of all public sector expenditure on goods and services see also the public procurement section. It also provides details on management and supervisory boards of all state-owned and state-controlled companies and their annual reports.

Effective anti-corruption policies in some Member States stem partly from a tradition of openness, transparency and disclosure of documents. A law adopted in [18] obliges all public institutions to publish online their decisions, including in relation to public procurement. Each document is digitally signed and automatically assigned a unique number. If there is a discrepancy between the text published in the Government Gazette and that on Clarity websites, the latter prevails. Concluded public contracts are also published.

Adequate whistleblowing mechanisms that codify processes within public administrations to allow official channels for reporting what they may perceive as irregularities or even illegal acts can help overcome detection problems inherent to corruption and indeed in other areas. In this regard, building an integrity culture within each organisation, raising awareness, and creating effective protection mechanisms that would give confidence to potential whistleblowers are key.

In the complex world of public policy-making, it is desirable for public administrations to engage in a continuous dialogue with outside stakeholders. All interested parties should be able to have their say, but this should be done in a transparent way. As lobbying activities can raise risks of corruption and regulatory capture, it is desirable to have mechanisms in place to frame such activities, be it through legislation or a voluntary registration of lobbyists.

Such mechanisms can help to create both clarity and transparency in the relationship between public authorities and outside stakeholders. As such, they can help to reduce the risk of corruption. So far, this area has been developed in relatively few Member States, though some other Member States have legislation or rules in the pipeline or are debating the possibility of introducing new mechanisms.


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Public procurement is a significant element of the national economies in the EU. The Commission estimated the total value of calls for tenders above those EU thresholds to be approximately EUR billion in Given the level of financial flows generated, and a number of other factors, public procurement is an area prone to corrupt practices. The financial interests at stake, and the close interaction between the public and private sectors, make public procurement a major risk area.

A study on identifying and reducing corruption in public procurement in the EU concluded that in the overall direct costs of corruption in public procurement for only five sectors i. The individual country assessments of this report point to public procurement as one of the areas most vulnerable to corruption, as also illustrated by a number of high-level corruption cases involving one or more countries.

Given that the corruption risk level in the public procurement process is rather high, anti-corruption and anti-fraud safeguards in public procurement are a matter of priority for both EU Member States and EU institutions. Weaknesses in the prevention and repression of corruption in public procurement adversely affect management of national and EU funds. The main objective of EU legislation on public procurement i.

The public procurement legislation aims to ensure that procurement markets are kept open Union-wide so as to contribute to the most efficient use of public funds, thus promoting a fair, uniform and transparent platform for public spending. This can also positively influence the overall EU anti-corruption policies where transparency and fair competition play an important role in preventing corrupt practices.

The public procurement legislation also includes provisions which are more directly relevant to anti-corruption policies such as exclusion from the tendering process of an entity against which a final court decision on corruption charges has been handed down, detailed provisions on publicity and transparency of various stages of the procurement cycle, minimum standards for remedies, specific provisions on abnormally low tenders, as well as provisions setting certain requirements for modification of contracts.

The award of works concessions is presently subject to a limited number of secondary law provisions[29] while service concessions are currently only covered by the general principles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Some Member States have specific legal provisions dealing with corruption in the area of public procurement or apply specific measures aimed at reducing the risk of corruption as detailed below.

Most Member States however deal with corruption in public procurement through their general legislation on corruption. The Annual Public Procurement Implementation Review noted that the number of contract notices and contract award notices advertised has continued to grow steadily over the past years. In fulfilling its role as guardian of the Treaties, in cases of potential violation of European public procurement rules, the Commission acts upon complaints or on its own initiative.

In this regard, the Commission strives to ensure compliance with the public procurement rules whatever the reasons for their violation, regardless of whether a violation has been committed knowingly or is the result of insufficient knowledge or errors. As a general rule, the Commission does not investigate whether a violation of EU public procurement rules might be due to corruption.

