From Watergate to Whitewater: The Public Integrity War (Contributions in Comparative Colonial)

Editorial Reviews. Review. "Roberts and Doss have produced a very important, timely, and From Watergate to Whitewater: The Public Integrity War ( Contributions in Comparative Colonial) - Kindle edition by Marion T. Doss, Robert North.
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He joined the firm after 15 years with the Department of Justice, during which he held the following positions: Acting deputy attorney general, assistant attorney general for the criminal division, and U. He is co-chairman of the corporate investigations and criminal defense practice group. Weld is a former two-term governor of Massachusetts, graduate of the Harvard Law School. Governor Weld began his legal career as a counsel with the House Judiciary Committee during the Watergate impeachment inquiry.

He then served as U. He served as undersecretary of the treasury for enforcement, ; as deputy assistant attorney general and chief of staff in the criminal division of the Department of Justice, ; and as assistant United States attorney in the eastern district of Pennsylvania, Before recognizing each of you, in whatever order you choose to go, although it's probably just as simple to start on my left to the right, I would like to recognize the ranking minority member, John Conyers, for a statement if he wishes to make one.

Could I delay my statement, Mr. Sullivan, turn the mike toward you and put the switch on, please. Is that all right? Members of the Judiciary Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the professional standards for obstruction of justice and perjury. My qualifications to discuss this subject include over 40 years of practice in federal criminal cases, chiefly in Chicago but also in other cities. During most of that time, I have acted as defense counsel for persons accused of or under investigation for criminal conduct.

For four years, from to , I served as the United States attorney for the northern district of Illinois. Chairman Hyde and Mr. Schippers are known to me from the practice in Chicago, and I believe they can vouch for my qualifications. During the past 35 years, I have taken an interest in, but no part in, politics. While I am a registered Democrat, I consider myself independent at the ballot box and I've often voted for Republican candidates.

I have prosecuted as well as defended Democrat and Republican office holders. I appear today not as an advocate or partisan for President Clinton or the Democrat Party, but rather as a lawyer of rather long experience who may be able to assist you in your deliberations on the serious and weighty matters you now have before you. The topic of my testimony is prosecutorial standards under which cases involving alleged perjury and obstruction of justice are evaluated by responsible federal prosecutors. In the federal criminal justice system, indictments for obstruction of justice and perjury are relatively rare.

There are several reasons. One is that charges of obstruction and perjury are not substantive crimes but rather have to do with circumstances peripheral to underlying criminal conduct. The facts giving rise to the obstruction or perjury arise during the course of an investigation involving other matters, and, when prosecuted, are usually tagged on as charges additional to the underlying criminal conduct. The law of perjury can be particularly arcane, including the requirements that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his testimony to be false at the time he or she testified, that the alleged false testimony was material, and that any ambiguity or uncertainty about what the question or answer meant must be construed in favor of the defendant.

Both perjury and obstruction of justice are what are known as specific intent crimes, putting a heavy burden on the prosecutor to establish the defendant's state of mind, Furthermore, because perjury and obstruction charges often arise from private dealings with few observes, the court have required either two witnesses who testified directly to the facts establishing the crime, or, if only one witness testifies to the facts constituting the alleged perjury that there be substantial corroborating proof to establish guilt.

Responsible prosecutors do not bring these charges lightly. There is another cautionary note, and this, I think, is very significant here. Federal prosecutors do not use the criminal process in connection with civil litigation involving private parties. The reasons are obvious. If the federal prosecutors got involved in charges and counter- charges of perjury and obstruction of justice in discovery or trial of civil cases, there would be little time left for the kinds of important matters that are the major targets of the Department of Justice criminal guidelines.

Further, there are well- established remedies available to civil litigants who believe perjury or obstruction has occurred. Therefore, it is rare that the federal criminal process is used with respect to allegations of perjury or obstruction in civil matters. The ultimate issue for a prosecutor deciding whether or not to seek an indictment is whether he or she is convinced that the evidence is sufficient to obtain a conviction; that is, whether there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.

This is far more than a probable-cause standard, which is the test by which grand jury indictments are judged. Responsible prosecutors do not submit cases to a grand jury for indictment based upon probable cause. They do not run cases up the flagpole to see how the jury will react. They do not use indictments for deterrence or as a punishment. Responsible prosecutors attempt to determine whether the proof is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

If the answer is yes and there are no reasons to exercise discretion in favor of levity, the case is submitted to the grand jury for indictment, which, where I come from-- and everywhere else I know about--is routine and automatic. Some years ago, during the Bush administration, I was asked by an independent counsel to act as a special assistant to bring an indictment against and try a former member of President Reagan's cabinet. Having looked at the evidence, I declined to do so because I concluded that when all the evidence was considered, the case for conviction was doubtful and that there were innocent and reasonable explanations for the allegedly wrongful conduct.

