Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit (Routledge Philosophy GuideB

Hegel and the. Phenomenology of Spirit. Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to. □ the Phenomenology as a misleading guide to Hegel's ultimate posi- tion).
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Only then, Hegel argues, will we have overcome our estrangement from the world and thus have achieved freedom: But given this, how does Hegel think these alienating conceptions come about? This dislocation was felt at many levels, as it appeared that the Enlightenment had shaken old certainties but had put nothing substantial in their place.

Thus, reason was seen as leading to scepticism, science to mechanistic materialism, social reform to bloody revolution, humanism to empty amoralism and crude hedonism, and individualism to social fragmentation. But for Hegel, as we shall see, it was crucial that this new direction should not involve the simple repudiation of reason, science, social reform, and so on. McGinn , Valberg In it validity and power are swept away from the opposition between freedom and necessity, between spirit and nature, between knowledge and its object, between law and impulse, from opposition and contradiction as such, whatever forms they may take.

Their validity and power as opposition and contradiction is gone. Absolute truth proves that neither freedom by itself, as subjective, sundered from necessity, is absolutely a true thing nor, by parity of reasoning, is truthfulness to be ascribed to necessity isolated and taken by itself. The ordinary consciousness, on the other hand, cannot extricate itself from this opposition and either remains despairingly in contradiction or else casts it aside and helps itself in some other way.

But philosophy enters into the heart of the self-contradictory characteristics, knows them in their essential nature, i. To grasp this Concept of truth is the task of philosophy. Hegel focuses on these categories, and especially on the relation between universal and individual, because he holds that they are central to our way of thinking, and are thus very pervasive.

At the epistemological level, we contrast the universality of thought with the individuality of intuition, and so generate the debate between rationalists and empiricists. Hegel believed that the division between universal and individual lies behind all these dichotomies; but at the same time, he believed that we do not have to set these categories apart, but can see things as combining individuality with universality, the one aspect depending on the other cf. Likewise, in the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel considers the human world at the levels of anthropology, phenomenology of mind, psychology, ethics, politics, art, religion, and philosophy, where again his aim is to demonstrate the value of his dialectical method rests on the categorical investigations of the Logic.

Every cultured consciousness has its metaphysics, its instinctive way of thinking. This is the absolute power within us, and we shall only master it if we make it the object of our knowledge. Philosophy in general, as philosophy, has different categories from those of ordinary consciousness.

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All cultural change reduces itself to a difference of categories. The question now arises: As an introduction to the system, the Phenomenology therefore has two fundamental tasks, one motivational and the other pedagogic. Or, in a higher sphere of education, we proceed to the relation of cause and effect, force and its manifestation, etc. All our knowledge and ideas are entwined with metaphysics like this and governed by it; it is the net which holds together all the concrete material which occupies us in our action and endeavour.

But this net and its knots are sunk in our ordinary consciousness beneath numerous layers of stuff. Quite generally, the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood. The commonest way in which we deceive either ourselves or others about understanding is by assuming something as familiar, and accepting it on that account; with all its pros and cons, such knowing never gets anywhere, and it knows not why. While these remain unmoved, the knowing activity goes back and forth between them, thus moving only on their surface.


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Hence the task nowadays consists. Hegel therefore gives the Phenomenology a role here too, helping consciousness to gradually question those conceptual certainties and thus to move to a position where it can see what it might mean to give them up. This is the pedagogic function of the Phenomenology: The Phenomenology is therefore written in a distinctive style, in so far as it has a story to tell from two points of view: For consciousness itself, therefore, the Phenomenology is a via negativa, as it responds to some failed position with another position that is equally one-sided, and so equally doomed to collapse.

But at the same time we as phenomenological observers learn a great deal from seeing what is going wrong, and when at the end of the Phenomenology consciousness is ready to adopt our standpoint, then it too will be in a position to learn these lessons for itself. Given this conception of the Phenomenology, it is therefore possible to see why the Phenomenology forms an introduction to the system set out in the Encyclopedia and associated works, and why also material from it is repeated within that system, in the Philosophy of Spirit: As well as linking the Phenomenology to the rest of his system, and particularly the Logic, in a natural way, I hope that another advantage of this emphasis on the dialectic will become clear as we proceed: But, on my account there is nothing particularly troubling here: From the perspective of my reading, therefore, it is hardly surprising that the discussion operates at both the individual and the cultural—historical level.

