Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception

PDF | On Feb 6, , S. Gallagher and others published Reading Merleau- Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception, edited by Thomas Baldwin.
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Purchase Subscription prices and ordering Short-term Access To purchase short term access, please sign in to your Oxford Academic account above. Only arguments can furnish decisive proof, but only descriptive sensitivity can guarantee the pertinence of analytical argument to real-world phenomena actually motivating philosophical reflection. The third and fourth essays form an interesting exchange between Komarine Romdenh-Romluc and Hubert Dreyfus concerning the role of thought in action. Merleau-Ponty regards perception and bodily movement as essentially intertwined, two sides of a coin; thought is a derivative phenomenon occurring against a background of perception and behavior, not a necessary ingredient for action.

Dreyfus is well known for emphasizing the role of unreflective, nondeliberate, subintentional "absorbed coping skills," marshalling Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty against the widespread cognitivist assumption that intelligent action must be driven by thought. And yet surely thought can and often does motivate action, not just when skillful coping breaks down, but simply because an idea occurs to us and we act on it.

Thomas Baldwin (ed.), Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception - PhilPapers

Such episodes are not ubiquitous, but they are perfectly ordinary, and Romdenh-Romluc worries that Dreyfus has left no room for them in his version of Merleau-Ponty's account. In reply, Dreyfus concedes that neither he nor Merleau-Ponty has an explicit theory of cognitive motivation, but suggests that Romdenh-Romluc has perhaps drawn too sharp a distinction between absorbed coping and thought-driven action.

True, Merleau-Ponty says nothing about what makes detached reflection and deliberate action possible. Still, his phenomenology arguably has the resources to describe intelligent lateral shifts of attention within a situation. A certain degree of thought or deliberation, that is, might emerge not from "stepping back" and disengaging from one's current tasks, but from maintaining a horizonal sensitivity to affordances lying on the fringes of one's immediate focused concern.

Dreyfus is right to stress this kind of lateral or background responsiveness to the environment, indeed this is just what Merleau-Ponty calls "motor intentionality," our abiding awareness of being open to an environment with stable horizons. Victims of brain damage suffering from visual form agnosia, like Kurt Goldstein's patient "Schneider," who figures prominently in the Phenomenology , lack that open perceptual awareness and seem virtually blind to all but those affordances that happen to be directly geared into their current bodily behavior.

In the fifth essay, "The Phenomenology of Social Rules," Mark Wrathall offers an account of a form of "motivation" that Merleau-Ponty insists is neither causal nor rational, but something in between. More specifically, Wrathall urges that our actions can be governed by rules even when we are not applying or following those rules, and even though our behavior is not just indirectly caused by them, as on Searle's theory of "the Background. Wrathall's account strikes me as phenomenologically correct, but just a bit metaphysically worrisome.

In many cases of normative responsiveness, he says, "the rule is actually present in the things themselves" But is it the rule itself that is present in such situations? A rule, it seems to me, is just what is stated in an explicit statement of the rule. My responsiveness, by contrast, need not have the articulated structure of such a canonical statement. What we ought to say, then, it seems to me, is not that I am directly responsive to a rule that is somehow present in the situation itself, but that what I am sensitive to is something more like a normative aspect or feature of the world that in turn bears a social or historical relation to the rule as explicitly stated.

Rules imbue the world with a certain normative texture, we might say, but it is that often vague, indeterminate texture that directly motivates my behavior; what my behavior is tracking is not the rule as such, but the more palpable normative grooves in the social world it has, so to speak, left in its wake. This is why, in order to be truly responsive to laws as such in any very fine-grained way, you need a lawyer, not just good instincts. Our behavior is governed by laws, but not because laws directly inhabit the mundane social world, but because we are responsive to the less determinate norms and customs that have in turn been shaped by those laws.

Lecture 01 of 31 Hubert Dreyfus on Merleau Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception

Social rules generally, it seems to me, are often mediated by a distinct form of normativity that is not equivalent to the articulate structure of the rules themselves. Thomas Baldwin's "Speaking and Spoken Speech" is a helpful explanation of Merleau-Ponty's distinction between two aspects of language: Baldwin suggests, plausibly, that Merleau-Ponty moved from a somewhat uncritical emphasis on the primacy and autonomy of the former to a more balanced notion, otherwise associated with Wittgenstein and Derrida, that even free expression can occur only within a publicly intelligible linguistic institution or system of signs.

