Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations Armed Servants should be read not only by academic specialists in national security, but also by military.
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- Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
- Civil–military relations - Wikipedia
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- Civil–military relations
- Armed servants : agency, oversight, and civil-military relations
Subscribe to receive information about forthcoming books, seasonal catalogs, and more, in newsletters tailored to your interests. Arms Control Share This. Recent News Allan Lichtman, author of The Embattled Vote in America , talked to Vox about the history of disenfranchisement in the United States and the dire consequences to American democracy of ongoing voter suppression. In philosophy he was a Hepburn, a Brando, a Dean, a Bacall, stars into whose souls he gave us entryways.
Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
And on ours, too! He dressed beautifully to attend our meetings, and he did his homework for them carefully, and spoke articulately on behalf of the books we had asked him to report on. The self-selective nature of the All-Volunteer Force is seen by some to have led to the unrepresentative nature of the armed forces [98] [] [] One argument, put forward by a Navy Chief of Chaplains, was that the drawdown in the size of the military was exacerbating differences and making the separation between the military and civilian societies potentially even more divisive.
He worried that unless an effective dialogue could be maintained between the military and civilian branches of society, especially in the area of ethical decision-making, the American military risked losing the support of society or becoming dangerously militaristic. One unique view, which does not neatly fall into either of the cultural- or connectivity-gap categories, centers on the organizational differences between the military and civilian societies.
This view claims to explain much as to why the military has been or may be used to press ahead of society's norms. Ultimately, the cultural gap matters only if it endangers civilian control of the military or if it reduces the ability of the country to maintain an effective military force. Those who concentrate on the nature of the gap tend not to be concerned about dangerous trends. However, those who are concerned about the lack of understanding between the civilian and military worlds are uniformly convinced that the civil-military relationship in the United States is unhealthy.
This debate has generally settled on whether or not the gap is too wide. If too wide, civilian control of the military may be jeopardized due to serious misunderstandings between the two worlds. While most agree that such a gap is to be expected and, in and of itself, is not dangerous, some do concede the aspects of that gap have led directly to misunderstandings between the two worlds.
In particular, some have argued that the culture of political conservatism and the apparent increase in partisanship of the officer corps has approached a dangerous limit. While Elizabeth Kier [] argues that "structure and function do not determine culture," most agree that a difference between the two is necessary because civilian culture was "incommensurate with military effectiveness.
Assuming that a problem exists, many have offered suggestions for narrowing the gap and correcting the problems arising from it. In general, those suggestions are along three lines. The first is that the military must reach out to the civilian world.
Civil–military relations - Wikipedia
Given the essentially universal agreement that civilians must control the military, the duty falls upon the military to find ways to talk to civilians, not the other way around. The second is that civilians must articulate a clear vision of what they expect in terms of the military mission. And the final suggestion is that the most practical and effective means of bringing about dialogue and understanding is to be bilateral education, in which both military and civilian elites would jointly attend specialized schools.
Such schooling would emphasize military-strategic thinking, American history and political philosophy, military ethics, and the proper relationship between civil and military authority.
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Some argue that the root problem is that the military is self-selecting, rendering the culture a self-perpetuating one. Solutions such as the reinstatement of the draft and a European-style national service obligation have been offered. A common issue that hinders many civil-military relations is when civil political leaders attempt to resume or gain a certain degree of civilian control after a period of transition, conflict or dictatorship, but do not possess the necessary capacities and commitment to handle defense affairs.
What should happen in such transitions is that when military figures begin to be withdrawn from political positions in order to achieve some balance, is that civilian politicians should be taught to deal with policy formulation and given an oversight on the defense sector so as to efficiently replace the former military leaders. However, civilian control over the military, despite the efforts that have been made over the past years, has yet to become institutionalized in many countries. The challenges that civil-military relations face in many countries, such as Indonesia, center around problems of military culture, overlapping coordination, authority, lack of resources and institutional deficits.
The military cannot continue to be an organization with unmatched institutional reach and political influence, while limiting state capacity, because in doing so it will be evermore challenging for civilian supremacy to take a stance, thus establishing effective civil-military relations. If these problems are not addressed properly, as long as civil-military relations of countries continue to interact within undefined boundaries, without clear subordination and authority and with the constrictions of limited budgets, it is unlikely that countries that still struggle with the concept will achieve a stable and efficient civil-military relationship, something that will continue to damage state capacity and stability.
According to Amitai Etzioni of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies, the AirSea Battle doctrine is an example of a situation in which the military conceptualizes and develops a plan to counter a perceived threat to the United States without sufficient civilian oversight. Researchers from the Overseas Development Institute wrote that 'the belief that development and reconstruction activities are central to security' From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Part of a series on Politics Primary topics. Index of politics articles Politics by country Politics by subdivision Political economy Political history Political history of the world Political philosophy.
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Separation of powers Legislature Executive Judiciary Election commission. Sovereignty Theories of political behavior Political psychology Biology and political orientation Political organisations Foreign electoral intervention. History of civil-military relations in Southeast Asia.
Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. Changing Frontiers Review Essay. The Pentagon and the Presidency: Reassessing Victory in Warfare. War, Politics, and the Ballot in America. Military in the 21st Century. Reveron and Judith Hicks Stiehm eds. Feaver and Richard H. An Event History Analysis. Reed and David R.
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Segal and William W. Segal and Morten G. The Art of War. A History of Militarism: A Romance and Realities of a Profession. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. A Social and Political Portrait. The Soldier and the State in India: The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style. Policy Performance and Social Change. Will the Thai Coup Prove Contagious? Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment. Johns Hopkins University Press. Sparrow and Donald S.
Civil–military relations
Civil-Military Relations in the Twenty-first Century. The Need for a Balanced Strategy. Broadening the perspective on military cohesion.
Armed Forces and Society , X Soldiers without an army? Patronage networks and cohesion in the armed forces of the DR Congo. Cohesion mechanisms in Jihadist organizations in Africa. Ethical Lapses and the Military Profession: Three Problems and a Solution. Intermarriage and the US Military. Gender and the military profession: Early career influences, attitudes, and intentions.
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Armed servants : agency, oversight, and civil-military relations
You already recently rated this item. Your rating has been recorded. Write a review Rate this item: Preview this item Preview this item. Harvard University Press, English View all editions and formats Summary: How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nation-state.
Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior. This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup.