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Nor has it shown any interest to get involved in the global power struggles between Beijing and Washington. Perhaps such a verdict represents a general understanding of Britain's reduced global influence, releasing the UK from the responsibility of trying to contain China. After all, the United States is doing that. All these factors combined have created the overarching pragmatic foreign policy orientation that has characterized the British government since New Labour took power in Moreover, the UK, with its traditional strength in banking and finance and as a popular destination for Chinese students and tourists, had much to offer China as an emerging power.

At the same time, with the uncertain prospect of Brexit amid the political reshuffling in London, the value of Britain as a platform for China's economic internationalization also diminished. Without access to the EU single market, Britain would need to secure a favourable trade agreement with China as the world's second largest economy.


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But at the moment, how that might pan out is anyone's guess. So far, we have discussed high-level government-to-government relations, with reference to the viewpoints of academics and other political and economic elites. But how does the British public perceive China, and what sort of bilateral relations do Britons think should be pursued between the two countries?

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Understanding public opinion on these issues has never been more important, given that the majority of Britons now consider China to be the world's leading economic power, with a more important role today than ten years ago, 33 and, as our survey shows, believe that negotiating a free trade agreement FTA with China after Brexit should be a top priority—higher, indeed, than FTAs with the United States, Japan and the Commonwealth countries. Scholars have long noted that Britain's foreign policy decision-making is conditional upon the country's changing perception of itself and its role in the world.

For example, a few months after the Brexit referendum, in a Christmas letter from Theresa May to the then new American president Donald Trump, she quoted a Christmas speech given by Winston Churchill in , speaking about the special bond between their countries:. I spend this anniversary and festival far from my country, far from my family, yet I cannot truthfully say that I feel far from home. Whether it be the ties of blood on my mother's side, or the friendships I have developed here over many years of active life, or the commanding sentiment of comradeship in the common cause of great peoples who speak the same language, who kneel at the same altars and, to a very large extent, pursue the same ideals, I cannot feel myself a stranger here in the centre and at the summit of the United States.

Where Brexit is concerned, an identity-based approach has also featured prominently in scholarly commentary on the referendum result. Should it continue to be part of the EU, or be independent and seek to recover the glory of the past, or pursue closer relations with the United States? Throughout the Leave campaign, substantial emphasis was placed on the argument that Britain should take back control over its affairs and regain British sovereignty from the EU, and on the related perception that immigrants were flooding in from the European continent.

If it does, do such divisions also apply to their perceptions of the ongoing rivalry between the United States and China on the international stage? To explore the questions outlined above, we designed a public opinion survey consisting of three main parts. The first part included questions that tap into the respondents' Brexit identities. As discussed in the previous section, the key elements of the Brexit debate revolve around the issues of sovereignty and control, which can be operationalized as how individuals perceive the UK's relationship with the EU and immigration to the UK.

Using these questions, we are able to construct a more nuanced measure of Brexit identities, as opposed to a simple dichotomous indicator based on directly asking how respondents voted in the referendum or how they would vote if another one were to be held. The second part of the survey included five questions about China and UK—China relations.

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The second question asked respondents which elements of the relationship with China they thought should be given the highest priority by the British government. The fourth question was related to Britain's trade relations. In the coming decade and in the context of competition between the United States and China, which country do you feel will …. The last part of the survey included a battery of standard socio-demographic questions on age, gender, place of birth and residence, marital status, ethnicity, education, employment and income.

We also asked about the respondents' political party affiliation, union membership and exposure to news on national politics. A detailed list of the survey questions is included in our online appendix. We implemented the survey using a crowdsourcing platform based in the UK. Respondents were randomly drawn from the platform's online subject pool. The survey was administered between 15 and 19 November , yielding a total of 1, responses. The average age of our respondents was 37 years. About 66 per cent of the respondents were female. In terms of geographical locations, the majority of the respondents lived in England The sample was highly educated, with 31 per cent having a bachelor's degree and About 74 per cent were self-employed or employed full time, and they were generally spread across the spectrum of professions.

The majority of our respondents self-identified with the Labour Party More than a third of the respondents reported paying a great deal or a lot of attention to news about national politics via TV, radio, printed newspapers or the internet. Overall, the above statistics suggest that our sample represented younger, wealthier, better-educated and more informed portions of the British population than the average.