This falls within the competence of the Member States. Nevertheless, infringement procedures[31] often refer to irregularities pointing to certain vulnerabilities in the application of public procurement rules that are also highly relevant when assessing the effectiveness of corruption prevention and control mechanisms. Most of these cases related to allegations of: Judging by the type of cases where the Commission opens infringement procedures for an alleged breach of the EU rules on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts the negotiated procedure without publication is the type of procedure most affected by irregularities.

A comprehensive evaluation has shown that the Public Procurement Directives have achieved their objectives to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, further improvement is considered necessary for the simplification of procedures, and to strengthen anti-fraud and anti-corruption guarantees. The proposed new legislation covers procurement in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors,[34] public works, supply and service contracts,[35] as well as concessions, regulated at EU level.

The Commission has proposed provisions regarding conflicts of interest for the first time defined in EU legislation , centralised data on corruption, fraud and conflicts of interest, stricter rules governing modification of contracts, broader exclusion criteria, and monitoring of concluded contracts. The proposal also included the setting up of oversight monitoring of the implementation of public procurement rules, red flagging and alert systems to detect fraud and corruption. However, Member States raised fundamental objections to such measures which were considered too cumbersome for their administrations.

The proposal on award of concession contracts[36] aims at reducing the uncertainty surrounding the award of such contracts and seeks to foster public and private investment in infrastructure and strategic services giving best value for money. The proposed directive on concessions also contains provisions requiring Member States to adopt rules combating favouritism or corruption and preventing conflicts of interest, aimed at ensuring transparency of the award procedure and equal treatment of all tenderers.

Engineering and construction companies are generally the most likely to say that all of these practices are widespread. This chapter reviews the corruption risks associated with public procurement based on the findings of the country-specific assessments of this EU Anti-Corruption Report, as well as on other Commission studies and data. All stages of the public procurement cycle are considered for the purpose of the current analysis: The phase of contract implementation is also taken into account. This is in accordance with the analysis of the OECD dating from that highlighted the need to take further measures to prevent corruption risks that occur during the entire public procurement cycle, starting with the phase of needs assessment up to contract management and payment, including also the use of national security and emergency procurement.

While this section looks generally at positive and negative practices across the EU, public procurement aspects have also been analysed more in depth in some of the country-specific chapters. This does not mean that issues of public procurement do not require further attention in the remaining Member States, but that the Commission decided to give more prominence to other corruption-related issues that seemed to be more salient than public procurement.

Neither the general nor the country-specific analyses aim at establishing universal benchmarks in this area, but rather seek to present vulnerabilities and corresponding solutions on both prevention and repression sides which have either succeeded or failed in practice. Judging from the prosecuted cases of corruption in public procurement in the Member States, the most frequently occurring problems concern: Apart from the public procurement procedure, audits have in many cases identified risks related to the post-award phase, when kickbacks may also occur, and for instance the quality of deliverables is intentionally compromised.

Other post-award patterns identified in corruption cases include: A study on identifying and reducing corruption in public procurement in the EU[39] identified four main types irregular practices concerning 96 cases in which corruption allegations have already been confirmed through final court decisions, or where there are strong indications of corrupt practices. While the use of negotiated and direct award procedures is justified in certain circumstances, there are cases in which it is done with the purpose of avoiding competitive procedure obligations.

In some Member States, the use of non-competitive procedures is considerably above the EU average. The unjustified use of negotiated procedures also increases the risk of corrupt practices. With a view to countering the risk of abusive use of negotiated procedures or direct award, some Member States provide for the legal obligation of ex-ante notification of negotiated procedure without publication of notice to the public procurement oversight or review bodies.

Construction, energy, transport, defence and healthcare sectors appear to be most vulnerable to corruption in public procurement. In several Member States where allegations of illegal party funding emerged, there were situations in which such funding was allegedly granted in exchange for beneficial decisions regarding the award of public contracts. In some other cases, the allegations concerned too close links between businesses and politicians at central or local level that encouraged alleged corrupt practices linked to the award of public contracts.

Public procurement at regional and local levels raise particular issues where local authorities have wide discretionary powers that are not matched with sufficient checks and balances, significant percentages of public funds are allocated at this level, and at the same time internal and external control mechanisms are weak. In convergence countries where a very substantial part of public investment is co-financed by Structural Funds, these risks are mitigated by the management and control requirements of the funds.

