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Table of contents

The Middle East, as defined in this book, comprises eighteen states, stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Probing the role of the military in each state, the author assesses such other factors as the geographical and regional influences on specific national developments. Dominating all are the ramifications of the competing American and Soviet policies for the region.

Through his analysis of the cold war tactics of the two Great Powers, and of the bewildering arms races and the confusion of military politics that these tactics have engendered, Professor Hurewitz brings into much clearer perspective the options for the West, and particularly for the United States, in this area.


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He has provided, in sum, an informative and fully documented study of the whole interplay of domestic, regional, and international politics in the postwar Middle East. The Islamic Tradition. The Beginnings of Military Modernization. European Imperial Styles. Military Politics and the Lingering Cold. Armies in Postwar Politics. Triumph of Sanusi Leadership. Born in India 85 years ago. The British dished out my birthplace to Pakistan as a parting gift. Till then sun never used to set on the British Empire but these days it hardly rises there. I was impressed with the Boston Tea Party episode, and was ashamed that my countrymen did not unite for their freedom.

In I applied for migration and received approval under preference III, immediately, may be because I had an Engineering background. My credentials included First B. Only 26 were successful, and I had the honor of a dancing swirl with shy Princess Elizabeth the present Queen of England, because Princess Margaret quickly tapped my shoulder and whisked me away. A rule-based order that is the result of a grand bargain voluntarily struck among the major actors who, therefore, view the order as legitimate and beneficial.

Randall L. Schweller

It is a highly institutionalized order, ensuring that the hegemon will remain engaged in managing the order but will not exercise its power capriciously. In this way, a negotiated rule-based order places limits on the returns to power, especially with respect to the hegemon. An imposed order. A non-voluntary order among unequal actors purposefully designed and ruled by a malign despotic hegemon, whose power is unchecked. The Soviet satellite system is an exemplar of this type of order. A spontaneously generated order.

Order is an unintended consequence of actors seeking only to maximize their interests and power. It is an automatic or self-regulating system. Power is checked by countervailing power, thereby placing limits on the returns to power. The classic 18th century European balance of power is an exemplar of this type of order. The predictability of a social system depends, among other things, on its degree of complexity, whether its essential mechanisms are automatic or volitional, and whether the system requires key members to act against their short-run interests in order to work properly.

As such, how they actually perform when confronted with a disturbance that trips the alarm, so to speak, will be highly unpredictable.

In This Article

In contrast, the operation of a balance-of-power system is fairly automatic and therefore highly predictable. It simply requires that states, seeking to survive and thrive in a competitive, self-help realm, pursue their short-run interests; that is, states seek power and security, as they must in an anarchic order. Here, I do not mean to suggest that balance-of-power systems always function properly and predictably.

Balancing can be late, uncertain, or nonexistent. These types of balancing maladies, however, typically occur when states consciously seek to opt out of a balance-of-power system, as happened in the interwar period, but then fail to replace it with a functioning alternative security system. The result is that a balance-of-power order, which may be viewed as a default system that arises spontaneously, in the absence or failure of concerted arrangements among all the units of the system to provide for their collective security, eventually emerges but is not accomplished as efficiently as it otherwise would have been.

There have been several recent challenges to the conventional realist wisdom that balancing is more prevalent than bandwagoning behavior, that is, when states join the stronger or more threatening side. Similarly, I have claimed that bandwagoning behavior is more prevalent than contemporary realists have led us to believe because alliances among revisionist states, whose behavior has been ignored by modern realists, are driven by the search for profit, not security.

Balances of power sometimes form, but there is no general tendency toward this outcome. Nor do states generally balance against threats.

The Balance of Power in World Politics

States frequently wait, bandwagon, or, much less often, balance. Two popular explanations for buck-passing behavior are structural-systemic ones. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder claim that great powers under multipolarity will buck-pass when they perceive defensive advantage; while John Mearsheimer argues that buck-passing occurs primarily in balanced multipolar systems, especially among great powers that are geographically insulated from the aggressor. Along these lines, it is important to point out that, when we speak of balancing and other competing responses to growing power, we are actually referring to four distinct categories of behavior.

First, there is appropriate balancing , which occurs when the target is a truly dangerous aggressor that cannot or should not be appeased. Second, there is inappropriate balancing , which unnecessarily triggers a costly and dangerous arms spiral because the target is misperceived as an aggressor but is, in fact, a defensively minded state seeking only to enhance its security. These policies may be quite prudent and rational when the state is thereby able to avoid the costs of war either by satisfying the legitimate grievances of the revisionist state or allowing others to satisfy them, or by letting others defeat the aggressor while safely remaining on the sidelines.

Moreover, if the state also seeks revision, then it may wisely choose to bandwagon with the potential aggressor in the hope of profiting from its success in overturning the established order. Finally, there is an unusual state of affairs, such as those we live under today, in which one state is so overwhelmingly powerful that there can be said to exist an actual harmony of interests between the hegemon or unipole and the rest of the great powers—those that could either one day become peer competitors or join together to balance against the predominant power.

The other states do not balance against the hegemon because they are too weak individually and collectively and, more important, because they perceive their well being as inextricably tied up with the well-being of the hegemon. In these cases, the underbalancing state not only does not avoid the costs of war but also brings about a war that could have been avoided or makes the war more costly than it otherwise would have been or both.

Since the end of the Cold War, many scholars of international politics have come to believe that realism and the balance of power are now obsolete. Liberal critics charge that, while power balancing may have been appropriate to a bygone era, international politics has been transformed as democracy extends its sway, as interdependence tightens its grip, and as institutions smooth the way to peace.

If other states do arise over the coming decades to become peer competitors of the United States, the world will not return to a multipolar balance of power system but rather will enter a new multipartner phase. It was a day of balances of power.

While I suspect that social constructivists would agree with most if not all of the arguments posed by the liberal challenge to realism, the thrust of their attack is more conceptual and theoretically oriented. Social constructivists, like Michael Barnett, charge that Walt, having shattered neorealist theory, does not go far enough in defining the ideational elements that determine threats and alliances. Ideology and ideas about identity and norms are, according to social constructivists, often the most important sources of threat perception, as well as the primary basis for alliance formation itself.

Finally, even self-described realists wonder if balance of power still operates in the contemporary world, at least at the global level. Today, nuclear arsenals assure great powers of the ultimate invulnerability of their sovereignty. Balance of power is a theory deeply rooted in a territorial view of wealth and security—a world that no longer exists.

Account Options

Barnett, M. Identity and alliances in the Middle East. Katzenstein Eds. New York: Columbia University Press. Find this resource:. Betts, R. Systems for peace or causes of war? Collective security, arms control, and the new Europe. International Security , 17 1 , 5— Brooks, S. Hard times for soft balancing.

International Security , 30 1 , 72— World out of balance: International relations and the challenge of American primacy.

Bull, H. The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics. Carr, E. New York: Harper and Row. Christensen, T. Chain gangs and passed bucks: Predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity. International Organization , 44 2 , — Claude, I. Power and international relations. New York: Random House. The balance of power revisited. Review of International Studies , 15 2 , 77— Clinton, H. Foreign policy address at the council on foreign relations , U.

Dehio, L.

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The precarious balance: Four centuries of the European power struggle. Fullman, Trans. Gould, S. Grieco, Joseph M. Cooperation among nations: Europe, America, and non-tariff barriers to trade. Gulick, E. New York: Norton.