Having reviewed the evident here, I have reached the same conclusion. It is my opinion that the case set out in the Starr report would not be prosecuted as a criminal case by a responsible federal prosecutor. Before addressing the specific facts of the several of the charges, let me say that in conversations with many current and former federal prosecutors in whose judgment I have great faith, virtually all concur that if the president were not involved, if an ordinary citizen were the subject of the inquiry, no serious consideration would be given to a criminal prosecution arising from alleged misconduct in discovery in the Jones civil case having to do with an alleged cover-up of a private sexual affair with another woman, or the follow-on testimony before the grand jury.

This case would simply not be given serious consideration for prosecution. It wouldn't get in the door. It would be declined out of hand. A threshold question is whether, if the president is not above the law, as he should not been, is he to be treated as below the law?

Is he to be singled out for prosecution because of his office in a case in which, were he a private citizen, no prosecution would result? I believe the president should be treated in the criminal justice system in the same way as any other United States citizen. If that were the case here, it is my view that the alleged obstruction of justice and perjury would not be prosecuted by a responsible United States attorney.

Having said that, I would like to address several of the specific charges in the Starr report. The first has to do with perjury in the president's deposition and before the grand jury about whether or not he had a sexual affair, relationship or relations with Ms. That definition, which you have before you in the papers, is difficult to parse, and one can argue either side; but it is clear to me that the president's interpretation is a reasonable one, especially because Rep.

Sullivan, I hate to interrupt, but your time has expired. Now, do you think in another three minutes you could wind up? I will--I think I can. Then we'll continue it for three minutes. Thank you very much, Mr. It's clear to me that the president's interpretation is a reasonable one, especially because the words which seem to describe oral sex--the words which seem to describe directly oral sex were stricken from the definition by the judge.

In perjury prosecution, the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew when he gave the testimony, he was telling a falsehood. The lying must be known and deliberate. It is not perjury for a witness to evade or frustrate of answer non-responsibly. The evidence simply does not support the conclusion that the president knowingly committed perjury, and the case is so doubtful and weak that a responsible prosecutor would not present it to the grand jury.

Let me turn to the issue of obstruction through delivery of gifts to Ms. Some of the evidence on this subject is not recounted in the Starr Report, but a responsible prosecutor will not ignore the proof consistent with innocence, or which shows that an element--an essential element of the case is absent. The evidence is that when talking to the president, Ms. Lewinsky brought up the subject of having Mrs. Currie hold the gifts.

Currie and asked Mrs. Currie to come to Ms. Lewinsky's home to take the gifts and [[ Page H ]] Mrs. Lewinsky testified that Mrs. Currie placed the call to Ms. But the central point in this is, that neither Mrs. Lewinsky testified that the president suggested to Ms. Lewinsky that she had the gifts, or that the president told Mrs. Currie to get the gifts from Ms. Under these circumstances, it is my view that a responsible prosecutor would not charge the president with obstruction, because there is no evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, that the president was involved.

Indeed, it seems likely that Ms. Lewinsky was the sole moving force, having broached the idea to the president, but having received no response or encouragement, she called Mrs. Currie to take the gifts without the president's knowledge or encouragement. That is not the stuff of which an obstruction charge is made. Because of time, I'm going to skip over my third example, and go to my conclusion. Which was about influencing Mrs. Time does not permit me to go through all of the allegations of misconduct in the Starr Report. Suffice it to say, that in my opinion, none of them is of the nature which a responsible federal prosecutor would present to a federal grand jury for indictment.

I will be pleased to respond to your questions. Thank you very much, and particularly for the extra time. This is a formal proceeding. And in the chamber of Congress, we never--unlike in certain state legislatures--introduce people in the gallery. But this is a special day, and we have someone in the audience that I think ought to be introduced. And with the permission of the gentleman from Massachusetts, I'd like to introduce Elsie Frank, Barney Frank's mother.

Conyers, members of the committee Rep. I'm reluctant to do this, but in the sense of fairness, do you think that since Mr. Sullivan was afforded an additional three minutes, that we should make that offer to the other members of the panel, if it comes to that? I'd rather face that critical decision Rep. But for the remaining four, at least I tried. I will try and summarize my longer, written statement, which the committee has.