Once again, however, on my approach this problem does not arise: Once this is accepted, there is no need to look for one key issue, or to treat the Phenomenology as a contribution to one area of philosophy as a contribution to epistemology or ethics, or philosophy of religion, or whatever: Nagel , who takes the problem of reconciling subjective and objective standpoints to underlie fundamental issues in ethics, political philosophy, epistemology, and metaphysics.

Some readings require these transitions to be extremely rigorous. For example, those readings that treat the Phenomenology as a transcendental argument are committed to the view that each new form of consciousness is introduced as a necessary condition for the possibility of the previous form of consciousness. Taylor , Norman On other readings, Hegel is seen as aiming to establish his position as uniquely coherent by showing all other possible world-views to involve some sort of incoherence, and that this requires him to be exhaustive in moving through these world-views, so that every transition must involve the smallest possible alteration from one perspective to the next.

Now, on my approach we can take the transitions seriously, but are not committed to these being more rigorous than a realistic interpretation of the actual text allows. It will therefore adopt a new perspective by questioning some of the assumptions of the position from which it began. Or, to take some examples from later in the Phenomenology: The Preface and the Introduction to 10 the Phenomenology are therefore notorious for failing to assist its 11 readers by telling them anything in advance about the conclusions to 12 be reached, as those conclusions will only be properly grasped at the 13 end of the work, and not the beginning: This is a short26 cut he seems determined to deny us.

Much of the Preface is therefore taken up with polemicizing against his contemporaries who Hegel believes have failed to achieve what he sets out to do, either because they have held that satisfaction can only be attained by abandoning reason in favour of faith, or because they have mistaken the kind of world-view in which true intellectual satisfaction can be found.

Hegel is scornful of what seems to him to be a merely anti-philosophical mysticism: Such minds, when they give themselves up to the uncontrolled ferment of [the divine] substance, imagine that, by drawing a veil over self-consciousness and surrendering understanding they become the beloved of God to whom He gives wisdom in sleep; and hence what they in fact receive, and bring to birth in their sleep, is nothing but dreams. However, although he accepts that some of the contemporary critics of philosophy have a point in attacking the philosophical sciences in their current state, he nonetheless insists that this is because in this state they are not properly developed, and that further philosophical progress will show that such attacks are premature: But it would be as unjust for such criticism to strike at the very heart of Science, as it is untenable to refuse to honour the demand for its [i.

This section of the Preface, and a later one on the same topic PS: Whatever is more than such a word, even the transition to a mere proposition, contains a becoming-other that has to be taken back, or is a mediation. But it is just this that is rejected with horror, as if absolute cognition were simply surrendered when more is made of mediation than in simply saying that it is nothing absolute, and is completely absent from the Absolute.

But this abhorrence in fact stems from ignorance of the nature of mediation, and of absolute cognition itself. As Hegel himself points out PS: James , Russell Hegel here makes clear what is distinctive about the therapeutic nature of his approach: As a consequence, he rejects the mathematical method as inappropriate for philosophy, observing in his defence: Hegel therefore claims that his project puts him between two extremes: He therefore criticizes a philosophy that is non-speculative 4 in that it merely sets out to overturn common-sense without putting 5 anything in its place: Also like the Preface, the Introduction makes 28 plain what Hegel takes to be the consequences of failure: Hegel sets out the problematic assumption at the start of the Introduction: In a passage that Hegel cites elsewhere FK: Given this evidence of our cognitive limitations, it might then be seen as sensible to see what it is about our cognitive capacities which produces those limitations, so that we do not try to overstep them in a way that would prove fruitless or misleading.

Thus, it would seem, the critical epistemic method could be motivated not by an epistemic overscrupulousness that gets things in the wrong order by questioning our capacities before it has sought to exercise them; rather, it could be motivated by a desire to make a reasonable inventory of our abilities faced with real evidence of their limitedness. At this stage, however, it is not clear how much of a worry this should be to the Hegelian.

