Editorial Reviews. From the Back Cover. This book offers a detailed study of the truth-bearers From the Act of Judging to the Sentence: The Problem of Truth Bearers from Bolzano to Tarski: (Synthese Library) - Kindle edition by Artur Artur was born on March 12, in S?ubice (close to the Polish-German border ).
Table of contents
- Selected Bibliography on Brentano's Contributions to Logic and Ontology. Second Part: L - Z
- Franz Brentano's Ontology - Selected bibliography (L - Z)
- Towards an Atlas of Meaning
Even if the width and the depth of Brentano's intellectual legacy are now well known, those asked to list the principal philosophers of the nineteenth century very rarely mention his name. We may call this puzzle the problem of Brentano's 'invisibility. It is obvious that Brentano's invisibility has serious consequences on assessment of his philosophical theory.
Selected Bibliography on Brentano's Contributions to Logic and Ontology. Second Part: L - Z
The reconstruction of Brentano's thought is still flawed and incomplete. Moreover, Brentano's emphasis on oral teaching, and the meagreness of his published work, compared with the enormous quantity of his manuscripts and correspondence, are also of theoretical importance because they are rooted in Brentano's method of 'doing' philosophy.
We know that the distinguishing feature of his philosophy was its empirical bias, its insistence on rigorous and partial answers rather than on the construction of systems. Given these features, it comes as no surprise that the same problem should be examined on several separate occasions and that different solutions should be proposed for it.
This procedure has a certain amount of inner coherence. Although Brentano always began his analysis with specific topics and problems, he proposed solutions which then reverberated through the entire edifice of his philosophy. This is a manner of philosophising which takes the natural sciences as its model.
These factors also account for the different solutions that Brentano proposed for the problems he addressed. His thought, in fact, displays a continuity of method and a permanence of problems, but not a univocity of solutions.
It is this aspect that allows one to talk of a school of Brentano among his pupils, to detect a 'family resemblance' among philosophers and scholars belonging to different disciplines. That is to say, the school is defined more by problems and the method used in their analysis than by their solutions in the strict sense. One further component of the Brentano puzzle is that a number of Brentano's outstanding pupils achieved their own success and founded their own schools.
The personal success and academic recognition attained by these exponents of Brentano's school in the broad sense have come to obscure their common thematic origins. Nevertheless, Brentano and his school display surprising affinities with Frege and the tradition that he inspired. Perhaps the most interesting reconstruction of these connections is that accomplished by a number of works in German by Paul Linke. It was thought that a survey of Linke's thought might prove useful to English readers. For this reason the book also contains the English translation of his 'Gottlob Frege als Philosoph,' published in , with an introduction by Claire Ortiz Hill.
Last but not least, analyses of the relevance of Brentano's and his followers' theses for contemporary philosophical and scientific debate are also considered. As far as the relation to the object exists, it is infallible - contrary to the fallible directedness at an external object. Brentanian intentionality is based on the evidence, and does not allow for degrees. Brentano has been careful to delimit his project of "Psychognosie" from the physical and from the physiological.
The thesis of intentional gradation is discussed, which allows for three degrees. The first form of intentionality involves simple tropisms. The second grade of intentionality is the one of generality, as opposed to specificity and particularity. The third intentional grade would enable directedness to the singular. As human organisms only are able to entertain directedness to the singular, brentanian intentionality would fall under the second kind of directedness, the one involving generality. Supposition that this thesis is right might then lead to the question whether Brentano really described intentionality specific for human organisms.
A Study of Franz Brentano. From the Act of Judging to the Sentence. Reprinted with the title: Brentano and Husserl on Imagination in: Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano. Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl. Though Meinong's philosophical investigations from early on were very Brentanian in character, he came to develop views that diverged from certain doctrines of his mentor.
In epistemology Meinong introduced the notion of immediate evidence of surmise in his views on memory and perception, whereas Brentano found this notion unacceptable. In descriptive psychology Meinong regarded feelings and desires as two distinct classes and introduced an additional class of mental phenomena called "assumptions". Thus he opposed Brentano's classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate. In ontology Meinong allowed for non-real objects. In value theory he even introduced the notion of special irrealia corresponding to feelings and desires.
Brentano, however, came to reject irrealia altogether. Such differences are discussed here, but attention is also given to the underlying and enduring philosophical affinity between Meinong and Brentano, namely their commitment to the ideal of scientific philosophy as attainable through descriptive psychology what might be called "descriptive phenomenology" , which is concerned with intentionally directed consciousness as its subject matter and does not in any way differ methodologically from natural science.
Studi Sulla Logica Dei Brentaniani. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of Being to on legetai pollachos. The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano. Chisholm , edited by Hahn, Lewis. It will be shown that neither the pre-reistic Brentano espoused anything of an ontological account of the intentional object in that he both distinguished it sharply from the intentional correlate and definitely rejected the idea of there being different sorts of existence, and it will be argued that the apparently ineradicable inclination to ascribe to the pre-reistic Brentano an ontological account of the intentional object stems from ignoring the Aristotelian background of Brentano's thinking about relations.