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There can be no doubt that the decision as to whether to prosecute a particular individual is an extraordinarily serious matter. Good prosecutors thus approach this decision with a genuine seriousness, carefully analyzing the facts in the law, and setting aside personal feelings about the person under investigation. In making a prosecution decision, as recognized by Justice Department policy, the initial question for any prosecutor, is can the case be won at trial.

Simply stated, no prosecutor should bring a case if he or she does not believe that, based upon the facts in the law, it is more likely than not that they will prevail at trial. Cases that are likely to be lost, cannot be brought simply to make a point, or to express a sense of moral outrage, however justified such a sense of outrage might be. You have to truly believe you will win the case. I would respectfully suggest that the same principle should guide the House of Representatives as it determines to, in effect, make the decision as to whether to commence a prosecution by impeaching of the president.

Indeed, if anything, the strength of the evidence should be greater to justify impeachment, than to try a criminal case. In the context of perjury prosecutions, there are some specific considerations which are present when deciding whether such a case can be won. First, it is virtually unheard of to bring a perjury prosecution based solely on the conflicting testimony of two people. The inherent problems in bringing such a case are compounded to the extent that any credibility issues exist as to the government's sole witness.

Second, questions and answers are often imprecise. Questions sometimes are vague, or used summarily to define terms, and interrogators frequently asked compound or inarticulate questions, and fail to follow up imprecise answerers. Witnesses often meander through an answer, wandering around a question, but never really answering it. In a perjury case, where the precise language of a question and answer are so relevant, this makes perjury prosecutions difficult, because the persecutor must establish that the witness understood the question, intended to give a false, not simply an evasive answer, and in fact did so.

The problem of establishing such intentional falsity is compounded, in civil cases, by the reality that lawyers routinely counsel their clients to answer only the question asked, not to volunteer, and not to help out an inarticulate questioner. Like other answers, such a response can be true or false, but it is a heavy burden to prove that a witness truly remembered the fact at issue. The ability to do so, will often depend on the nature of that fact.

Precise times of meetings, names of people one has met, and details of conversations, and sequences of events, indeed, even if those events are of fairly recent origin, are often difficult to remember. Forgetting a dramatic event, is however more difficult to justify. The ability to win a trial is not however the only consideration guiding a decision whether to prosecute. Other factors reflected in the Justice Department guidelines include federal law enforcement priorities, the nature and seriousness of the offense, the impact of the offense on any victim, whether there has been restitution, deterrence, in the criminal history of the accused.

Before turning to the application of these principles to the facts at hand, I should say that in my work at the Watergate Special Prosecutor's office, I was involved in applying these principle in extraordinarily high profile cases. While we successfully prosecuted a number of matters, we also declined to proceed in a number of close cases. We did so even in circumstances where we believed in our heart that a witness had deliberately lied under oath, or committed some other wrongful act, but simply concluded that we were not sufficiently so certain that we would prevail at trial.

I will not turn to the issue of whether, from the perspective of a prosecutor, there exists a prosecutable case for perjury in front of the grand jury. The answer to me is clearly no. The president acknowledged to the grand jury the existence of an improper intimate relationship with Monica Lewinsky, but argued wit the prosecutors questioning him, that his acknowledged was not a sexual relationship as he understood the definition of that term being used in the Jones deposition. Engaging in such a debate, whether wise or unwise politically, simply does not form the basis for a perjury prosecution.

Indeed, in the end, the entire basis for a grand jury perjury prosecution comes down to Monica Lewinsky's assertion that there was a reciprocal nature to their relationship, and that the president touched her private parts with the intent to arouse or gratify her, and the president's denial that he did so. Putting aside whether this is the type of difference of testimony which should justify an impeachment of a president, I do not believe that a case involving this kind of conflict between two witnesses would be brought by a prosecutor, since it would not be won at trial.

A prosecutor would understand the problem created by the fact that both individuals had an incentive to lie--the president to avoid acknowledging a false statement at his civil deposition, and Miss Lewinsky to avoid the demeaning nature of providing wholly unreciprocated sex. Indeed, this incentive existed when Miss Lewinsky described the relationship to the confidantes described in the independent counsel's referral. Equally as important, however, Mr. Starr has himself questioned the veracity of his one witness, Miss Lewinsky, by questioning her testimony that his office suggested she tape record Ms.

