Guide Campaign Promises: A Six-year Review of Arizonas Experiment with Taxpayer-financed Campaigns

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Campaign Promises: A Six-year Review of Arizona's Experiment with. Taxpayer-​financed Campaigns by Allison R. Hayward, Campaign.
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• Buckley v. Valeo | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
• Publicly funded elections
• The Biggest Issues for States to Watch in 12222
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In , the Act was revised to include pre-nomination transactions such as those involved in conventions and primary campaigns. Act of Aug.

See United States v. The Act was upheld against a challenge that it infringed upon the prerogatives of the States in Burroughs v.

The Court held that it was within the power of Congress "to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard [a Presidential] election from the improper use of money to influence the result. Although the disclosure requirements were widely circumvented, [n71] no further attempts were made to tighten them until , when the Senate passed a bill that would have closed some existing loopholes.

The attempt aborted because no similar effort was made in the House. The Act presently under review replaced all prior disclosure laws.

Its primary disclosure provisions impose reporting obligations on "political committees" and candidates. These files are subject to periodic audits and field investigations by the Commission. Each committee and each candidate also is required to file quarterly reports. They are to be made available by the Commission "for public inspection and copying. Every candidate for federal office is required to designate a "principal campaign committee," which is to receive reports of contributions and expenditures made on the candidate's behalf from other political committees and to compile and file these reports, together with its own statements, with the Commission.

Unlike the over-all limitations on contributions and expenditures, the disclosure requirements impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities. But we have repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.

Florida Legislative Comm. We long have recognized that significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest. Alabama, we have required that the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny. See Pollard v. Roberts, F. This type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights arises not through direct government action, but indirectly, as an unintended but inevitable result of the government's conduct in requiring disclosure.

NAACP v. Kusper v. Alabama and its progeny, because the Act only requires disclosure of the names of contributors, and does not compel political organizations to submit the names of their members. As we have seen, group association is protected because it enhances "[e]ffective advocacy.

The right to Join together "for the advancement of beliefs and ideas," ibid. Shultz, U. Our past decisions have not drawn fine lines between contributors and members, but have treated them interchangeably. Alabama and reversed convictions for failure to comply with a city ordinance that required the disclosure of "dues, assessments, and contributions paid, by whom and when paid.

Rumely, 34 U. Alabama is necessary because compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights. But we have acknowledged that there are governmental interests sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement, particularly when the "free functioning of our national institutions" is involved.

Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd. The governmental interests sought to be vindicated by the disclosure requirements are of this magnitude. They fall into three categories.

First, disclosure provides the electorate with information "as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate" [n77] in order to aid the voters in evaluating those [p67] who seek federal office. It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches.

The sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive, and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office. Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.

A public armed with information about a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election special favors that may be given in return. Justice Brandeis' advice:. Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman. Third, and not least significant, recordkeeping, reporting, [p68] and disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations described above.

The disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly serve substantial governmental interests. In determining whether these interests are sufficient to justify the requirements, we must look to the extent of the burden that they place on individual rights. It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute. In some instances, disclosure may even expose contributors to harassment or retaliation. These are not insignificant burdens on individual rights, and they must be weighed carefully against the interests which Congress has sought to promote by this legislation.

In this process, we note and agree with appellants' concession [n81] that disclosure requirements -- certainly in most applications -- appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist. We turn now to this contention. Appellants contend that the Act's requirements are overbroad insofar as they apply to contributions to minor [p69] parties and independent candidates because the governmental interest in this information is minimal, and the danger of significant infringement on First Amendment rights is greatly increased.

Under those circumstances, the Court held that "whatever interest the State may have in [disclosure] has not been shown to be sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional objections. Alabama mold. It concluded that substantial governmental interests in "informing the electorate and preventing the corruption of the political process" were furthered by requiring disclosure of minor parties and independent candidates, U. The court left open the question of the application of the disclosure requirements to candidates and parties who could demonstrate injury of the sort at stake in NAACP v.

No record of harassment on a similar scale was found in this case. Alabama is inapposite where, as here, any serious infringement on First Amendment rights brought about by the compelled disclosure of contributors is highly speculative. It is true that the governmental interest in disclosure is diminished when the contribution in question is made to a minor party with little chance of winning an election.

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As minor parties usually represent definite and publicized viewpoints, there may be less need to inform the voters of the interests that specific candidates represent. Major parties encompass candidates of greater diversity. In many situations, the label "Republican" or "Democrat" tells a voter little. The candidate who bears it may be supported by funds from the far right, the far left, or any place in between on the political spectrum. It is less likely that a candidate of, say, the Socialist Labor Party will represent interests that cannot be discerned from the party's ideological position.

The Government's interest in deterring the "buying" of elections and the undue influence of large contributors on officeholders also may be reduced where contributions to a minor party or an independent candidate are concerned, for it is less likely that the candidate will be victorious.

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But a minor party sometimes can play a significant role in an election. Even when a minor party candidate has little or no chance of winning, he may be encouraged by major party interests in order to divert votes from other major party contenders. We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to supporters of independents could be significant.

These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base, and thus are more vulnerable to fall-offs in contributions. In some instances, fears of reprisal may deter contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free circulation of ideas both within [n85] and without [n86] the political arena.