However, their effective implementation poses a real challenge. In a few Member States, control mechanisms have revealed cases in which officials used local government assets to conclude transactions with companies related to them. Most of the cases have concerned charges or allegations of illegal party funding, personal illicit enrichment, diversion of national or EU funds, favouritism and conflicts of interest. In a few Member States, there were cases in which some organised crime leaders at municipality level established their own political parties or infiltrated municipal councils to exert influence over local law enforcement or judiciary, and to rig public tenders.

In order to address this risk, some municipalities have implemented anti-corruption measures such as establishing systems for internal financial management and control. Construction linked to urban development, as well as waste management are among the sectors most prone to corruption at local level. High-level corruption cases involving regional and local officials in some Member States have revealed that re-zoning decisions[40] were at times taken under pressure from local developers in relation to future property construction contracts.

In some Member States local administrations have developed or are asked to develop their own integrity or anti-corruption action plans. While some of them are formalistic or unevenly enforced, and the actual impact is difficult to measure, others have pioneered the building models that work in practice. In some Member States, contracting authorities are obliged to develop their own integrity plans and assess corruption risks. In a few cases, civil society initiatives have had a beneficial effect on the accountability of local administrations with regard to transparency of public spending.

In the framework of external monitoring of public spending, the Open Local Government initiative of Slovakia ranks Slovak towns according to a set of criteria based on transparency in public procurement, access to information, availability of data of public interest, public participation, professional ethics and conflicts of interests.

The project is run by Transparency International. More details can be found in the country chapter on Slovakia. A Brochure on the Prevention of Corruption in Public Tendering agreed by the German Association of Towns and Municipalities jointly with the Federal Association of Small and Medium-Sized Building Contractors provides an overview of preventive measures against corruption in public procurement at the level of towns and municipalities.

Conflicts of interest in the Member States are covered by general legislation on prevention of corruption or by specific provisions on public procurement. The effectiveness of the prevention and detection of conflicts of interest in public procurement depends therefore on the effectiveness of the overall control mechanisms in this area. Particular vulnerabilities can be noted with regard to conflicts of interest affecting public procurement procedures at local level. Some Member States, through their anti-corruption or integrity agencies, carried out targeted checks on conflicts of interest in certain areas considered particularly vulnerable.

This led to an increased number of detected cases involving conflicts of interest and identified public contracts concluded for private gain to the detriment of the public interest. Where there are rules on asset disclosure applicable to public officials, they almost always apply to public procurement officers as well.

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Several Member States have recently undergone or are going through public procurement reforms aiming at increasing transparency and further supporting fair competition. In some Member States national anti-corruption strategies are in place, covering prevention and repression of corruption in public procurement. Nevertheless, frequent legislative changes have led in some Member States to legal uncertainty and weaknesses in the implementation process and corresponding control mechanisms. Complexity of legislation is also perceived in some Member States as an obstacle to smooth implementation. The contracting authorities are asked to adopt integrity plans and assess corruption risks only in few Member States.

In most cases such risk assessments are carried out with the support of either law enforcement or anti-corruption agencies. There are a few Member States that have been implementing red-flagging systems[43] for some time, raising awareness at both central and local level.

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A few Member States have also developed specific risk management tools tailor-made for particular challenges faced at their respective national or regional levels. Several networks and associations of regional and local administrations are actively implementing actions for prevention of mafia infiltration in public structures and promoting transparency of public procurement at regional level e.

Various other measures have been taken at the level of public authorities to prevent criminal infiltration in public contracts e. More details can be found in the country chapter on Italy. Such centralised data gathering is largely seen by the Member States as an unnecessary administrative burden.

Regular and structured market studies are not common practice before the public procurement, with the exception of complex and high-value procurements. Unit costs databases are being developed only in very few Member States at either central or local level or are sector-specific. Such databases may help carry out comparative analysis between similar types of projects e. They can help identify risks or suspicions of corrupt behaviour if a serious mismatch is identified, despite limitations of such approach given the complexity of the products and the variety of inputs that feed into a final deliverable.