The Routledge Guide Book to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit - Robert Stern - Google Книги

We therefore do not need to assume anything about the world at the outset, or to use such assumptions to criticize consciousness: As we have discussed, for Hegel this sort of shift involves a revision in how consciousness thinks about the world: At the most general level, commentators are agreed about how Hegel intended us to conceive of sense-certainty, namely, as a form of consciousness that thinks the best way to gain knowledge of the world is to experience it directly or intuitively, without applying concepts to it: At the same time, Hegel wishes to bring out how sense-certainty gains its attractiveness by trading on a commitment that appears plausible, but which turns out to be highly problematic, and once this is recognized our attachment to sense-certainty as a paradigm of knowledge will be lost.

At this point, there is disagreement among commentators. For some interpreters, the motivation behind sense-certainty is a commitment to epistemic foundationalism, which posits direct intuitive experience as giving us the kind of unshakeable hook-up to the world on which knowledge is built; for others, it is a commitment to empiricism, according to which intuitive knowledge is prior to conceptual knowledge, because empirical concepts are learned and get their meaning by being linked to objects as they are given in experience; and for yet others, it is a commitment to realism, which holds that if the mind is not to distort or create the world, it needs to be in a position to gain access to the world in a passive manner without the mediation of conceptual activity, so the kind of direct experience envisaged by sense-certainty must be fundamental.

Sense-certainty adopts its aconceptual view of knowledge because it thinks that it will grasp what constitutes the unique essence of the thing as an individual only if it does not use concepts in knowing that individual; for sense-certainty holds concepts can be applied to many different things, and so cannot tell us about the thing qua individual. In so far as it has this unique nature, the individual is claimed to be irreducible to any shareable qualities and so is said to be ontologically prior to any such qualities, in being what it is in a way that is wholly unlike anything else; it therefore appears to sense-certainty that it can be grasped by the subject or I directly, without any conceptual activity being required: I, this particular I, am certain of this particular 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 4 5 Folio THE DIALECTIC OF THE OBJECT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 Folio 4 6 thing, not because I, qua consciousness, in knowing it have developed myself or thought about it in various ways; and also not because the thing of which I am certain, in virtue of a host of distinct qualities, would be in its own self a rich complex of connections, or related in various ways to other things.

Neither of these has anything to do with the truth of sense-certainty: On the contrary, the thing is, and it is, merely because it is. It is; this is the essential point for sense-knowledge, and this pure being, or this simple immediacy, constitutes its truth. Similarly, certainty as a connection is an immediate pure connection: Hegel begins his argument by asking sensecertainty what its experience of the object tells us about it: Sense-certainty responds by saying that for it the object is simply present: Hence, this instinct seized upon the present, the Here, the This.

A simple thing of this kind which is through negation, which is neither This nor That, a not-This, and is with equal indifference This as well as That — such a thing we call a universal. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite: The second option is that sense-certainty may deny that the object has any such unique essence, in which case there is no reason not to use concepts in seeking knowledge, and so no grounds for prioritizing sense-certainty as an epistemic position.

Both truths have the same authentication, viz. Sense-certainty therefore ends up unable to make good the kind of ontological commitment underpinning its conception of knowledge: It is sometimes alleged that Hegel is here attacking the metaphysical view that there are individuals at all cf. Assuming rather than denying our capacity to grasp individuals, Hegel therefore concludes that knowledge of individuals cannot require us to go beyond universality in the way sense-certainty supposes. Adopting the method of immanent critique, Hegel has thus brought out how such metaphysical misconceptions can have philosophical consequences that are profoundly distorting; by diagnosing these misconceptions, Hegel hopes that as phenomenological observers we will no longer be tempted to adopt the one-sided epistemology of sense-certainty.

Perception, on the other hand, takes what is present to it as a universal. Since the principle of the object, the universal, is in its simplicity a mediated universal, the object must express this its nature in its own self. However, because perception is still at the level of sense-experience, the universals out of which it takes individuals to be constituted are of the simplest kind, that is, they are sensible properties, like being white, cubical, tart, and so on.

As Hegel makes clear at the end of the section, this introduction of a limited conception of universality will in fact turn out to be inadequate: And, at the same time, without being separated by different Heres, they do not affect each other in this interpenetration. The whiteness does not affect the cubical shape, and neither affects the tart taste, etc. To wit, if the many determinate properties were strictly indifferent to one another, if they were simply and solely self-related, they would not be determinate; for they are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves from one another, and relate themselves to others as to their opposites.

Yet; as thus opposed to one another they cannot be together in the simple unity of their medium, which is just as THE DIALECTIC OF THE OBJECT essential to them as negation; the differentiation of the properties, in so far as it is not an indifferent differentiation but is exclusive, each property negating the others, thus falls outside of this simple medium; and the medium, therefore, is not merely an Also, an indifferent unity, but a One as well, a unity which excludes an other.

One interesting reading of it is given by Charles Taylor see Taylor I therefore think Taylor is wrong to characterize the position Hegel starts from here as one that lacks the concept of a particular altogether: An alternative reading can be developed by comparing the passage we are considering to the following paragraph from F. We may take the familiar instance of a lump of sugar. This is a thing, and it has properties, adjectives which qualify it. It is, for example, white, and hard, and sweet. The sugar, we say, is all that; but what the is can really mean seems doubtful.

And, again, in so far as sugar is sweet it is not white or hard; for these properties are all distinct. Nor, again, can the thing be all its properties, if you take them each severally. Sugar is obviously not mere whiteness, mere hardness, and mere sweetness; for its reality lies somehow in its unity. We can discover no real unity existing outside these qualities, or, again, existing within them. He then asks how we can say that this is so, as this would make the single individual identical with three distinct properties. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we talk or reason concerning it.

For further helpful discussion of that argument, see Baxter For, it should be remembered that at this point the universals he is considering are property-universals whiteness, tartness etc. The object which I apprehend presents itself purely as a One; but I also perceive in it a property which is universal, and which thereby transcends the singularity [of the object].

But since the object is what is true, the untruth falls in me; my apprehension was not correct. On account of the universality of the property, I must rather take the objective essence to be on the whole a community. I now further perceive the property to be determinate, opposed to another and excluding it. Hegel therefore offers his diagnosis of what has gone wrong here, which, as we have already pointed out, focuses on the inadequate conception of the categories of universality and individuality being used by perception: Thus the object in its pure determinateness, or in the determinatenesses which were supposed to constitute its essential being, is overcome just as surely as it was in its sensuous being.

But these expedients, instead of warding off deception in the process of apprehension, prove themselves on the contrary to be quite empty; and the truth which is supposed to be won by this logic of the perceptual process proves to be in one and the same respect the opposite [of itself] and thus to have as its essence a universality which is devoid of distinctions and determinations. The concept of force came to dominate eighteenth-century physics through the work of Newton, while playing a prominent role in the thought of Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant.

This interconnectedness is not visible to us directly in the world given to sense experience, where it appears that reality consists of distinct entities; but this pattern is now taken by consciousness to be merely the appearance of a more holistic structure of internally connected forces: From this we see that the Notion of Force becomes actual through its duplication into two Forces, and how it comes to be so.


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    • These two Forces exist as independent essences; but their existence is a movement of each towards the other, such that their being is rather a pure positedness or a being that is posited by an other; i. Consequently, these moments are not divided into two independent extremes offering each other only an opposite extreme: They have thus, in fact, no substances of their own which might support and maintain them.

    Thus the truth of Force remains only the thought of it; the moments of its actuality, their substances and their movement, collapse unresistingly into an undifferentiated unity.

    Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit

    This true essence of Things has now the character of not being immediately for consciousness; on the contrary, consciousness has a mediated relation to the inner being and, as the Understanding, looks through this mediating play of Forces into the true background of Things. At this point, the understanding attempts to render this supersensible realm less mysterious by identifying it with the laws that govern the natural phenomena, which both stand above the phenomena and are instantiated in them: Second, he argues that an understanding of the world in terms of laws is incomplete, because it provides no answer to the question of why these laws obtain, when it appears that the universe could have obeyed other laws: Third, he claims that while laws may help us to think about phenomena in general terms, they describe rather than properly explain: In this tautological movement, the Understanding, as we have seen, sticks to the inert unity of the object, and the movement falls only within the Understanding itself, not within the object.

    Thus, whereas the understanding began with a conception of forces and laws as universals underlying the particular objects as they appear to us, it now sees that without the particularity of empirical phenomena, there would be no content to our talk of general laws; its claim to have established the priority of universality over particularity in this respect has therefore proved unstable. So that to use the previous examples, what tastes sweet is really, or inwardly in the thing, sour; or what is north pole in the actual magnet in the world of appearance, would be south pole in the inner or essential being; what presents itself as oxygen pole in the phenomenon of electricity would be hydrogen pole in unmanifested electricity.

    Thus the supersensible world, which is the inverted world, has at the same time overarched the other world and has it within it; it is for itself the inverted world, i. Thus, in the opening chapter of the Phenomenology, Hegel has shown how fundamental metaphysical and epistemological problems arise for consciousness because of the ways in which it has so far conceived of the relation between universals and individuals.

    Hegel has tried to demonstrate that none of these ways is adequate, as each leads consciousness into certain fundamental aporias, so that some new conception of these categories must be found if consciousness is to reach a rationally satisfactory metaphysical picture of the world. It is not entirely clear, however, how this transition 30 from the dialectic of the object to the dialectic of the subject is 31 supposed to come about.

    This makes the transition from object to subject easy to explain: This makes this reading of the transition contentious, as this Kantian treatment of Hegel is not universally accepted cf. Stern , Wartenberg , K. If this is so, then the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness cannot be explained in Kantian terms, as a realization by consciousness that it somehow determines the world. See also Harris Hegel frequently contrasts the theoretical and practical attitudes in these terms cf.

    In the theoretical approach a the initial factor is our withdrawing from natural things, leaving them as they are, and adjusting to them. In doing this we start from our senseknowledge of nature. If physics were based only on perceptions however, and perceptions were nothing but the evidence of the senses, the activity of a natural scientist would consist only of seeing, smelling, hearing, etc. The more thought predominates in ordinary perceptiveness, so much the more does the naturalness, individuality, and immediacy of things vanish away.

    As thoughts invade the limitless multiformity of nature, its richness is impoverished, its springtimes die, and there is a fading in the play of its colours. That which in nature was noisy with life, falls silent in the quietude of thought; its warm abundance, which shaped itself into a thousand intriguing wonders, withers into arid forms and shapeless generalities, which resemble a dull northern fog.

    Our aim is rather to grasp and comprehend nature however, to make it ours, so that it is not something beyond and alien to us. Faced with this breakdown, consciousness naturally recoils from the theoretical attitude, and moves over to its opposite, the practical attitude. Thus, the transition here is what one might expect from the Phenomenology as a via negativa: But at the same time it is evident that we cannot without more ado go straightaway behind appearance. Self-Consciousness Mastership and Servitude With the breakdown of consciousness, and the collapse of its purely object-centred theoretical attitude, we now move to self-consciousness, which takes up the opposing stance, by placing the subject at the centre of things.

    As one might expect, Hegel wants to show that both attitudes are one-sided: Hegel sets out the problem here quite clearly in the discussion of self-consciousness in the third part of the Encyclopedia the Philosophy of Spirit: But for us, or in itself, the object which for self-consciousness is the negative element has, on its side, returned into itself, just as on the other side consciousness has done.

    Self-consciousness therefore conceives of itself as more than a merely animal consciousness cf. At its most basic, this practical relation takes the form of desire, in which the subject exerts itself as a kind of pure will, where any sense of estrangement from the world is countered by the destruction of the object, and so by a negation of its otherness in a literal sense: Thus, with desire the subject attempts to preserve its individuality by negating the world around it.

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    With this, we already have before us the Notion of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is — this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: Thus, at the stage we have reached, the single self-consciousness is not yet able to achieve a stable sense of its own identity in the face of the other self-consciousness: On the simplest interpretation, the argument is as follows cf.