Schaar, Maria van der. Selected essays - Dordrecht, Kluwer pp. In later texts Brentano appears sharply critical of Aristotle, mainly in respect to Aristotle's mereology, or theory of part and whole, and to his theory of substance and accident. It is argued that Brentano hadn't observed that Aristotle's belief that there are as many predicative senses of 'be' as there are categories of being is based not on his mereology but on his theory of definition.
Overlooking this Brentano was led to far reaching inadequate ontological consequences. He is rightly celebrated as the person who reintroduced the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion of intentio back into the study of the mind. Brentano's inspiration was Aristotle's theory of perception in De anima, though his terminology of intentional inexistence was medieval.
For the history of the work and its position in his output may I refer to my Introduction to the reprinted English translation. Alongside Aristotle the work shows influences of Descartes, Comte and the British empiricists. The theory of intentionality presented in the Psychology is much less modern and less plausible than almost all recent commentary would have it, and was in any case not where Brentano's main interest lay.
Intentionality simply served to demarcate mental phenomena from physical, in Book One, but the main aim was a classification of the mental, outlined in Book Two. Books Three to Five were to have dealt in detail with the three main classes of presentations, judgements and feelings, with the final book considering the metaphysics: Brentano's shifting views, recently documented in English with Benito Muller's translation of Descriptive Psychology, a work from the transitional s, made the original plan obsolete. The role of an a priori, philosophical or descriptive psychology, methodologically prior to empirical-experimental genetic psychology, foreshadowed and influenced Husserl's notion of phenomenology, and Brentano's Comtean methodological epoche of desisting from controversial metaphysical statements in favour of an examination of the phenomena likewise presaged Husserl's more ponderous phenomenological reductions.
Brentano's other work covers most areas of philosophy, notably ethics, where he upheld a form of a priori intuitionism much admired by G. Moore, the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, philosophy of language, deductive and inductive logic, and the history of philosophy. I shall mention just two areas. In his logic lectures from onwards a compilation published Brentano rejected the subject-predicate analysis of simple judgements and proposed instead for which he apparently secured written assent from Mill that all judgements are logical compounds of positive and negative existential judgements.
For example the universal judgement All men are mortal becomes the negative existential There are no immortal men. On this basis Brentano radically simplified the inference rules of deductive logic. While unlike de Morgan, Frege and others he does not go beyond logic's traditional scope by recognising relations, within its bounds his reformed-term logic is simple, elegant and easily teachable. Some of his ideas in logic influenced the young Husserl.
Unfortunately Brentano took against mathematical logic, which he wrongly associated exclusively with Hamilton's confused doctrine of the quantification of the predicate. His inductive logic, which takes up by far the greater part of his logic lectures, remains unresearched to this day. Brentano's Theory and Austria's History. Brentano and the Reform of Elementary Logic. A Study in Descriptive Psychology.
A Study in Aristotle and Brentano. The overarching context of all Brentano's writings is the psychology of Aristotle and the ontology of material and immaterial substance that goes together therewith.
The present remarks will accordingly consist in an account of Aristotle, and more specifically of Aristotle's conception of the soul, as reflected by Brentano in his Psychology of Aristotle , Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Descriptive Psychology. An Investigation in Brentanian Ontology. Logic, Semantics and Ontology , edited by Wolenski, Jan, It is with this last that we shall be principally concerned in what follows, and more precisely with Brentano's own account of the part-whole structures obtaining in the mental sphere.
The Legacy of Franz Brentano. But there is no specifiable part of the continuum, and no point, which is such that we may say that it is the existence of that part or of that point which conditions the boundary. This leads to consequences in other areas, too. The Development of the Concept of Intentionality. Revised by the author and translated in: Second revised edition ; Third expanded edition with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann Franz Brentano forerunner of the phenomenological movement - pp. It was in connection with this attempt that he first developed his celebrated doctrine of intentionality as the decisive constituent of psychological phenomena.
The sentence in which he introduces the term 'intentionality' is of such crucial importance that I shall render it here in literal translation: Each contains something as its object, though not each in the same manner. In the representation Vorstellung something is represented, in the judgment something is acknowledged or rejected, in desiring it is desired, etc. This intentional inexistence is peculiar alone to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything like it.
Franz Brentano's Ontology - Selected bibliography (L - Z)
And thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain objects in themselves by way of intention intentional. While a quick reading of the passage may seem to confirm this view, it is nevertheless misleading. But it is precisely this conception which Brentano himself did not share, or which in any case he abandoned, to the extent of finally even dropping the very term 'intentionality. It was certainly none of Brentano's doing that this new wholly unscholastic conception came to sail under the old flag of 'intentionality.
No hearing without something heard, no believing without something believed, no hoping without something hoped, no striving without something striven for, no joy without something we feel joyous about, etc.
Physical phenomena are characterized, by contrast, as lacking such references. It also becomes clear at this point that Brentano's psychological phenomena are always acts, taking this term in a very broad sense which comprises experiences of undergoing as well as of doing, states of consciousness as well as merely transitory processes. Here, then, Brentano for the first time uncovered a structure which was to become one of the basic patterns for all phenomenological analysis.