I'm placing it in the very highest tier I can offer--the most distinctive, singular ranking I can give it in my shelves. A spot where it will rub shoulders with maybe only other books--those being my top picks from the entire field of philosophy. I close this hierarchy to all but a select few. To be included, a title must contain what I feel is the most salient and relevant wisdom to offer our lives today. Here are the others: If only every child in North America could read this and some empirical, vernacular juggernaut such as Robert Burton's "Melancholy" before the age of eighteen View all 4 comments.

When we want to analyze perception, we transport these objects into consciousness.


  1. Phenomenology of Perception by Maurice Merleau-Ponty!
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We build perception out of the perceived. And since the perceived is obviously only accessible through perception, in the end we understand neither. What begins as an exploration of perception - one which interjects the body between consciousness and When we want to analyze perception, we transport these objects into consciousness.

What begins as an exploration of perception - one which interjects the body between consciousness and the world and institutes it as both Subject and Object, simultaneously - and through much of part two restructures the way one views their interaction with the world and their relation with the world - eventually attempts to encompass the complication of the perceptive Other which mostly closes part two.

I'll admit, some of the stuff M-P tackled towards the end of part two and the beginning of part three went over my head; that's okay, I always aim to take what I can away from these texts and hopefully revisit them renewed some later day to gain more from them. Some of that later stuff I felt was reaching, but I reserve that judgment based on my own imperfect understanding. In its own way this book has altered the way in which I at least think about my interaction with and my interaction in the world.

I suppose that's all I ask. I would survey the world from above, and far from all places and times suddenly becoming real, they would in fact cease to be real because I would not inhabit any of them and I would be nowhere engaged. If I am always and everywhere, then I am never and nowhere. Thus, there is no choice between the incompleteness of the world and its existence, between the engagement and the ubiquity of consciousness, or between transcendence and immanence, since each of these terms, when it is affirmed by itself makes its contradiction appear.

What must be understood is that for the same reason I am present here and now, and present elsewhere and always, or absent from here and now and absent from every place and from every time. This ambiguity is not an imperfection of consciousness or of existence, it is their very definition. Nov 02, Joshua Stein rated it really liked it Shelves: Merleau-Ponty is, for me, the best writer in phenomenology since Husserl, who created the damned thing. While Phenomenology of Perception is clearly a product of its time, and the available psychology, the amount of interesting work that Merleau-Ponty is able to do in what is essentially proto-cognitive science is very impressive.

One of the things that really struck me in reading Merleau-Ponty was the realization of how extensive his impact is on what is easily just written off as an "analytic" philosophy of mind. Many of the case studies that he discusses are a major part of the writing of Dan Dennett and the arguments that he lays out against neuro-centric views of mind are basically the same as the views that contemporary neuro-centrists are still arguing against. Writers who focus on the debates in philosophy of mind are still unable to shake the influence of Merleau-Ponty, and as someone very interested in that discussion, it was pretty incredible to look at what has stayed the same, in many ways, in contemporary study.

There are a lot of good ways to enter into this book, as a reader. If you're new to philosophy of mind, but not to continental philosophy, it will give a nice preface to early philosophy of mind and discussions of consciousness. If you're experienced in philosophy of mind, but just starting off in continental philosophy, this gives a nice bridge that maintains a good portion of the data that you're familiar with and shows how the data can be assessed through the processes of phenomenology.

If you're engaged with both, this makes a great read as a point of interest in the history of philosophical traditions. I strongly, strongly recommend the read.

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I do think that the most important thing to attend to, as a reader of the book, is Merleau-Ponty's lengthy footnotes. The most interesting one, for me, is the extensive discussion of dialectical materialism and the way that phenomenologists who aren't sympathetic to Marx understand the metaphysics of that approach. Merleau-Ponty is very philosophically dense, so this really isn't good for those who are just entering philosophy.

