Manual Independent: self evolution towards constant life amendment

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The Second Amendment (Amendment II) to the United States Constitution protects the individual right to keep and bear arms. It was ratified on December 15, as part of the Bill of Rights.
Table of contents

• Article VIII
• The First Amendment in Schools: A Resource Guide
• The Fight to Bear Arms: Challenging the Second Amendment and the U.S. Constitution as a Sacred Text

The practice of medicine, using this word in its most general sense, has long been the subject of regulation. Although statutes requiring pilots to be licensed and setting reasonable competency standards e. The Court has also upheld a variety of other licensing or regulatory legislation applicable to places of amusement, grain elevators, detective agencies, the sale of cigarettes or cosmetics, and the resale of theater tickets.

A state may prohibit conduct that leads to the waste of natural resources. A state may act to conserve resources even if it works to the economic detriment of the producer. Thus, a state may forbid certain uses of natural gas, such as the production of carbon black, where the gas is burned without fully using the heat therein for other manufacturing or domestic purposes. Such regulations were sustained even where the carbon black was more valuable than the gas from which it was extracted, and notwithstanding the fact that the producer had made significant investment in a plant for the manufacture of carbon black.

Article VIII

Special pre-cautions may be required to avoid or compensate for harm caused by extraction of natural resources. Thus, a state may require the filing of a bond to secure payment for damages to any persons or property resulting from an oil and gas drilling or production operation. A statute requiring the destruction of cedar trees within two miles of apple orchards in order to prevent damage to the orchards caused by cedar rust was upheld as not unreasonable even in the absence of compensation.

Apple growing being one of the principal agricultural pursuits in Virginia and the value of cedar trees throughout the state being small as compared with that of apple orchards, the state was constitutionally competent to require the destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in the judgment of its legislature, was of greater value to the public.

A statute making it unlawful for a riparian owner to divert water into another state was held not to deprive the property owner of due process. What it has it may keep and give no one a reason for its will. Similarly, a state has sufficient control over fish and wild game found within its boundaries so that it may regulate or prohibit fishing and hunting. Oklahoma it formally overruled prior case law, indicating that state conservation measures discriminating against out-of-state persons were to be measured under the Commerce Clause.

Subsequently, in the context of recreational rather than commercial activity, the Court reached a result more deferential to state authority, holding that access to recreational big game hunting is not within the category of rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and that consequently a state could charge out-ofstaters significantly more than in-staters for a hunting license. It is now well established that states and municipalities have the police power to zone land for designated uses.

Zoning authority gained judicial recognition early in the 20th century. Initially, an analogy was drawn to public nuisance law, so that states and their municipal subdivisions could declare that specific businesses, although not nuisances per se , were nuisances in fact and in law in particular circumstances and in particular localities. With increasing urbanization came a broadening of the philosophy of land-use regulation to protect not only health and safety but also the amenities of modern living.

Governments may regulate the height of buildings, establish building setback requirements, preserve open spaces through density controls and restrictions on the numbers of houses , and preserve historic structures. Similarly, black persons cannot be forbidden to occupy houses in blocks where the greater number of houses are occupied by white persons, or vice versa. In one aspect of zoning—the degree to which such decisions may be delegated to private persons—the Court has not been consistent. Thus, for instance, it invalidated a city ordinance which conferred the power to establish building setback lines upon the owners of two thirds of the property abutting any street.

In its most recent decision, the Court upheld a city charter provision permitting a petition process by which a citywide referendum could be held on zoning changes and variances. The Due Pro-cess Clause does not prohibit a state from varying the rights of those receiving benefits under intestate laws. Because rights of succession to property are of statutory creation, the Court explained, New York could have conditioned any further exercise of testamentary power upon the giving of right of election to the surviving spouse regardless of any waiver, however formally executed.

Even after the creation of a testamentary trust, a state retains the power to devise new and reasonable directions to the trustee to meet new conditions arising during its administration. For instance, the Great Depression resulted in the default of numerous mortgages which were held by trusts, which had the affect of putting an unexpected accumulation of real property into those trusts.

The states have significant discretion to regulate abandoned property. For instance, states have several jurisdictional bases to allow for the lawful application of escheat and abandoned property laws to out-of-state corporations.

The relationship between New York and its residents who abandon claims against foreign insurance companies, and between New York and foreign insurance companies doing business therein, is sufficiently close to give New York jurisdiction. New Jersey , a divided Court held that due process is not violated by a state statute escheating shares of stock in a domestic corporation, including unpaid dividends, even though the last known owners were nonresidents and the stock was issued and the dividends held in another state.

Short , which upheld an Indiana statute that terminated interests in coal, oil, gas, or other minerals that had not been used in twenty years, and that provided for reversion to the owner of the interest out of which the mining interests had been carved. Indeed, merely filing a claim with the local recorder would preserve the interest. Even under the narrowest concept of the police power as limited by substantive due process, it was generally conceded that states could exercise the power to protect the public health, safety, and morals. There are few constitutional restrictions on the extensive state regulations on the production and distribution of food and drugs.

There also can be no question of the authority of the state, in the interest of public health and welfare, to forbid the sale of drugs by itinerant vendors or the sale of spectacles by an establishment where a physician or optometrist is not in charge. Equally valid as police power regulations are laws forbidding the sale of ice cream not containing a reasonable proportion of butter fat, of condensed milk made from skimmed milk rather than whole milk, or of food preservatives containing boric acid. The Court reasoned that filled milk is inferior to whole milk in its nutritional content and cannot be served to children as a substitute for whole milk without producing a dietary deficiency.

Even before the passage of the 21st Amendment, which granted states the specific authority to regulate alcoholic beverages, the Supreme Court had found that the states have significant authority in this regard.

For instance, various measures designed to reduce fire hazards have been upheld. These include municipal ordinances that prohibit the storage of gasoline within feet of any dwelling, require that all gas storage tanks with a capacity of more than ten gallons be buried at least three feet under ground, or prohibit washing and ironing in public laundries and wash houses within defined territorial limits from 10 p. States exercise extensive regulation over transportation safety.

Although state highways are used primarily for private purposes, they are public property, and the use of a highway for financial gain may be prohibited by the legislature or conditioned as it sees fit. A state may also fix minimum rates applicable to such private carriers, which are not less than those prescribed for common carriers, as a valid as a means of conserving highways. In exercising its authority over its highways, a state is not limited to the raising of revenue for maintenance and reconstruction or to regulating the manner in which vehicles shall be operated, but may also prevent the wear and hazards due to excessive size of vehicles and weight of load.

Thus, legislation suppressing prostitution or gambling will be upheld by the Court as within the police power of a state. Accordingly, a state statute may provide that judgment against a party to recover illegal gambling winnings may be enforced by a lien on the property of the owner of the building where the gambling transaction was conducted when the owner knowingly consented to the gambling. Similarly, a statute creating an additional remedy for enforcing liability does not, as applied to stockholders then holding stock, violate due process.

Some rules of law probably could not be changed retroactively without hardship and oppression. Assuming that statutes of limitation, like other types of legislation, could be so manipulated that their retroactive effects would offend the constitution, certainly it cannot be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive a state of the power to determine what duties may be performed by local officers, and whether they shall be appointed or popularly elected.

As long as the judgment continues as an existing liability, no unconstitutional deprivation is experienced. Local units of government obliged to surrender property to other units newly created out of the territory of the former cannot successfully invoke the Due Process Clause, nor may taxpayers allege any unconstitutional deprivation as a result of changes in their tax burden attendant upon the consolidation of contiguous municipalities.

It was not contemplated that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment would restrain or cripple the taxing power of the states. Theoretically, public moneys cannot be expended for other than public purposes.

Some early cases applied this principle by invalidating taxes judged to be imposed to raise money for purely private rather than public purposes. A tax measured by the net income of residents is an equitable method of distributing the burdens of government among those who are privileged to enjoy its benefits. The routine practice of making taxes retroactive for the entire year of the legislative session in which the tax is enacted has long been upheld, and there are also situations in which courts have upheld retroactive application to the preceding year or two. A state also has broad tax authority over wills and inheritance.

A state may apply an inheritance tax to the transmission of property by will or descent, or to the legal privilege of taking property by devise or descent, although such tax must be consistent with other due process considerations. The taxation of entities that are franchises within the jurisdiction of the governing body raises few concerns. Thus, a city ordinance imposing annual license taxes on light and power companies does not violate the Due Process Clause merely because the city has entered the power business in competition with such companies.

States have significant discretion in how to value real property for tax purposes. Thus, assessment of properties for tax purposes over real market value is allowed as merely another way of achieving an increase in the rate of property tax, and does not violate due process. A state also has wide discretion in how to apportion real property tax burdens. Thus, a state may defray the entire expense of creating, developing, and improving a political subdivision either from funds raised by general taxation, by apportioning the burden among the municipalities in which the improvements are made, or by creating or authorizing the creation of tax districts to meet sanctioned outlays.

On the other hand, when the benefit to be derived by a railroad from the construction of a highway will be largely offset by the loss of local freight and passenger traffic, an assessment upon such railroad violates due process, whereas any gains from increased traffic reasonably expected to result from a road improvement will suffice to sustain an assessment thereon. The operation of the Due Process Clause as a ju-risdictional limitation on the taxing power of the states has been an issue in a variety of different contexts, but most involve one of two basic questions.

First, is there a sufficient relationship between the state exercising taxing power and the object of the exercise of that power?

1. Freedom of Expression: The Philosophical Basis;
2. A Place to Fear.
3. Judicial Department.
4. Macbeth by William Shakespeare.
5. Account Options.
6. Limitied Government.

North Dakota , however, used a two-tier analysis that found sufficient contact to satisfy due process but not dormant commerce clause requirements. In Quill , the Court struck down a state statute requiring an out-of-state mail order company with neither outlets nor sales representatives in the state to collect and transmit use taxes on sales to state residents, but did so based on Commerce Clause rather than due process grounds. Even prior to the ratification of the Four-teenth Amendment, it was a settled principle that a state could not tax land situated beyond its limits.

A state may tax tangible property lo-cated within its borders either directly through an ad valorem tax or indirectly through death taxes irrespective of the residence of the owner. Thus, when rolling stock is permanently located and used in a business outside the boundaries of a domiciliary state, the latter has no jurisdiction to tax it. Conversely, a nondomiciliary state, although it may not tax property belonging to a foreign corporation that has never come within its borders, may levy a tax on movables that are regularly and habitually used and employed in that state.

To determine whether a state may tax intangible personal property, the Court has applied the fiction mobilia sequuntur personam movable property follows the person and has also recognized that such property may acquire, for tax purposes, a permanent business or commercial situs.

The Court, however, has never clearly disposed of the issue whether multiple personal property taxation of intangibles is consistent with due process. Constitutional lawyers speculated whether the Court would sustain a tax by all three jurisdictions, or by only two of them. The following personal property taxes on intangibles have been invalidated: 1 debts evidenced by notes in safekeeping within the taxing state, but made and payable and secured by property in a second state and owned by a resident of a third state; 2 a tax, measured by income, levied on trust certificates held by a resident, representing interests in various parcels of land some inside the state and some outside , the holder of the certificates, though without a voice in the management of the property, being entitled to a share in the net income and, upon sale of the property, to the proceeds of the sale.

The Court also invalidated a property tax sought to be collected from a life beneficiary on the corpus of a trust composed of property located in another state and as to which the beneficiary had neither control nor possession, apart from the receipt of income therefrom. Norfolk , is distinguishable by virtue of the fact that the property tax therein voided was levied upon a resident beneficiary rather than upon a resident trustee in control of nonresident intangibles.

Virginia , where a property tax was unsuccessfully demanded of a nonresident trustee with respect to nonresident intangibles under its control. Also a domiciliary state that imposes no franchise tax on a stock fire insurance corporation may assess a tax on the full amount of paid-in capital stock and surplus, less deductions for liabilities, notwithstanding that such domestic corporation concentrates its executive, accounting, and other business offices in New York, and maintains in the domiciliary state only a required registered office at which local claims are handled.