Its significance is both biographical and philosophical. Biographically it shows Brentano's tolerant friendship for his emancipated student and Husserl's unwavering veneration for his only philosophical teacher. The philosophical issues taken up are Euclidean axiomatics, Husserl's departure from Brentano in the Logical Investigations by distinguishing two types of logic as the way out from psychologism, and the possibility of negative presentations, but not Husserl's new phenomenology. Few agreements are reached, but the dissents were clarified.
Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth. From Psychology to Phenomenology: A Comparison of Aristotle and Brentano. Reprinted with revisions, in: Linda McAlister - The philosophy of Brentano - pp. Objections are raised to interpretations that depend on a parallel between Urteil and assertion of a proposition. A more appropriate parallel is drawn between the assertion as subject to description in a metalanguage and the Urteil as secondary object in inner perception. This parallel is then applied so as to suggest a reinterpretation of substitutional quantification, rendering the substitutional interpretation immune to problems that often arise as to the relation between substitutional range and referential range.
A New Survey - Vol. However, it is still an open question how it is best understood. It is widely held that according to Brentano a mental act is conscious iff it is self-presenting. In contrast, I will argue that Brentano holds that a mental act x is conscious iff it is unified with an immediately evident cognition 'Erkenntnis' of x. If one understands Brentano's theory in this way, it promises to shed light on standard problems for theories of inner consciousness. A One-Level Theory of Consciousness. The problem stems from the fact that Brentano's works, letters, manuscripts, memoirs, etc.
Moreover some Brentano's scholars, namely Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrandt, were incorrect in their method in publishing the philosopher's works. Namely, they misinterpreted his earlier works by incorporating numerous interpolations from different time periods as being the philosopher's final thoughts. It is hoped that this paper goes some way in resolving the said errors and coupled with the continue discovery of new material that the jigsaw of Brentano's works and thinking shall someday be correctly completed.
Translation by Arthur Szylewicz of a review of F. Brentano, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand published in: Przelom , 11 II August 3 , Vienna, pp.
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Brentano's interpretation of the formula veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus and of the principle ens et verum convertuntur is shown to fit into the history of these principles and into modern interpretations like that of Tarski. Austro-Polish contributions to the theory of truth from Brentano to Tarski, ], which contains a short discussion of Brentano's arguments against the theory of truth based on the concept of a correspondence between truth-bearers and reality or its appropriate portions.
In that paper we attempt to show that Tarski's conception successfully meets Brentano's objections. There are several reasons for doing this. First, the renaissance of Brentano's own philosophy and Brentanism in general requires that his arguments deserve considerable attention. Secondly, Brentano's arguments against the correspondence theory of truth have become part of philosophical folklore. Thirdly, Tarski's semantic truth-definition, despite the reservations raised by several authors, is often considered as a possible modern interpretation of the classical theory of truth. Fourth, Tarski's theory of truth is deeply rooted in the Brentanian theoretical tradition, independent of Tarski's own philosophical consciousness.
The author locates Tarski's ideas in a broad context of Austrian philosophy, in particular, Brentano's tradition. Bolzano and phenomenology Husserl and Reinach are also taken into account. The historical perspective is completed by showing how Tarski was rooted in Polish philosophical tradition originated with Twardowski and his version of Brentanism.
The historical considerations are the basis for showing how the idea of truth-bearers as acts of judging was transformed into the theory of truth-bearers as sentences. In particular, the author analyses the way to nominalism in Polish philosophy, culminating in Lesniewski, Kotarbinski and Tarski. This book is indispensable for everybody interested in the evolution of Austrian philosophy from descriptive psychology to semantics. It is also a fundamental contribution toward a deeper understanding of the philosophical background of Tarski's theory of truth.
Publications of Artur Rojszczak. Klappentext This book offers a detailed study of the truth-bearers problem, that is, the question of which category of items the predicates 'true' and 'false' are predicated. However, Bolzano and phenomenology Husserl and Reinach are also taken into account. In this case, however, although the latter remains, the former has been effaced. Inawell-ordered world Artur Rojszczak would have perhaps one day written tributes to ourselves. Verlag Springer Verlag Gmbh.
Reihe Synthese Library Hardcover , Kategorie Geisteswissenschaften, Kunst, Musik. Sachgebiet Geisteswissenschaften, Kunst, Musik Philosophie. The Ambiguity of Tarski's Concept of a Sentence.
Towards an Atlas of Meaning
Alfred Tarski as Philosopher? Some Facts and Genetic Connections. Brentanism in Tarski's Philosophical Background? Tarski and the Vienna Circle. The Content of the Study. The Notion of the Truth Bearer. The Problem of the Truth Bearer. The Definition of the Truth Bearer. The Variety of Truth Bearers. The Act of Judging as the Truth Bearer. The Truth of the Object of Presenting. Thinking and True Objectives. The Object of Thinking. The Content of a Judgment. Summary of Chapter 3: Judgement, Psychology, and Language. The Use of Linguistic Expressions.