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Jump to Detention of a suspect - Detention of a suspect The detention of suspects is the process of keeping a person who has been arrested in a police-cell, remand prison or other detention centre before trial or sentencing.‎Definition of detention · ‎Indefinite detention · ‎Detention by country.
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• 1. What is a police detention?
• Arrest and provisional detention » ICTR/ICTY/IRMCT Case Law Database
• Detention of a suspect Law and Legal Definition

Alabama v. White, U. Texas, U. Prouse, U. Brignoni-Ponce, U. Georgia, U. But cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, U. Mississippi, U. Illinois v. Wardlow, U. California, U.

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Sokolow, U. Hensley, U. Mendenhall, U. Royer, U. Delgado, U. Chesternut, U. As in Michigan v. Chesternut, supra , the suspect dropped incriminating evidence while being chased. Bostick, U. See also United States v. Drayton, U. Under these circumstances, and following the arrest of his traveling companion, the defendant had consented to the search of his person. Long, U. Maryland v. Buie, U. Sharpe, U. Montoya de Hernandez, U. Place, U. However, the search in Place was not expeditious, and hence exceeded Fourth Amendment bounds, when agents took 90 minutes to transport luggage to another airport for administration of the canine sniff.

The length of a detention short of an arrest has similarly been a factor in other cases. Therefore one of the jurisdictional facts is absent. It cannot be said that Ms Ndala entertained a reasonable suspicion that the listed offence had been committed. It is trite that the arrestor must be a peace officer, who entertains a suspicion that the suspect committed an offence referred to in Schedule 1 and that the suspicion must rest on reasonable grounds see Duncan v Minister of Law and Order SA 2 AD at G-J.

No doubt the discretion must be properly exercised. But the grounds on which the exercise of such a discretion can be questioned are narrowly circumscribed. Nothing was said about whether or not the wound inflicted was dangerous. There was no evidence by the respondent that an investigation was carried out to ascertain the nature and extent of the wound.

Clearly, seen objectively, that was insufficient. The arresting officer failed to investigate further the circumstances of the assault itself, whether the wound was inflicted intentionally or whether it came about accidentally during the scuffle. The nature and the seriousness of the wound was never investigated. The arresting officer wrongly assumed that the assault was committed with intent to do grievous bodily harm and that the offence is listed in Schedule 1.

Arrest without a warrant in these circumstances was not lawfully permissible. In my view the respondent failed to establish the jurisdictional facts, in particular that the appellant committed an offence referred to in Schedule 1. I find that the appellant succeeded to prove that the discretion was exercised in an improper manner.

I will now deal with the second cause of action, the unlawful detention. The malicious prosecution claim seems to have been abandoned as it was not argued before us. I am of the view that the appellant was unlawfully detained for not more than two hours. The evidence shows that he arrived at the Sandton police station after eight in the morning and that by ten am he had appeared in court and had been remanded in custody. I am of the view that what happened in court and thereafter cannot be placed before the doorstep of the respondent.

My view is fortified by what Harms DP said in Sekhoto at paras 42, 43 and part of para For completeness sake I prefer to quote the text fully:. Once an arrest has been effected the peace officer must bring the arrestee before a court as soon as reasonably possible and at least within 48 hours depending on court hours. Once that has been done the authority to detain that is inherent in the power to arrest has been exhausted.

The authority to detain the suspect further is then within the discretion of the court. Indeed, in some cases the suspect must be detained pending his trial, in the absence of special circumstances.

1. What is a police detention?

I need not elaborate for present purposes save to mention that the Act requires a judicial evaluation to determine whether it is in the interests of justice to grant bail, that in some instances a special onus rests on a suspect before bail may be granted and the accused has in any event a duty to disclose certain facts, including prior convictions, to the court. It is sufficient to say that if a peace officer were to be permitted to arrest only once he is satisfied that the suspect might not otherwise attend the trial then that statutory structure would be entirely frustrated.

To suggest that such a constraint upon the power to arrest is to be found in the statute by inference is untenable. He or she is not called upon to determine whether the suspect ought to be detained pending a trial. That is the role of the court or in some cases a senior officer. The purpose of the arrest is no more than to bring the suspect before the court or the senior officer so as to enable that role to be performed.

It seems to me to follow that the enquiry to be made by the peace officer is not how best to bring the suspect to trial: the enquiry is only whether the case is one in which that decision ought properly to be made by a court or the senior officer. Whether his decision on that question is rational naturally depends upon the particular facts but it is clear that in cases of serious crime — and those listed in Schedule 1 are serious, not only because the Legislature thought so — a peace officer could seldom be criticized for arresting a suspect for that purpose.

It is incorrect that the police refused to release the appellant on bail, the arresting officer in fact recommended that the appellant may be released on bail of R, which recommendation was in writing and formed part of the content of the docket. In her evidence the arresting officer, Ms Ndala, said that on the first appearance, cases are usually postponed with no bail fixed. In my view, what the arresting officer thought or believed was irrelevant as it was the duty of the presiding officer to address the question of further detention or the fixing of bail.

I agree with what Harms DP said in Sekhoto , that the arresting peace officer has a limited role in the process that takes place in court. In my view presiding officers in courts of first appearance must ensure that the rights in s35 1 e-f of the Constitution are not undermined. It is imperative for a presiding officer to enquire from the prosecution why it is necessary to further detain a suspect.

In that enquiry the reasons for further detention will emerge as to whether or not it is in the interests of justice to further detain or release the suspect. This I say, mindful of the provisions of s 12 1 of the Constitution which deals with freedom and security of the person and the right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause. Failure to enquire at the first appearance of the reasons for further detention is clearly a contravention of the above constitutional imperatives and therefore the further detention of a suspect without just cause would be arbitrary and unlawful.

In my view the police cannot be held liable for the further detention, even if the arrest is found to have been unlawful. What is critical is that, the justice department would be responsible and liable for the further detention because of its failure to observe the constitutional rights of a detained person. It is the complainant who set the law in motion by reporting a case of assault, the police were doing their job by taking the suspect to court.

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He mentioned, amongst others, that the complainant knew that there was simply no evidence upon which Tyokwana could be successfully prosecuted and he was aware that the initial statements of the state witnesses were obtained under duress and that they were false. And further that Tyokwana had been seriously assaulted at the hands of the police. What is also striking is that at no stage did this Court in Tyokwana refer to Sekhoto.

Mthimkhulu expressed a view contrary to mine in this matter. Therefore the decision in Tyokwana is distinguishable on the facts — it cannot be authority for the proposition that the further detention of the appellant by the court, in this case, was unlawful because the arrest was unlawful. I am of the view that the respondent cannot be held liable for what transpired in court just because the arrest was unlawful.

To do so would be legally untenable and would be contrary to well established precedent in this court, to which I have referred. I shall now deal with the question of quantum. The amount of damages is limited to the detention for two hours. The appellant was called telephonically to report at the police station.