Partly as a result of the transposition and implementation process surrounding the Public Procurement Directives, notable improvements have been made in the level of transparency of public procurement procedures in the majority of the Member States. Some have taken extensive measures to ensure real-time publication of annual accounts and balance sheets of public authorities in user-friendly formats, including details on costs of public works and services.

Tracing public money — online application of the Slovenian Commission for Prevention of Corruption. The application indicates contracting parties, the largest recipients, related legal entities, dates, amounts and purpose of transactions. It offers an overview of the average EUR 4. This transparency system facilitates detection of irregularities in public contracts and expenditure. BASE receives data from the electronic edition of the Portuguese Official Journal and from the certified electronic platforms concerning open and restricted pre-award procedures.

All public contracting authorities use the reserved area of the portal to record contract data, upload the contracts themselves and record information on their performance. From to , the BASE only publicised contracts relating to direct awards. It also publishes information on contract performance. In March , a web portal and public procurement electronic database were launched by a local NGO as a result of an EU-funded project. The database consolidates information related to the implementation of public procurement procedures and companies involved in public procurement procedures, and is available free of charge to the public.

The electronic database also contains information concerning assets and interests of public officials, in line with asset disclosure rules. Such aggregated data allow cross-checks to be carried out. In a few Member States access to documents and information regarding public procurement is limited by overly broad exceptions and a wide definition of confidentiality concerning public procurement documentation.

In some other Member States, procurement organised by state-owned enterprises does not follow the same transparency, competitive or supervision standards as the regular public procurement procedures. There were cases in some Member States where state-owned enterprises concluded non-competitive purchase contracts above market prices with favoured partners. Publication of concluded contracts is not yet a widespread practice in the EU. There are some Member States where contracts are published in their entirety and in one Member State publication is even a precondition for the validity of the contract i.

Integrity pacts are agreements between the contracting authority for a particular project and the bidders, all committing themselves to abstain from any corrupt practices. Certain monitoring, transparency and sanctioning provisions are also included in such agreements. With a view to ensuring that they are effectively implemented, integrity pacts are often monitored by civil society groups.

In some Member States which apply a far-reaching transparency policy, civil society has become very active in complex monitoring of procurement processes and public contracts. In some Member States, often at the initiative of NGOs, integrity pacts are implemented with regard to certain public procurements, particularly where large public contracts are concerned e. E-procurement, apart from improving the efficiency of public procurement procedures, offers additional safeguards in terms of preventing and detecting corrupt practices because it helps increase transparency and allows for better implementation of standardised procedures, as well as facilitating control mechanisms.

The current Public Procurement Directives contain provisions requiring all Member States to introduce e-procurement, including through the electronic publication of procurement notices, electronic communication including the submission of bids , and new, fully electronic procurement such as dynamic purchasing systems and e-auctions.

At the time of the adoption, in , the Directives were accompanied by an Action Plan. However, a few Member States have made significant progress towards full implementation of e-procurement in the pre-award phases. This is particularly true of Member States in which e-procurement has become mandatory by national law and is expected to be gradually implemented. Lithuania has made significant progress in providing online access to combined data on public procurement.

The range of information published exceeds the requirements of EU law, including draft technical specifications, concluded and performed public contracts. Also, suppliers are required to indicate subcontractors in their bids. As a result, the share of e-procurement rose from 7.

Estonia has set up an e-procurement portal and related e-services e. The State Public Procurement Register is an e-Tenders portal where all public procurement notices have been published electronically since The Portuguese e-Procurement Programme was launched in June as a centralised and high-quality platform that promotes efficiency and competition through increased transparency and savings in the public procurement process. The portal — http: A Contract Management Tool ensures uploading of public contracts, allows monitoring of contracts concluded and enables e-invoicing.

The Information Management System also helps collect, store and systemise statistics on the procurement process. According to the EU legislation in force, the establishment of a central procurement body is optional. Most Member States have nevertheless implemented this option in their national legislation. As noted in the Public Procurement Implementation Review, most Member States designate specific authorities which handle many or all of the tasks related to procurement, with some exceptions where the institutions in charge are not designated specifically to handle procurement but it is only one of their tasks e.

