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Recruiters search Monster every day looking to fill top jobs with qualified candidates, just like you. So take the risk there is no risk , and let Monster help you find a good-paying job. By commenting, you agree to Monster's privacy policy , terms of use and use of cookies. Thank you! The following hypothetical case was put to a group of physicians: Imagine that you have operable lung cancer and must choose between two treatments: surgery and radiation therapy.
Of people having surgery, 10 die during the operation, 32 are dead after one year, and 66 after five years. Of people having radiation therapy, none die during treatment, 23 are deadafter one year, and 78 after five years. Which treatment do you prefer? It is perhaps not completely surprising to learn that people are poor judges of probabilities, but "we want to give [people] credit for at least knowing their own minds," as one report puts it, "when it comes to assigning values to the outcomes of their choices.
Two alternative programs to combat the disease are proposed If program A is adopted, people will be saved. Since our judgments about risk are apparently inconsistent, it is hard not to draw the conclusion that our attitudes towards risk are also irrational.
These findings have disturbing implications for public policy, especially in a society like our own which relies on a democratic process. If we are irrational in our judgments about risk, the policies we enact will reflect a similar bias. Given our untrustworthy attitudes, a consent-based approach to legitimating risk-imposing activities can only lead to irrational public policies.
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Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Substitute for Consent But if we cannot rely on a consent-based approach because it is unworkable or not to be trusted, where are we to turn to find a way to legitimate decisions that expose us to risks to which we have not been able to give our actual consent? How should such decisions be made? Some believe that the way out of this apparent cul-de-sac is for us to rely on cost-benefit analysis to tell us what to do in our public policies involving risks. But cost-benefit analysis is regarded with no small amount of suspicion by the general public.
No matter how efficient such analytic methods may be, they are believed to require the technical expertise of well-trained professionals for their operation. Therefore, policies which emerge from their application are likely to seem less legitimate than policies that evolve, however clumsily, from a more participatory political process. Indeed, cost-benefit analysis appears to be as far removed from a consent-based approach as one could find.
A powerful case, however, in favor of cost-benefit analysis, put forward recently by policy analysts Herman Leonard and Richard Zeckhauser, suggests that we may have less to fear from such methods than we imagine 14 They admit without hesitation the moral appeal of consent-based solutions and go on to argue that - contrary to popular opinion - cost-benefit analysis can be grounded in a form of consent after all.
Assumptions about its narrowly technocratic character are misplaced. Their argument, in brief, runs as follows. Cost-benefit analysis incorporates into its calculus the criterion of economic efficiency as well as an assumption of rationality. Since people, by and large, want to act rationally and prefer efficiency to inefficiency, they would consent to public policies concerning risks to health and safety that were based on cost-benefit analysis, because the outcomes generated by the analysis are the same as the outcomes that they would choose, if they could go through the process themselves.
Leonard and Zeckhauser: If In this polar case, consent and the benefit-cost criterion are equilvalent, and in this sense cost-benefit analysis can be thought of as a form of "hypothetical" consent by the community. In this sense risk cost-benefit analysis is our most reasonable self writ large.
25 dangerous jobs and what they pay
It is not an impersonal, narrowly technocratic method for calculating outcomes. It identifies choices from a range of alternatives that an idealized rational actor would choose. Reasonable people ought to rely on cost-beneft analysis to identify solutions to complex risk decisions because that is the rational thing to do. What we lose by a lack of opportunity for actual consent we gain in the concept of rationality. A government agency that relies on cost-benefit analysis to arrive at a public policy decision about risk ought not to be seen as imposing its will on an unsuspecting populace since all that cost-benefit analysis does, we would do.
Cost-benefit analysis applied to risks fills a vacuum created by the unavailability of market solutions and the impracticality of obtaining the explicit, informed consent of all parties to a risk decision. And not only does it fill a void, it fills it, according to Leonard and Zeckhauser, in an ethically appropriate way, since the ethical underpinnings for the defense of cost-benefit analysis ultimately rest, if not on actual consent, on a form of consent nevertheless, albeit hypothetical.
What are we to make of this? Do we have in cost-benefit analysis a solution to our problem? Commensurability of Risks For cost-benefit analysis to do its work, it is essential that a number of widely divergent alternatives be comparable. Part of the strength of the technique is its claim to be able to order and rank a variety of options. To perform its task, it is necessary to find a measure that is sufficiently abstract and general so that the costs and benefits of various alternatives can be lumped together and added up.
However the homogenization that takes place often results in the glossing over of differences and the production of outcomes that offend common sense. Of course common sense itself is not always a reliable guide. Indeed the failures of common sense in making judgments about risks are part of the rationale for wanting something like risk cost-benefit analysis in the first place. But the measure which cost-benefit analysis adopts to represent all factors on a single scale must yield comparisons that are in some way recognizable to us and not so counter-intuitive as to appear arbitrary.
Some such requirement must be taken seriously especially in light of a defense of cost-benefit analysis on grounds of hypothetical consent, on the grounds of its being able to produce results to which people would consent. As Leonard and Zeckhauser themselves make clear, for their defense of cost-benefit analysis to work, benefits and costs must be "appropriately" measured.
Part of what will determine that appropriateness will be the intuitive appeal of the comparisons made under the technique, in their connecting up, however dimly, with common sense. But this feat is much less easy to accomplish than might be thought. Imagine that we are faced with having to compare the expected health risks of the following two options: Option 1: the death of two children with an average future life expectancy of 70 years. Option 2: the incapacitation say by a serious bout of influenza of 16, people for an average period of 4 days. To compare the costs of the two options, assume that a common measure of "work-days lost" is chosen, giving the following results: For Option 1 the total work-day loss will stand at 2 X 7 X or 51, work-days lost.
For Option 2 the total work-day loss will be 16, X 4 or 64, work-days lost. This defies common sense: four days of discomfort even for a great number of workers, seems preferable to the deaths of the children. Perhaps the wrong measure of comparison was chosen, and another measure other than work-days lost would yield a more intuitive result. But for a comparison to yield the right intuitive "feel" the common measure we choose will more than likely have to take some of the particularities of the cases into account. Although we may be able to come up with a common measure in a specific case that will yield intuitively acceptable results, this works against the grain of the analysis as a useful tool at the level of public policy where there is incentive to come up with more and more general measures in order to compare the greatest possible variety of options.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that no matter what scale of measurement is chosen, any general measure of comparison will inevitably produce intuitively unacceptable results. The technique also does not pay sufficient attention to different human responses to risk, treating them instead as if they all belonged on the same level, although perhaps varying in intensity.