Jordan, and potentially the president. And in any trial, the independent counsel would also be arguing that other key points in Miss Lewinsky's testimony are false, including where she explicitly rejects the notion that she was asked to lie and that assistance in her job search was an inducement for her to do so. It also was extraordinarily unlikely that in ordinary circumstances a prosecutor would bring a prosecution for perjury in the president's civil deposition in the Jones case, First, while one could always find isolated contrary examples, under the prosecution principles discussed above, perjury prosecutions involving civil cases are rare and it would be even more unusual to see such a prosecution where the case had been dismissed on unrelated grounds and then settled, particularly where the settlement occurred after disclosure of the purported false testimony.

Second, perjury charges on peripheral issues are also uncommon. Perjury prosecutions are generally filed where the false statement goes to the core of the matter under inquiry. Indeed, in order to prevail in a perjury prosecution, the prosecutor must establish not only that the testimony was false, but that the purported false testimony was material. Here, the Jones case was about whether then-governor Clinton sought unwanted sexual favors from a state employee in Arkansas. Monica Lewinsky herself had nothing to do with the actual facts at issue in that suit.

This deposition was about the Jones case. It was not part of a general investigation into the Monica Lewinsky affair, and that is important on the materiality issue. Given the lack of connection between these two events, under the applicable rules of evident, her purely consensual relationship with the president half a decade later would, I believe, not have even been admissible at any ultimate trial of the Jones case.

While the court allowed questioning in the civil deposition about this matter, the judge did so under the very broad standard used in civil discovery. Indeed, while not dealing with the admissibility issue, had there been no independent counsel inquiry after the controversy about the President's relationship with Miss Lewinsky arose, the court considered this testimony sufficiently immaterial so as to preclude testimony about it at the trial. Finally, the ability to prove the intentional making of false statements in the [[ Page H ]] civil deposition is compounded by inexact questions, evasive and inconsistent answers, insufficient follow-up by the questioner, and reliance by the examiner on a definition of sexual relations rather than asking about specific acts.

But whatever the ability to meet the standard of proof on this issue as to any particular question, this simply is not a perjury case that would be brought. It involves difficult proof issues as to, at best, peripheral issues where complete and truthful testimony would be of doubtful admissibility, in a settled civil case which had already been dismissed. This simply is not the stuff of criminal prosecution. Turning to the issues of obstruction of justice involving the Paula Jones case, a prosecutor analyzing the case would be effected by many of the same weaknesses that are discussed above.

These weaknesses, as well as additional problems with such a case are discussed in my written statement and I will not comment on them, you know, orally, in the interest of time. Before concluding, I would like to make two closing observations, and I will be, with your permission, just a minute or so. In August, , prior to the pardon, the Watergate special prosecution force commenced the extraordinarily difficult process of whether--determining whether--to indict then-former President Nixon.

In my memorandum analyzing the relevant factors which should ultimately affect such a decision, and proceeding in that memorandum on the belief not present here that adequate evidence clearly existed to support the bringing of such criminal charges, I articulated two primary and competing considerations which I believed it appropriate for us then, as prosecutors, to consider.

The first factor was to avoid a sense of a double standard by declining to prosecute a plainly guilty person because he had been president. The second was that prosecutors should not proceed with even provable charges if they conclude that important and valid societal benefits would be sacrificed by doing so. In the Nixon case, as articulated in my memorandum, such a benefit was the desirability of putting the turmoil of the past two years behind us so as to better be able to proceed with the country's business.

The second was the prosecutor should not proceed with even provable charges if they conclude that important and balanced societal benefits would be sacrificed by doing so. In the Nixon case, as I articulated in my memorandum, such a benefit was the desirability of putting the turmoil of the past two years behind us so as to better be able to proceed with the country's business.

I believe today, 25 years later, that it is still appropriate for those deciding whether to bring charges to consider these factors. Finally, prosecutors often feel a sense of frustration if they cannot express their sense that a wrong has been committed by bringing charges. But not every wrong is a crime, and wrongful noncriminal conduct sometimes can be addressed without the commencing of any proceeding.

Apart from issues of censure, we live in a democracy, and one sanction that can be imposed is by the voters acting through the exercise of their right to vote. President Clinton lied to the American people, and if they believe it appropriate they were free to voice their approval by voting against his party in , and remain free to do so in , as occurred in when the Democrats secured major gains. The answer to every wrongful act is not the invocation of punitive legal processes.

