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Iraq can be considered the 'perfect storm' which brought out the stark differences between the US and Europe. The disagreement over the role of the United Nations continues and the bitterness in the United States against its betrayal by allies.
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Three factors speak against it happening. First, after a decade in crisis mode, the latter are deeply divided on essential political questions. Never before since they set up on the path of European integration has there been so little agreement about which goals they want to pursue through it. It is hard to imagine that the EU member states will, in the next few years, find the energy and political will to set aside their disagreements and focus on the common interest.

Second, there is trend of navel-gazing in Europe too. Many states are limited or even paralyzed by domestic challenges, from Brexit in Britain to the yellow vests movement in France to the transformation of the party system in Germany. In this context, it is not clear which country would be capable of leading Europe. Third, European integration is not only an internally driven process. In the third scenario, President Trump is not only indifferent towards the EU, but sees it as a hostile institution that needs to be eliminated.

He actively undermines its cohesion and pursues a divide-and-rule policy toward the member states. The European countries are for him objects of U. He puts more and more pressure on them by linking economic and security policy; for example, to buy American weapons systems or liquefied natural gas. In the process he gives European countries the impression that the U. Germany is the main focus of his criticism.

What the UNITED STATES thinks of EUROPE (by Aleix Saló)

Trump openly sympathizes with Euroskeptic forces in the EU. In his interactions with the EU members, he ditches transatlantic institutions in favor of bilateral relations and special deals. Trump also feels closest to the European governments that emphasize national sovereignty and reject globalization and migration. The divisive potential of such a policy would be enormous, as the EU members would be forced to prioritize either their European or transatlantic connection—in other words to choose between the U.

Benjamin Zyla, CIPS Postdoctoral Fellow, – Centre for International Policy Studies

This would run counter to the idea that the stability of Europe rests on two pillars: unity through the EU and close transatlantic ties through NATO. However, Trump could only succeed in splitting the EU if its members allow themselves to be split. His ideas about the EU are met with much approval in some of them. Even if the European countries tried to limit transatlantic conflicts to specific areas for example, the Iran nuclear deal and prevent escalation, it would not work with Trump in office.

Each of the scenarios considered here represents one of the trends in U. At the moment, they all seem plausible. They are also far from mutually exclusive; in fact, it is likely that in the next two years elements from all three will play out. The best-case scenario for Europe is that as much of the Trump status quo as possible is maintained. Trump is not going to change his mind about Europe. To a degree the three scenarios are different versions of the same dark timeline. After all, President George W.

They can determine their own destiny. In every scenario, they need to act together to advance their interests. If Europe were more unified and capable of joint action in foreign policy, it would be able to tip the international scales without the United States.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

However, so far the EU member states have not been able to develop a unified policy to react to Trump: some have gone for confrontation, others want to wait things out, and others have tried to ingratiate themselves with him. Unfortunately there is no reason to assume that Trump, in any of the scenarios described here, will become a unifying factor in Europe. Cracks in transatlantic relations are also always intra-European cracks. Some European countries will come to terms with the situation better than others and be more open to bilateral and transactional relations with the United States over the next two years.

As Hans Kundnani and I have previously argued, Europe is caught between a rock and a hard place. The uncertainty about U. The simple fact is that European countries cannot defend themselves without the United States in the short or even medium term, and that would not immediately change even if they moved quickly to fill the void. Worse, while it calls on them to become more independent, the United States also views with mistrust their efforts to this end, such as developing their own defense industrial base instead of buying American.

There is, moreover, no member state of the EU that has the power, credibility, and political will to rally the others behind it. It is hard to imagine that, say, Poland or the Baltic states would back an EU that France and Germany lead away from the transatlantic alliance. If transatlantic relations in fact deteriorate further, European states might have to choose what is more important to them, unity or ability to act.

It might well be that the latter cannot be achieved with all member states. The logical conclusion is that some member states may be forced to move ahead with a selected group of like-minded partners that are ready to act together. They may be forced to put the achievable ahead of the aspirational. When Ambassador Sergei Kislyak, who represented Russia in the United States for almost a decade, went back to Moscow in , not long after President Donald Trump stepped into the White House, the questions he faced from Russian journalists in a press conference were mainly about one matter: whether the two countries are now locked into a new Cold War.

For all the props of the Cold War have reappeared. The tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsions. Yet, these trappings aside, are we standing at the onset of a new Cold War? The answer is reassuring and worrying at the same time. No, that conflict will not return. But confrontation between the West and Russia is likely to intensify, and it may be more unpredictable and therefore more dangerous than was the case during the Cold War. The Cold War preoccupied the minds of every single leader in the East and the West and was fought relentlessly every single hour, for four long decades.

It was pursued directly on the streets of Berlin, where the barrels of U. It was pursued around the world. The truth remains that, for President Vladimir Putin, confrontation with the West is not the exception but the rule, and since Russia is by far the weaker side in this game, most of what it does entails secret destabilization and subversion operations.

Dovilė Budrytė

For every scenario, the emphasis is on what would be the implications for the transatlantic alliance, and how certain key actors in Europe are likely to react. Meanwhile, Putin continues to find opportunities to create mischief in Europe as well as between Europe and the United States. Of all the policy promises Trump made during his election campaign, none has been more prominent or more durable than that to forge a new strategic partnership with Russia. It has been repeated so often and in such categorical terms that it has spawned a wave of conspiracy-theory explanations.

There is a more humdrum and perhaps more persuasive explanation: that the U. The similarities between their two visions are, therefore, compelling. Even if they genuinely try, the two presidents will soon discover that what they are prepared to offer each other is not very appealing to either, while the price each partner expects to extract from the other for such a strategic deal will be deemed unacceptable by both sides. This is the story of a divorce slated to occur before even the partners even went out on a date, let alone married.

Although Trump has never spelt out in detail what he wants from Russia, it is clear that there are two tasks for which he deems the country useful. The second is potential support in cornering China, which Trump sees as presenting the United States with the biggest and most sustained strategic challenge. Russia has very different objectives. It is happy to cooperate with the United States on counter-terrorism, but it sees that as merely a diversion from its top priority, which is to regain its status as a global power whose support is required in the management of any future world crisis.

The continued crisis in Ukraine is largely about getting Western approval for the establishment of a Russian sphere of influence, and Putin has no intention of compromising on this quest. At the same time, although it has its own reasons to mistrust China, Russia has no intention of cooperating with the United States in containing its Asian neighbor. Russia may well be tempted to engage in its own China-hedging. Even if one assumes that Trump is prepared to put the China question aside and forge a partial strategic deal with Russia over Europe and the Middle East, it is difficult to see how this will be accomplished, or what purpose it would serve.

The United States could abandon Ukraine to Russia by simply stopping all economic and military assistance to that country. But it could not deliver Eastern Europe to Russia as a sphere of influence even if it wanted. This is not when, at the end of World War II, countries could be bartered away with the whisk of a pen.

Nor is it very obvious what Russia can actually eradicate terrorism. Its military can drop bombs on terrorists, but bombs are a commodity the United States does not lack either. On almost every other count, Russia is part of the problem, rather than part of the solution to terrorism: its internal problems with domestic separatists and the marginalization of its own Muslim minorities feed into further violence, and it has one of the highest rates of people volunteering for fighting with terrorist organizations abroad.

A true counter-terrorism partnership between the United States and Russia should entail a change in domestic Russian policies, which neither Putin nor Trump are seeking. Historica Canada. Retrieved 19 November New York: Oceana Publications. Trade Representative, , i, 1. Retrieved December 29, Miller Center.


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