I do think that it is useful to have a background in some phenomenology, even if it is just a passing familiarity with Husserl or Heidegger. Sep 21, Andrew added it Shelves: From what I comprehended of the Phenomenology of Perception, it is a stunning, absolutely stunning work of philosophy-- rigorous and scientific while at the same time very aware of the limits of human knowledge, radical without devolving into cant, deeply humanistic, and, unsurprisingly, exceptionally perceptive.

This book is a seriously steep climb, laden as it is with multi-page arguments and reports of neurological research, but that climb delivers the reader to a very high Alpine meadow of intellect. Dec 06, Lance rated it it was amazing Shelves: First, I must admit it took me many months to read this book. Frankly, I can only handle one chapter at time. But like many such books, the work pays off as one slowly reflects on the slow, detailed exposition of a philosophy.

In some ways, I see this book as a sequel to Schopenhauer's World of Will and Representation a book that takes even longer to read. Merleau-Ponty takes the world of representation -- or perception -- and deeply explores how consciousness arises, not as a thing itself, b First, I must admit it took me many months to read this book.

Merleau-Ponty takes the world of representation -- or perception -- and deeply explores how consciousness arises, not as a thing itself, but within the world.

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Most importantly for me, Merleau-Ponty is revising the Cartesian subjectivity, which is the foundation for much of Western philosophy, science, and comparative work -- and also the root of many ideologies and problems we've struggled with for several centuries. As the world becomes more "globalized" and interrelated, it will be important that new approaches to science, theory, and cultural studies start with this revised Cartesian subject.

In short, Merleau-Ponty shows that our consciousness can not exist in and of itself; the very core of consciousness is intersubjectivity. This may seem like a small point, but it completely revolutionizes how we think and act in the world, particularly as academics and scientists. What many religions have asserted for a very long time, Merleau-Ponty gives philosophical and methodological weight. Apr 22, Ann Michael rated it really liked it. Not an easy read, but a thought-provoking book.

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Merleau-Ponty essentially sets forth reasons to rethink philosophy's approaches in an age of science and psychology; not a call to end philosophy or render it irrelevant, though. He suggests that philosophy as a discipline can become MORE relevant if philosophers admit of phenomena and look to the ontology of being as an aspect of phenomena.

He's not a reductionist; though he is often classed with the existentialists, he's not that, either. Nor wou Not an easy read, but a thought-provoking book. Nor would he agree with E. Might be a great book to read along with the works of Oliver Sacks. Nov 13, Gizem Kendik added it. Fortemente influenzato da Husserl, da Scheler, e dalla Gestalpsychologie, Merleau-Ponty riscrive totalmente il nostro modo di porci nei confronti dell'esistenza, e in particolar modo dell'oggetto percepito, proponendo un ritorno ad una percezione primordiale, sulla falsariga del motto husserliano "Alle cose stesse!

Prendiamo una macchia bianca su uno sfondo omogeneo. Tutti i punti della macchia hanno in comune una certa "funzione" che fa di essi una "figura". Parte prima - Capitolo V: Molto descrittiva, ma non per questo meno interessante, la seconda parte, in cui Merleau-Ponty esplora lo spazio, condizionato anche dagli sviluppi delle geometrie dette non euclidee: Parte seconda - Capitolo II: Mai come oggi abbiamo bisogno di sentirci dire che gli altri hanno importanza per noi.

Infatti, Merleau-Ponty chiude l'analisi con un bellissimo capitolo incentrato sul superamento del conflitto tra coscienze elaborato da Sartre: Ma qui si deve tacere: Parte terza - Capitolo III: Per ritrovare noi stessi sotto una nuova ottica: Nonostante sia un testo consistente, vale tutto il tempo necessario a leggerlo e ad interiorizzarlo: Sep 09, Otto Lehto rated it really liked it. This could, and undoubtedly necessary will, cloud my judgment.

So take my conclusions with a grain of salt. It carries heavy traces of Husserl and Heidegger in it. And of course Sartre. Then again, all the great philosophers have always subverted tradition. The notion of the primacy of the intentional body is utilized to overcome the subject-object dualism. There is no mystical union, here: The whole analysis is elaborate and a bit all over the place, but the basic point is well-made.