Conyers, members of the House of Representatives committee on the Judiciary, I am opposed to the impeachment of President Clinton. My opposition is grounded in part in my belief that a criminal conviction would be extremely difficult to obtain in a court of law. There is very weak proof of the criminal intent of the president. The Lewinsky affair is of questionable materiality to the proceedings in which it was raised. And I believe that a jury would be sympathetic to any person charged with perjury for dancing around questions put to them that demanded an admission of marital infidelity; that is, unless the answers were essential to the resolution of a very substantial claim.

On another level, I sense an impeachment under these circumstances would prove extremely divisive for the country, inflaming the passions of those who would see impeachment as an attempt to thwart the election process for insubstantial reasons. Perjury and obstruction of justice are serious offenses.

However, in my experience perjury or obstruction of justice prosecutions of parties in private civil litigation are rare. Rarer still are criminal investigations in the course of civil litigation in anticipation of incipient perjury or obstruction of justice. In such circumstances prosecutors are justifiably concerned about the appearance that government is taking the side of one private party against another.

The oath taken by witnesses demands full and truthful testimony at depositions and in grand jury proceedings-- excuse me, demands truthful testimony at depositions and in grand jury proceedings. Nonetheless, imprecise, ambiguous, evasive and even misleading responses to questions don't support perjury prosecutions, even though such responses may raise serious questions about the credibility of a witness on a particular subject.

Proof that a witness's testimony is untrue is not sufficient alone to prove perjury, and to prove that a witness is intentionally evasive or nonresponsive is not sufficient to prove perjury either. Courts are rigorously literal in passing on questions of ambiguity in the questions and the responses of witnesses under oath, and generally give the accused the benefit of any doubt on possible interpretations of the questions and the meaning of the allegedly perjurious response.

Perjury cases are very difficult to win under the most favorable circumstances. I believe the question of whether there were sexual relations between the president and Ms. Lewinsky is collateral to the harassment claim in the Jones case. The president has confessed to an inappropriate relationship with Ms. The Jones case was dismissed and is now settled. These circumstances simply would not warrant the bringing of a criminal prosecution, and a criminal prosecution would most likely fail. Certainly the exercise of sound prosecutorial discretion would not dictate prosecuting such a case.

The consequences of the impeachment of the president of the United States are far reaching. These consequences are grave, and they impact the entire nation. Impeachment in my view should not serve as a punishment for a president who has admittedly gone astray in his family life, as grave as that might be in personal terms.

Where there is serious doubt, as there must be in this case, prudence demands that Congress defer to the electoral mandate. I too will attempt to keep my remarks within 10 minutes, Mr. Ranking Minority Member, and members of the committee, before I begin my formal remarks, let me extend my thanks to the following people who helped prepare me under these rushed circumstances: I have been trying to give them hypotheticals with which they could learn or from which they could learn.

I told them I will be the best prop they will have today. I am honored to appear before you today. I will discuss the factors ordinarily considered by federal prosecutors and federal agents in deciding whether to investigate, indict and prosecute allegations of violations of federal criminal law. I submit that a federal prosecutor ordinarily would not prosecute a case against a private citizen based on the facts set forth in the Starr referral.

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My experience, which forms the basis of my testimony, is as follows: I have served as an assistant U. Attorney, a chief of staff and deputy assistant attorney general in the Justice Department's Criminal Division during the Reagan and Bush administrations, and undersecretary of the Treasury for enforcement in the Clinton administration, and I am currently a professor at the New York University School of Law where I teach, as I said, a course in evidence.

When investigating a possible violation of the law, every federal prosecutor must heed the guidelines of the Department of Justice. DOJ guidelines recognize that a criminal prosecution entails profound consequences for the accused and the family of the accused, whether or not a conviction ultimately results. Career federal prosecutors recognize that federal law enforcement resources and federal judicial resources are not sufficient to permit prosecution of every alleged offense over which federal jurisdiction exists.

Federal prosecutors are told to consider the nature and seriousness of the offense, as well as available taxpayer resources. Often these resources are scarce and influence the decision to proceed or not to proceed and a decision how to proceed. Federal prosecutors may properly weight such questions as to whether the violation is technical or relatively inconsequential in nature, and what the public attitude is towards prosecution under the circumstances of the case.

What will happen in the public confidence and the rule of law if no prosecution is brought, or if a prosecution results in an acquittal? Even before the Clinton-Lewinsky matter arose, DOJ guidelines intimated that prosecutors should pause before bringing a prosecution where the public may be indifferent or even opposed to enforcement of a controlling statute, whether on substantive grounds or because of a history of nonenforcement, or because the offense involves essentially a minor matter of private concern and the victim is not interested in having it pursued.