However, in some of the Member States where a central body exists, its capacity is limited by insufficient staff and training for dealing with ever increasing tasks. The Remedies Directives leave it to the Member States to decide whether reviews are handled by administrative or judicial bodies. The choice between the two possibilities is split fifty-fifty among Member States. In a few Member States, there are insufficient guarantees for the independence of such review bodies from political interference, including as regards the appointment of their leadership and staff.

Government administrations, at both central and local levels, are increasingly using specialised bodies, such as central procurement bodies, while greater use of framework contracts is changing the nature of the procurement function. Currently, practice varies widely across Member States.

In relation to awareness and training on anti-corruption policies, while this has improved over recent years in the majority of Member States, public procurement officials see a rather limited role for themselves in detecting corrupt practices. Moreover, the effectiveness of cooperation between public procurement authorities, law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies varies widely across the Member States.

In many cases, the cooperation is formalistic and statistics show a low number of notifications about suspicions of corruption or conflicts of interests submitted by public procurement authorities to law enforcement or integrity agencies. In some Member States, where control mechanisms, particularly at local level, are rather weak or fragmented, cases of favouritism in allocation of public funds within national, local and regional authorities involved in public procurement appear to be widespread.

While the efficiency of control mechanisms concerning pre-bidding, bidding and award phases has improved in the Member States, the implementation post-award phase is less closely monitored. Some national Courts of Audit or national audit offices have often pointed out that irregularities occur in the execution phase.

In many Member States the courts of audit have become key players in identifying gaps and shortcomings related to public procurement procedures. Their recommendations in this field are often not sufficiently followed up. Ownership of bidders and sub-contractors is very rarely checked in public procurement procedures. In at least one Member State legislation allows public contracts to be concluded with companies that have anonymous shareholders, while at the same time not offering sufficiently strong safeguards against conflict of interests.

Coordination of oversight, partial overlap, division of tasks or fragmented control mechanisms at central and local levels, including in the implementation phase, still pose problems in a number of Member States. Control mechanisms for public procurement below the thresholds of the EU legislation are particularly weak in the majority of Member States. This raises concerns in particular in relation to the reported practices, whereby contracts are split into smaller ones to circumvent EU procurement requirements and checks.

Many national laws contain self-cleaning provisions. In many Member States contracting authorities have cross-access to their internal debarment databases. International debarment lists are, as a rule, not considered as a basis for exclusion in EU Member States. In most Member States corruption in public procurement is covered by criminal offences such as bribery and trading in influence.

There are Member States where specific corruption-related offences affecting the course of public procurement are incriminated distinctively. As a rule, procurement procedures are suspended, interrupted or cancelled when a corrupt behaviour or a conflict of interest is detected. However, the situation is different in the case of concluded contracts in relation to which corrupt behaviour or a conflict of interest is detected or occurs after the award of the contract.

In many cases, apart from the sanctioning of corrupt behaviour or conflicts of interest as such, separate civil action for the annulment of the public contract is required. This often entails lengthy procedures and risks producing effects at a too late stage when it is difficult or even impossible to fully recover the losses. In some other Member States, public contracts include an anti-corruption clause that guarantees more effective follow-up in the event of corrupt practices being proven within the lifetime of the contract e.

In some Member States where corruption in public procurement raises particular concerns, the track record of prosecutions and final court decisions is weak, and few cases of public procurement corruption are finalised with dissuasive sanctions. These cases usually take a long time and, frequently, contracts or projects are already executed at the time when corrupt practices are discovered. Cases of corruption in public procurement are often complex and at times they may involve high-ranking officials. Specific technical knowledge is therefore required in order to ensure effective and fair judicial proceedings.

The above-mentioned findings show progress as to the implementation of anti-corruption policies in public procurement within the Member States, but it remains an area of risk. Further efforts aimed at strengthening integrity standards are called for. The reform of the Public Procurement and Utilities Directives, as well as the proposed Directive on award of concessions, include anti-corruption and good governance standards as an important part of the overall modernisation drive.