As is typical of the French tradition, the language turns occasionally very poetic and literary.


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    • Rhetorical flourish, and a good quip, is preferred over analytical intelligibility, and a simple syllogism. This is the difference between the German-French and the Anglo-Saxon traditions. The worst-reading parts are influenced by the tortuous language of Hegel, but as long as one is comfortable with its off-putting terminology - such as "for itself" and "in itself" - the methodology that Merleau-Ponty uses is, all things considered, relatively rational. There are no wild leaps of logic, just a few wild goose chases. Arguments are happily sprinkled full of real-life examples, literary quotations, and even references to empirical Gestalt psychology.

    Although not a philosophical masterpiece in the league of, say, Heidegger's "Being and Time", Phenomenology of Perception is, nonetheless, one of the essential works of the 20th Century. I give it 4 stars because it is, to put it bluntly, too meandering and too unoriginal. It also seems to relish in its repetition of the same questions from a multitude of angles.

    This befits a philosophy aiming to bring us back to the "Ur-Presence" of our primary phenomenology, but it sometimes feels like a series of disjointed diary entries, rather than a single logical whole. So, to sum up my criticism: A fact perhaps made worse in translation. It would have been a better book with tighter editing and a more focused structure. Such looseness, alas, is a common problem in French philosophy - but this doesn't excuse Merleau-Ponty's falling into the same trap. Some chapters are better than others. It is not the most original of works, even if it revolutionized the way we approach, or interpret, phenomenology.

    Merleau-Ponty did not completely extricate himself from the Husserlian-Cartesian projects. He simply wanted to follow it faithfully to the existentialist direction. Furthermore, by rehashing traditional themes, and tossing them about, he often gets entangled in some old Cartesian snares. Despite these problems - which are mostly quibbles - the book is well worth a read. It has been used in philosophy - e. And it also forces a deep self-study on the un fortunate reader. It is a remarkable work in many ways.

    But just how this book, full of the unique spirit of its times Les Temps Modernes and all that jazz , written in a laid-back but obscurantist fashion, will be rated in a hundred years, is hard to judge. Perhaps it will be forgotten, or treated as an "in-between", second-rate work of those years, relegated in the shadow of Heidegger and Sartre? Or perhaps someone, with less Hegelian baggage, will come along, one day, and express the same thing - the fundamental bodily-phenomenological insight - more clearly, for a new audience? Or perhaps one would do better to read some Hubert Dreyfus instead.

    That would be desirable, because unfortunately many people will find the form in which the argument is presented to be impenetrable. Until then, I hope this book continues to inspire generations to come. Because it has a point, and the point is simple and good: Jan 16, Linus Ragnhage rated it it was amazing. This work is - together with Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil" and Heidegger's "Being and Time" - a perfect cure for anyone who has overdosed on abstract thinking.

    Its message has yet to be heard by a wider audience and is bound to gain new appreciation as the currently dominant mode of thinking begins to falter.

    A thorough background in philosophy might be required to understand much of what Merleau-Ponty writes, but, then again, if you have not already spent a substantial amount of time in th This work is - together with Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil" and Heidegger's "Being and Time" - a perfect cure for anyone who has overdosed on abstract thinking. A thorough background in philosophy might be required to understand much of what Merleau-Ponty writes, but, then again, if you have not already spent a substantial amount of time in the realm of rational thinking, then it is unlikely that you require the relief that this work can bring.

    Aug 20, Carlo rated it it was amazing.

    This should required reading for humans. Nov 04, Lesliemae rated it really liked it Shelves: Coming to Merleau-Ponty through Heidegger was a kind if shock to my system. I was not prepared for the deeply rational language of MP's study. Still, he brought to Heidegger's inherence, or being-in-the-world a very full-"embodied" discussion of our indissoluble link to that world via our own bodies. In most respects, MP's conception of being-in-the-world follows Heidegger's original, yet there are three starkly divergent thoughts I can identify from a first read: Merleau-Ponty wanted phenomen Coming to Merleau-Ponty through Heidegger was a kind if shock to my system.