Yet public sentiment against should not discourage prosecutors from bring charges simply because a biased and prejudiced public is against prosecution. For example, in a civil rights case or a case involving an extremely popular political figure, it might be clear that the evidence of guilt viewed objectively and by an unbiased fact-finder would be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction. Yet the prosecutor might reasonably doubt whether the jury would convict. In [[ Page H ]] such a case, despite his or her negative assessment of the likelihood of a guilty verdict, based on factors extraneous to an objective view of the law and facts, the prosecutors may properly conclude that it is necessary and desirable to commence of recommend prosecution, and allow the criminal process to operate in accordance with its principles.

During the civil rights era many prosecutions were brought against people for locally popular but no less heinous crimes against blacks. However, prosecutors should not bring charges on public sentiment in favor of prosecution when a decision to prosecute cannot be supported on grounds deemed legitimate by the prosecutor. DOJ prosecutors are discouraged from pursuing criminal prosecutions simply because probable cause exists. And a number of the witnesses have already addressed this point. Because probable cause can be met in a given case, it does not automatically warrant prosecution.

Further investigation may be warranted, and the prosecutor should still take into account all relevant considerations in deciding upon his or her course of actions. Prosecutors are admonished not to recommend in an indictment charges that they cannot reasonably expect to prove beyond a reasonable doubt by the legally sufficient evidence at trial. It is one of the most important criteria that prosecutors must consider. Prosecution should never be brought where probable cause does not exist, and both as a matter of fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution should be initiated against any person unless the government believes that the person will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact.

Federal prosecutors and federal agents as a rule ought to stay out of the private sexual lives of consenting adults. Neither federal prosecutors nor federal investigators consider it a priority to invest allegations of perjury in connection with the lawful, extramarital, consensual, private sexual conduct of citizens. In my view, this is a good thing. From a proactive perspective, who among us would want the federal government to initiate sting operations against private citizens to see if we lie about our extramarital affairs or the nature of our sexual conduct.

Imagine a rule that required all federal job applicants to answer the following question under oath: It certainly would be relevant and it certainly might lead to blackmail. Irrespective of constitutional challenges from a public policy standpoint, most Americans would object to federal prosecutors and federal agents investigating and prosecuting those cases that came to our attention.

Could we trust our government to make fair, equitable and restrained decisions about how much to investigate any one of these allegations? The potential for abuse and violation of our right to privacy would be great. Indeed, assigning federal agents to interview witnesses, install wiretaps and insert bugs to learn about the private, legal, sexual conduct of U. But aggressive prosecutors and agents would do exactly that to make cases against those citizens where prosecutions would garner publicity and thereby act as a deterrent.

In my view, the biggest target would be politicians. As a general matter, federal prosecutors are not asked to bring federal criminal charges against individuals who allegedly perjure themselves in connection with civil lawsuits. As a rule, federal prosecutors on their own do not seek to bring criminal charges against people who perjure themselves in connection with civil depositions, for the reasons that have already been articulated. Parties by definition are biased, and it would be difficult to discount the potential bias.

By their nature, lawsuits have remedies built into the system. Lying litigants can be exposed as such and lose their lawsuits. The judge overseeing the lawsuit is in the best position to receive evidence about false statements, deceitful conduct, and even perjured testimony.

She can sanction violating litigants by initiating civil or criminal contempt proceedings. Notwithstanding the reasons generally, there are 10 good reasons, taken in combination, which support the view that a career federal prosecutor asked to investigate allegations like those in the Clinton-Lewinsky matter would not pursue federal criminal prosecution to the indictment or trial stage. One, the alleged perjury occurred in a civil deposition and concerned private, lawful, sexual conduct between consenting adults.

Two, the alleged perjured testimony was deemed inadmissible by the trial judge. Three, that evidence arguably was dismissed as immaterial by the trial judge. Four, in any event, the alleged perjured testimony was, at most, marginally relevant. Five, the alleged perjured testimony did not affect the outcome of the case. Six, the parties settled and a court dismissed the underlying civil suit. Seven, the settlement of the suit prevented the appellate court from ruling on a dismissal and on the materiality of alleged perjured testimony. Eight, the theoretically harmed party knew of the alleged perjury prior to settlement.