    Since the object is in its own self negation, and in being so is at the same time independent, it is consciousness. However, as I try to impose my will on you, so you will try to impose your will on me: As an argument, this has a certain plausibility: On this reading, recognition replaces desire as the outlook of self-consciousness, because it has realized that desire is contradictory: On one view, the explanation is comparable to the explanation we gave above on the desire account: As we have seen, Hegel emphasizes this lack of mutual recognition at the outset: The contrast may be put as follows: How can this be?

    On this reading, the answer is that in order to achieve recognition, I must show you that I am a subject and not a mere living thing; but although each of us knows that we are subjects, we need to convince the other that we are, for otherwise we may be seen as merely living creatures lacking in subjecthood, and so fail to be granted the recognition we require. As Sartre puts it: In order to make myself recognized by the Other, I must risk my own life. Now, textual support for this interpretation can be found from the following passages: Appearing thus immediately on the scene, they are for one another like ordinary objects, independent shapes, individuals submerged in the being [or immediacy] of Life — for the object in its immediacy is here determined as Life.

    They are, for each other, shapes of consciousness which have not yet accomplished the movement of absolute abstraction, of rooting-out all immediate being, and of being merely the purely negative being of self-identical consciousness; in other words, they have not as yet exposed themselves to each other in the form of pure being-for-self, or as self-consciousnesses. Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle.

    They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case. As he puts it in the Philosophy of Right: Even if it is right that I must risk my life at this stage, why should I do so through attempting to kill you? This, however, may seem a rather ad hoc way of bringing these two facets of the life and death struggle together. For, Hegel seems to offer a different answer to the question why I come to risk my life through the life and death struggle.

    The relevant passage is as follows: The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness. The other is an immediate consciousness entangled in a variety of relationships, and it must regard its otherness as a pure being-for-self or as an absolute negation. However, while this interpretation might explain why I would be prepared to kill you, it does not explain why I should feel compelled to do so.

    So another interpretation might be this: I only expect recognition from you in so far as I show myself to be more than an animal subject; likewise, I will only recognize you if you show yourself to be the same; so I will not recognize you without testing you to see if you are worthy of recognition, and the way to do this is to put your life in peril and see how you behave cf. And this test will involve the negation, disregard, and destruction of life.

    Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit

    Under interpretation B, self-consciousness is limited by the fact that it is unable to grant recognition to other subjects without feeling that its own autonomy is undermined. Now, it may be for this reason that in a later discussion of the life and death struggle in the Encyclopedia, Hegel seems to revert to something more like interpretation B, where the life and death struggle is said to take place because recognition at this stage is one-sided.

    It is still the case [at this point in the dialectic] that in that I recognize another as being free, I lose my freedom. At this present standpoint we have to completely forget the relationships we are used to thinking about. If we speak of right, ethicality, love, we know that in that I recognize the others, I recognize their complete personal independence. We know too that I do not suffer on this account, but have validity as a free being, that in that the others have rights I have them too, or that my right is also essentially that of the other i.

    Benevolence or love does not involve the submergence of my personality. Here, however, there is as yet no such relationship, for one aspect of the determination is that of my still being, as a free self-consciousness, an immediate and single one. Then go back to the specific paragraphs this guidebook mentions and reread them in the text. Sep 12, M. Mandoki rated it it was amazing. This is a must-have book to understand Hegel's work.

    It makes it much easier to understand The Phenomenology of Spirit, if a person reads this book first! Good intro to this book. May 07, Effie rated it liked it. I enjoyed the introduction part of the book, even though i had difficulties translating into Greek. Michael Wyatt rated it really liked it Jun 29, Shannon Gramas rated it it was amazing Sep 18, Keith Peck rated it liked it Dec 10, Alex rated it liked it Sep 09, Ricardo Rojo rated it liked it Jun 02, LauraKaarina rated it liked it Jun 05, Melika emami rated it really liked it Oct 19, Samuel Cooke rated it really liked it Oct 15, Jesse rated it liked it Dec 01, Shawn rated it it was ok Sep 07, The First Philosophy of Right.

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