We first examine British public perceptions of China. Figure 1 a shows that only a minority of Britons reported favourable views of China: a meagre 2 per cent had very favourable views and another 21 per cent had somewhat favourable views of the country. In contrast, a total of 37 per cent did not have favourable views of China, with 7 per cent having very unfavourable views and 30 per cent somewhat unfavourable.

Notably, 40 per cent held neutral views of China. This suggests that a substantial number of Britons do not have strong opinions on China, or perhaps do not think China is relevant for them. Some responses e.

Regarding the list of issues that should be the British government's foreign policy priorities regarding China, 40 per cent of people picked UK—China cooperation on global issues such as climate change, epidemics and counterterrorism. Another 36 per cent thought the government should put more emphasis on developing further trading relations with China.

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None of the other issue areas received much attention, with the exception of 16 per cent thinking that the government should pay more attention to human rights issues in China figure 1 b. These results indicate that many Britons are to some degree anxious about the security aspect of China's increasing presence in the international arena. Finally, we looked at public opinion on the priority of signing an FTA with China in comparison with signing similar agreements with the EU and the US figure 1 d.

In the context of Brexit and the uncertainty surrounding future relations with the EU, 81 per cent of respondents thought it was extremely important or very important to have a trade agreement with the EU.

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A very high percentage 70 per cent had a similar view on an FTA with China. All in all, these results show us that Britons have a relatively pragmatic and mercantilist stance where China is concerned, which is consistent with Breslin's research findings, discussed above: even though people do not hold favourable views of China, these negative perceptions do not translate into ideological convictions about what the British government should do. In this section, we investigate how Brexit identities affect views of China and its relations with the UK.

As noted in the section above on research design, we used two questions to measure Brexit identities. Owing to space constraints, in the remainder of the empirical sections of this article we report on findings using the question about the EU. Results using the immigration question, which are very similar to the ones shown here, can be found in the online appendix see fn About 10 per cent of our respondents strongly agreed with the statement that being a member of the EU undermines Britain's distinctive identity.

On the other side of the spectrum, 32 per cent of respondents strongly disagreed that EU membership threatens their national identity. We focus on these two groups of respondents since they can be regarded as having the strongest Leave and Remain identities, respectively.

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Figure 2 plots views on China and concern about Chinese military power for the Leavers and Remainers. We can see that those who identify more as Leavers tend to view China more favourably but are also more concerned with the rise of Chinese military power. Specifically, while the percentages of unfavourable views of China are similar for both groups 35 per cent , Leavers are nearly 50 per cent more likely than Remainers to have a favourable view of China 22 per cent compared to 15 per cent.

On the other hand, 55 per cent of Leavers believe that the rise of China's military power poses a concern for Britain, compared to 40 per cent of Remainers who agree with that statement. These seemingly contradictory findings suggest that the Leavers view relations with China through a pragmatic lens. This pragmatism can be seen in the Leavers' views on trade, presented in figure 3 overleaf, which illustrates the importance respondents attach to the UK having an FTA with, respectively, the EU, the US and China.

In contrast, an overwhelming majority 96 per cent of Remainers view a trade agreement with the EU as important, while lower majorities accord priority to such agreements with the US 66 per cent or China 71 per cent. The inference that Leavers adopt a pragmatic view gains additional validation from our question regarding the UK government's foreign policy priorities with China.

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Figure 4 presents the breakdown of the responses on three issues ranked highest by respondents: collaboration on global issues, trade and investment, and human rights in China. Once again, we see divergent effects across these three issues, driven by Brexit identities. Respondents with greater attachment to the Leave identity were predictably less inclined towards addressing global issues and meddling with China's human rights record, and were more in favour of promoting trade and investment with Beijing.

To this end, we take a closer look at the list of eight issues we chose to compare Chinese and American leadership on the global stage. We first look at the overall responses, which are plotted in figure 5. In general, more respondents believed that in the next decade China will be the largest economic power, be more stable and predictable, and be more respectful to other people around the world. Conversely, more respondents believed that the United States will be the more responsible global leader, do more to maintain global peace, be more committed to freedom of speech and expression, and do more for its poorest people.

Do Brexit identities influence respondents' choice of one country over the other on these issues? To answer this question, we broke down the responses presented in figure 5 between Leavers and Remainers, with the results shown in figure 6. Across all eight categories, Leavers consistently held more favourable views of the United States than of China.

Closer inspection reveals a number of more nuanced findings. In the question on which country will be the more responsible global leader, 56 per cent of Leavers believed that the United States will be more responsible.


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Indeed, the difference in support for the United States between Leavers and Remainers is nearly 27 percentage points.