Nine, alleged--and I say alleged--political enemies of the defendant funded it in a plaintiff's suit. Ten, a federal government informant conspired with one of the civil litigants to trap the alleged perjurer into perjuring himself. Given the above considerations, most federal prosecutors would not want to use taxpayer dollars, federal agents and sensitive federal investigative resources to uncover the most intimate and embarrassing details of the private sexual lives of consenting adults when there is a risk of bias and when there is a judge in a position to address the alleged criminal conduct.

The judgment that a career prosecutor might make about an ordinary person might be very well affected by the knowledge that the alleged perjury was committed by the president. That is to be conceded. Even the most experienced, fair-minded prosecutor will find it difficult not to pursue allegations of criminal misconduct against a president, a senator, a governor, any member of Congress.

The interest in targeting, threatening and harming the president, especially, can be explained in part by the power and visibility of his office. Even a prosecutor with exceptional judgment might be tempted by the challenge of bringing down a president. A prosecutor with unchecked power, unlimited resources and only one target might find the temptation even stronger.

Chairman, I believe I can conclude in two minutes, with the permission of the chairman.


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It is difficult to think of a fail-safe structure that could protect anyone from allegations of bias in a decision to prosecute or not prosecute the president. Not the attorney general, the independent counsel, the Justice Department, the FBI, the Secret Service, the federal judiciary, the congress, the bar and the academy can escape some person or act in their background that could create a conflict or an appearance of a conflict.

No one for or against prosecution would be safe from attack on the merits or from false personal attacks. For this reason, a prosecutor or a committee assigned such a case must strive to be objective, knowing that criticism of bias will be unavoidable. In a prosecutorial context, a to vote by the grand jury constitutes enough votes to proceed, but reflects that there must be, or might be, a serious problem with some aspect of the case. Similarly, a vote for impeachment based on a party-line vote or near party-line vote is a signal that something is wrong or may be wrong with the case and that the case may not be worth pursuing.

This is particularly true where the overwhelming majority of Americans appear to be well-informed about the allegations and unbiased as a group, yet they do not want this president impeached. While indictments and impeachment proceedings are different, they carry at least two similarities. One, most of us know it when we see the clear cases for criminal conviction and for impeachment.


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Two, public confidence in the rule of law and our system of government would suffer if we regularly indicted cases or impeached presidents, only to have juries or the Senate vote to acquit. Indictments and impeachments that result in acquittal ought to be avoided where possible. No prosecutor would be permitted to bring a prosecution where she believed that there was no chance that an unbiased jury would convict.

Almost no one in this country believes that the U. Senate will convict the president on any potential article of impeachment. Members of Congress should consider the impact that a long and, no doubt, sensationalized trial will have on the country, especially a trial that will not result in a conviction. In the end, I am confident that you will give the weighty responsibility that you must discharge serious consideration.

A vote against impeachment need not be viewed as a vote against punishment. As Professor Steve Saltzburg noted before you earlier this week, Judge Susan Webber Wright retains jurisdiction over the case wherein the allegedly perjured testimony occurred. She can hold civil or criminal contempt hearings. Of all the arbiters of justice in this matter, she is perceived as being the least biased.

She can punish the president for false and misleading conduct even if it does not rise to the level of perjury or obstruction of justice. Trust her to mete out the appropriate punishment. Ranking Member, members of the committee, my name is William Weld and I am sincerely honored to appear before you this morning. I'm no Tom Sullivan, but I have knocked around the criminal justice world a little bit, from to Under President Reagan I was the assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal division in Washington, which is relevant because that's the policy, or political appointment, charged with ensuring the uniformity of charging decisions-- decisions of whether to seek an indictment [[ Page H ]] around the country, in various districts.

It so happens that in , for nine months, I also worked for this committee under Chairman Rodino on the impeachment inquiry into President Nixon. And I worked on the constitutional and legal unit there, which was charged with reading every precedent--in Britain sp , in Heinz sp , in Cannon sp , in reported cases in the records of the debate on the Constitution--having any relevance at all to what high crimes and misdemeanors means in the United States Constitution. Sullivan, like many others, I do not consider myself an advocate here before you.

I do have a couple of points of view that I would like to share with the members of the committee, and you can take them for what they're worth. Ordinarily, in a civil context, you don't qualify as an expert on the basis of nine months' experience, but for whatever they're worth. I do believe, Mr. Chairman, that under the Reagan administration it was not the policy of the U. Justice Department to seek indictments solely on the basis that a prospective defendant had committed adultery or fornication, which are not lawful, but it simply wasn't the policy to go there.