The minimum standards on conflicts of interests proposed in these Directives, preliminary market consultations, mandatory and voluntary exclusion criteria, self-cleaning rules, stricter provisions on modification and termination of contracts, centralisation of data on corruption and conflict of interest cases, as well as the monitoring and reporting obligations, respond to a large extent to the remaining concerns expressed above. As regards possible further action to be taken by the Member States, the 17 country chapters where public procurement issues are highlighted, as well as the analysis in this section, point to the following general recommendations:.

Base risk assessments on these centralised data. Risk assessments can also helpfully look into the particular vulnerabilities of this level of administration. Help contracting authorities and oversight bodies detect corrupt behaviour, favouritism and conflicts of interest. Implementation of high transparency standards for the entire procurement cycle as well as during contract implementation.

Ensure more transparency of procurement carried out by state-owned enterprises, as well as within the context of public-private partnerships. Strengthening of internal and external control mechanisms for the entire procurement cycle as well as during contract implementation.

Ensure sound and uniform methodologies for anti-corruption and conflict of interest checks during the public procurement cycle. Such methodologies should consider prioritisation of the most vulnerable procurement processes or levels of administration and ad-hoc unannounced checks by independent oversight bodies. Ensuring coherent overview and raising awareness about the need and know-how for prevention and detection of corrupt practices at all levels of public procurement.

Although the exact meaning and scope of the concept are the object of academic debate, this implies that the Report covers two aspects. First, it covers specific acts of corruption and those measures that Member States take specifically to prevent or punish corrupt acts as defined by the law. Secondly, it covers certain types of conduct and measures which impact on the risk of corruption occurring and on the capacity of a State to control it.

Consequently, the Report deals with a wide range of issues associated with corruption, including, in addition to bribery, trading in influence, abuse of office, aspects related to nepotism, favouritism, illegal lobbying, and conflict of interests. The aim of this first EU anti-corruption report is to keep the focus on a limited number of key corruption-related issues. Wider aspects are mentioned for contextual coherence.

Constitutional arrangements degree of devolution of power, position of judiciary, prosecutors vs executive branch , the organisation and quality of the civil service, active role of the state in the economy, privatisation are relevant from a corruption point of view. The report does not make any general value judgement on constitutional arrangements, or on how the boundary is drawn between state and private ownership. Hence, it is neutral with respect to decentralisation, but does look into whether adequate control mechanisms to manage corruption risks are in place.

The same applies to privatisation: The report looks only at whether transparent, competitive procedures are in place to reduce the risk of corruption. Finally, there are different legal and constitutional arrangements concerning the relation between prosecution services and the executive power. The report is neutral with respect to the different models, since it only examines whether the prosecutors are able to pursue corruption cases in an effective manner. The report is therefore not based on detailed questionnaires or expert country visits.

It is based on the abundance of information available from existing monitoring mechanisms, together with data from other sources including national public authorities, research carried out by academic institutions, independent experts, think-tanks, civil society organisations etc. Furthermore, the report draws on corruption-related information concerning a wide range of policy areas e. Studies and surveys were specifically commissioned for the purpose of further extending the knowledge base in areas relevant to the report.

An extensive study on corruption in public procurement involving EU funds, launched at the initiative of the European Parliament, was commissioned by OLAF. Its findings fed into both the thematic chapter and the national chapters. Another study concerned corruption in healthcare. Two Eurobarometer surveys were carried out in Data on corruption at regional level were drawn from the Study on Quality of Government carried out by Gothenburg Quality of Government Institute. Finally, the Commission has used information generated by research projects co-funded by the EU, such as the National Integrity System reports carried out by Transparency International.

While these two mechanisms serve different purposes, the current report draws on the extensive knowledge and lessons acquired in the CVM process and makes references in the two country chapters accordingly. After the conclusion of the CVM procedure, this report will continue to follow up on those issues which are relevant in the context of corruption. In relation to Croatia, extensive information was collected as part of the pre-accession process and related monitoring. More broadly, the monitoring of anti-corruption efforts that has been part of the enlargement process has brought many useful lessons that could have been applied in the context notably factors affecting sustainability of an anti-corruption agenda.

