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Table of contents
These would roughly be the paradigmatic and syntagmatic dimensions of language respectively. Competence here would consist in knowing how to make moves in this game; which is to say, knowing how to form sentences or engage in speech-acts. We can think of philosophies as similar to games and languages in this respect.
One shows competence in any one of these games not when they can cite the intricacies of these philosophies chapter and verse, but rather when they can make a new move within those games according to the rules governing the game. Compare the Plato game and the Epicurean game, for example. Suppose we were to ask whether or not it is ethical to do the drug MDMA or ecstasy? One need only think of the famous dance scene in The Matrix Reloaded to discern the power of the drum and bass.
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In Epicurus the goal of the game is to live the most pleasurable life possible because pleasure is the moral good and to minimize anxiety as much as we can. It is likely that he would see it as being a negative impact on all these fronts and would thus argue that the prudent person should reject it.
All of this seems remote from issues of metanoia; however, a few things are of interest here.
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For Heidegger, truth as aletheia is not a correspondence between a proposition or statement and the independent reality that it depicts, but is rather a revealing or disclosure. As Avanessian and Hennig repeatedly remind us, disclosure is a dual relation between a subject or self and a world. Compare three examples: the mechanic that works at a privately owned garage, the investor, and the Marxist sociologist.
She grasps those tools in terms of their purpose and their use. When the investor enters the shop, he probably pays little notice to the tools and certainly has little understanding or comprehension of what they are for. He might not really notice them at all except in a vague and fuzzy way.
Like the investor, the tools about the garage are more or less a mystery for him. However, unlike the investor our Marxist sociologist would be particularly attentive to what the working day is like for the mechanics and whether or not the way the wealth produced by the garage is justly distributed. The worlds that each are talking about, while overlapping in some respects, are nonetheless divergent. With Heidegger, we can thus say that with every disclosure there is also a veiling.
Other worlds are hidden.
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And is this not what we perpetually see in philosophy? What, then, does the concept of metanoia as developed by Avanessian and Hennig bring to the table? In approaching philosophy as something that is not so much about the world as something that brings a world into being, it seems to me that they present us with a sort of meta-philosophy or philosophy of philosophies.
In politics, for example, we often occupy ourselves with the question of how to make the winning move. In this respect, the deep structure of power remains in place; for power is not to be measured so much by which side holds the advantage, but rather by the structure—the rules, the grammar, the pieces— that preside over the game or the relations themselves. Their answer seems to be yes and their name for this answer is metanoia.
What strategies can we devise to accomplish this aim? Jean-Jacques Rousseau. But can we ever regain the former perspective? To see the world with new eyes means that our thinking has changed forever. The question can thus directly be answered in the negative: an earlier understanding is no longer accessible to a new way of thinking. Understanding and not understanding switch positions. The new understanding overwrites the old one, that is to say, the new understanding entails not understanding the previous understanding.
Metanoia is more than just a problem of understanding; it shifts an existing relation of thinking and world. To express a new thought also always means inventing a new language game appropriate to that thought.
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Language is not arbitrary, however obvious such arbitrariness may seem to contemporary theorists of language. Instead, each and every part of language is tied into an ever-developing system. Language develops our understanding of the world in the same way and to the same extent that it continues to develop itself. The principle of language is not arbitrariness but contingency.
Language, in other words, develops within a continually changing framework of possibilities constituted by its ties to thinking and the world. Metanoia is a fundamental transformation of the mind. What does that mean? What happens in metanoia?
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We read a book and cannot put it down. We read a book and when we stop reading, we have changed. Once we have stopped reading, the world itself has changed because of our reading. Through metanoia, we become intellectuals; metanoia makes philosophers philosophers; through metanoia, literary scholars become the literary scholars they are; basically, metanoia has made us all who we have become. Metanoia touches on and creates the existential core of thinking. Without metanoia, that is, without having been a Deleuzian, say, or a Lacanian, without ever having understood everything really understood everything!
Metanoia does not just bring about change—it institutes reality. In every metanoia, an elementary epistemological situation emerges in which the new subject and the world change at the same time. A third element—an other—always participates in this emergence that transforms subject and object equally. That is why thinking about metanoia compels us to go beyond a structuralist universe determined by oppositions: how thinking goes beyond thinking becomes intelligible only if we replace all descriptions of dyadic epistemic situations with descriptions of triadic epistemic situations.
The engagement with metanoia furthermore compels us both to reformulate the connection of cognition and language and to understand this connection as the question of the mutability of thinking and the plasticity of our brains. Language plays every conceivable part in metanoia, as an everyday phenomenon in natural language , as an artifact in literature , as a social practice in speech , and, not least of all, as a mental structure and form of knowledge as logos.
Yet what metanoia confronts us with above all and in a unique way is the poietic function of language. How can we account for the fact that, in extreme cases, all it takes to change the world is reading a single book? An inquiry into metanoia necessarily leads to the question of how an ontology of language is possible. This book is a philosophical book about why metanoia is possible and about the conclusions to be drawn from its existence.
Nor do we encounter metanoia at the level of our knowledge, just as we cannot grasp it by reading phenomenological descriptions or by understanding historical facts. That is why this book can only be written at the level of our experience. The philosophical challenge in writing it is to develop a way of thinking that avoids falling behind this experience. Yet it is not to be thought of as an aesthetic experience; more precisely: it may be perceived as aesthetic, but that tells us nothing about what happens in metanoia.
How else could we explain that a phenomenon all philosophers have been so familiar with has remained invisible for so long? Granted, we, too, are not writing about metanoia, we are writing of metanoia, writing of a thinking that changes thinking.
We are interested in this change, and to this extent ours is a philosophical book that reacts to a problem, to an experience that makes thinking itself problematic. Just think of the debate between proponents of hermeneutics and of deconstruction or the enduring rift between so-called continental philosophy and analytic philosophy.
The nominalism of the analytic philosophy of language has led both linguistics and philosophy to a dead end, which is why it is now being revised by contemporary linguistic and philosophical theories. Both are united in their resistance to the thesis that language is arbitrary, a thesis that creates a rift between language and the world. Because of its immanent knowledge, language can claim a higher degree of realism than our perception, which presents us with things alone.