In September , the Commission adopted a decision to set up a group of experts on corruption to support the work on the EU Anti-Corruption Report. The expert group advises on the overall methodology and the assessments contained in the report. Seventeen experts were selected following an open call to which nearly candidates registered their interest.

The selected experts come from a wide variety of backgrounds public authorities, law enforcement, judiciary, prevention services, private sector, civil society, international organisations, research, etc. The experts act in their personal capacity and they do not represent the institutions they come from. The group started its work in January and has met on average every three months. The Commission also set up a network of local research correspondents, operational since August The network complements the work of the expert group, by collecting and processing relevant information from each Member State.

It consists of experts on corruption coming from research institutions and civil society organisations. The Commission organised two workshops with participation of national authorities anti-corruption agencies, prosecution services, coordinating ministries , researchers, NGOs, journalists and business representatives. The Commission also gave an opportunity to authorities of Member States to see early drafts of the respective country chapters without the issues recommended for follow-up by the Member States and provide comments.

These comments were carefully considered in the preparation of the report. The report is based primarily on qualitative rather than quantitative assessment. Qualitative assessment as indicated above is driven by the assessment of each country on its own merits. The focus is on what works and what does not work in terms of dealing with corruption in a particular country. Quantitative approaches play a lesser role, mostly because it is difficult to put a figure on how much of a problem corruption is, and even more difficult to rank the countries by results.

This creates a cascade effect: Surveys tend to use for instance the Eurobarometer results; however, by the time the composite index is published, another more recent Eurobarometer survey may be available. Perception surveys, given the hidden nature of corruption, provide over time for an important indicator of pervasiveness of the problem. Surveys are by definition confined to the limited scope of the questions answered and depend heavily on the openness of respondents.

The results of surveys are also undoubtedly influenced by immediate events occurring at the time of the interviews. At the same time, when a country takes more robust measures against corruption leading to more cases being revealed, more coverage by the media and more public awareness, perception surveys might lead to a negative dynamic — more people than previously will report high levels of perceived corruption.

Also, responses may be politically biased, associating the popularity of a certain government with ineffectiveness in implementation of policies. Still, the mere perception of widespread corruption can be considered in itself an indicator of inefficient policies. Moving beyond perception surveys, there is interesting research on correlation between some economic and social indicators and corruption.

For instance, corruption was examined in the light of potential correlation with the rate of economic growth, allocation of public funds, internet penetration, budget for prosecution, and enforcement of competition rules. However, in practice, difficulties were encountered as regards capacity to collect credible, comparable data of high quality across Member States as well as to demonstrate convincingly the link between those factors and corruption.

Finally, there is a difficulty in drawing clear policy-oriented conclusions from these correlations. Despite these limitations, the Commission resolved to take stock of the already existing indicators. The inventory was not designed to be the basis of a new index on corruption, but to provide elements of analysis supplementing the qualitative assessment that is at the core of the report. During preparation of the list, the Commission became aware that there might be a fundamental difficulty in relying primarily on indicators and statistical data for getting to the core of corruption problems, and most importantly for building actionable, tailor-made policy recommendations.

Still, already established indicators directly relevant to the anti-corruption efforts supported by robust data were collected in order to examine the situation in Member States and identify areas for closer analysis in the country-specific research. These data 1 were used for scene setting i. The interpretation of criminal justice statistics in the context of corruption deserves thoughtful consideration. In the case of serious crimes such as theft, robbery, burglary or assault, one could legitimately expect that a victim will report the crime to the police.

Therefore, the crime statistics may indicate the scale of the problem. Corruption, unlike these crimes, is hidden, and in most cases there is no direct victim who could report the crime. Therefore the percentage of undetected cases is likely to be much higher for corruption than for other crimes. A high number of cases reported to the law enforcement bodies, pursued through the courts and resulting in convictions may give an indication of the scale of the corruption problem.

On the other hand, it also shows a positive picture: The contrary is also true: Furthermore, comparison of data on criminal proceedings is very difficult for the following two reasons: Firstly, there is no unified criminal definition of corruption within Member States, thus leading to different ways of recording corruption-related offences. Secondly, in view of differences in criminal procedures, for instance in requirements concerning evidence gathering, corruption might be prosecuted through other offences e.

The amount of available information on corruption, also beyond criminal cases, varies considerably among Member States. Again, the interpretation could be twofold as indicated above. On the one hand, correlation could be made between the scale of the problem and the quantity of available information. On the other hand there are cases where corruption is not prioritised and there is relatively little information that allows its scale to be measured and assess whether policy measures are sufficient and effective.

This methodological challenge adds to the difficulty of making meaningful comparisons between Member States. It does not propose standardised solutions for all Member States: The report aims to present recommendations which fit the context of each Member State. Comprehensive anti-corruption strategies were seen a decade ago as a universal recipe for putting corruption higher on the political agenda and to mustering political will and resources. Nevertheless, the results varied. While in some cases, the work on strategies was a catalyst for a genuine progress, in some others, impressive strategies had little or no impact on the situation on the ground.

Therefore, the report is cautious about recommending the adoption of strategies, and it does so only where it appears that the effort of producing a strategy will lead to a positive engagement and significant improvement in cooperation between authorities. Similarly to strategies, anti-corruption agencies have been very much in fashion. Again, diverse results followed. In some cases, where agencies have a strong mandate, independent committed leadership turned out to be the breakthrough development allowing them to prosecute high-level corruption cases.

In other cases, the establishment of agencies might have played a negative role in creating an impression that other authorities do not need to do their share of the work. The report draws attention to the fact that certain authorities that could play a key role in confronting corruption are not adequately equipped with human and financial resources. The Commission is keenly aware that in the current climate of austerity, allocating more resources for certain institutions and implementation efforts may face serious difficulties. However, such allocation may, in certain situations, bring substantial savings over time by reducing the cost of corruption.

The report therefore, in some instances, advocates prioritising the allocation of resources to specific public bodies or programmes of key importance for preventing or fighting corruption. The report does not replicate the detailed, technical analysis included in GRECO or the OECD reports, though it builds upon their recommendations whenever they are still not implemented and relevant to key issues in focus as identified for a particular country chapter.

By bringing to the fore selected recommendations that have been previously identified within other mechanisms, the report aims at promoting their implementation. The Commission is currently taking measures which will allow full accession of the EU in the future, allowing also for closer cooperation in view of subsequent editions of the EU Anti-Corruption Report. R 10 on codes of conduct for public officials and No. R 4 on common rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns. A total of 27 persons representative sample participated in this survey in late February and early March of The survey dealt inter alia with corruption perception generally, personal experience with corruption as well as attitudes towards favours and gifts.

While the Eurobarometer surveys are run every second year since , the Commission decided in to tailor questions to the needs of this report. Therefore, any comparison with previous years should be undertaken with caution. Full report is available at http: Businesses from the energy, healthcare, construction, manufacturing, telecommunications and financial sectors all company sizes were requested to provide their opinion. Some of the Member States which apply asset disclosure systems do not publish all asset declarations. They do however require public officials to submit detailed asset declarations to relevant authorities.

R 10 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on codes of conduct for elected officials:. Each Member State is responsible for the implementation of EU law implementing measures before a specified deadline, conformity and correct application within its own legal system. The European Commission is responsible for ensuring that EU law is correctly applied.

The Commission can launch three types of infringement procedures: Each classification entails different restrictions and obligations. An Integrated Strategy for Preventing and Countering Corruption and Organised Crime was adopted in ,[1] followed by an action plan to prevent corruption in However, efforts against high level corruption have been reactive and formalistic, failing to deliver substantial improvement since EU accession in Bulgaria amended corruption-related provisions in the Criminal Code following ratification of international conventions.

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A draft new Criminal Code was published for consultation in December and presented to Parliament in January Reform efforts have resulted in the establishment of important and sometimes innovative structures to encourage specialisation in the judiciary and police. Since , internal inspectorates of the administration, under the guidance of the Inspectorate General, have been strengthened. Joint teams between investigatory agencies and prosecution should also lead to a more effective response against corruption. There was an overhaul in of police and security services dedicated to fighting corruption and organised crime.