It was also not the policy to seek an indictment based solely on evidence that a prospective defendant had falsely denied committing unlawful adultery or fornication. And let me say a little bit about perjury cases. I don't think they're all that rare, and I've prosecuted a lot of them, but I do think that what one or two of the witnesses said is true; there's usually something else involved in a federal perjury prosecution.

There's a pass-through aspect here--you're really going to something else. I once prosecuted a guy who stated that he was in Florida on November 28th and 29th, You may say, that's kind of, you know, stooping to pick up pins. Why would you prosecute him for that? Well, that was the day the city of Lynn, Massachusetts burned down, and this guy was an arsonist and three people made him in the Porthole Pub in Lynn, Massachusetts, that day, so--and we found his fingerprints on a ticket to Florida the next day after the fire, so we thought it would be a good idea to bring a perjury prosecution there to rattle the cage a little bit, and we did.

And often, we brought them where we were trying to penetrate a wall of silence, as in cases of public corruption or narcotics, when you're trying to break through this omerta, everyone's got to dummy up, phenomenon. But there is something else that you're trying to get at here. Until this year, the policy of the Department of Justice was that in cases of false statements they would not seek an indictment solely on the basis of somebody denying that they themselves had committed misconduct. So, a very unsympathetic case for the court applying the exculpatory no doctrine. In my view, it would have been a handy idea to carve out an exception to the abrogation of that doctrine for cases involving personal misconduct as opposed to a violation of an independent federal statute such as was involved there.

Certainly, a responsible prosecutor could apply that filter in the exercise of his or her discretion. The last thing, let me just say, on the law of impeachment, I am pretty well convinced that adultery, fornication or even a false denial--false--I'm assuming perjury here--false denial of adultery or fornication, they do not constitute high crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of the impeachment clause of the U.

They're not offenses against the system of government, they don't imperil the structure of our government. The remedy of impeachment is to remove the officeholder. Get the worm out of the apple. It's a prophylactic-- prophylactic remedy, it is not punitive. If any of you are thinking, we've got to vote yes on impeachment to tarnish the president, he's already tarnished, and that's really not the purpose of the impeachment mechanism. Nobody's going to forget this stuff. This is a man who's been elected president of the United States twice, and thus entitled to this office, after allegations very similar to those now before you.

I hate to open old wounds, but you remember back in and the Gennifer Flowers matter; if there are two people in a room and they both deny that something happened, then you can't prove that it happened. Well, that's very similar to what we're talking about here, and this officeholder was elected president of the United States twice after all those facts were before the people.

So, I come out thinking that the most appropriate result is something other than removing this person from his office, taking his office away from him. There's a lot of talk about censure. I think, personally, the dignity of Congress and the dignity of the country demands something more than merely censure here, and I would suggest, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, four things that you might want to think about, in addition to censure. Number one, it's not unknown for grand juries investigating corruption in a city or a county, for example, to issue a written, detailed report of their findings.

That could easily be done here, be entirely proper. Number three, there could be an agreement to pay a fine. This is something tangible, more tangible than censure, and it involves the respondent as well as the moving party, the moving party here being the House. And that would mark the moment. That would mark the solemnity of the occasion. And the agreement would remove any doubt about somebody going to court and saying there's no basis for this. It would be thrown out on the basis of the political question doctrine anyway, I think.

I'm not here to say what the fine should be, but if memory serves, Speaker Gingrich had to pay quite a large fine not so long ago because people didn't like either the content or the market of a college course that he taught. The members might wish to consider providing that the fine could not be paid out of the proceeds of a legal defense fund, given all the background circumstances. Finally, what I am proposing, the final element would be that the president would have to take his chances with respect to the criminal justice process post his presidency.

I do not agree with those in the media who say that any deal on censure has to protect the president against criminal proceedings after he leaves office. First of all, there doesn't have to be any deal on censure. That's entirely within your power. The White House has no leverage there. Second, the Constitution explicitly says that even if a president or anybody is impeached, convicted and removed from office, they remain liable to trial and indictment.

It's right in the Constitution. If the objection is that the spectacle of a former president being prosecuted would be tawdry and degrading, it really couldn't be much more tawdry and degrading than what we've already been subjected to through the constant daily reports of the Lewinsky affair. Lastly, I agree with everyone who's spoken before about whether a perjury prosecution here really lies. I think there's quite a low risk of that from the point of view of the president. So that's the suggestion. It's a political suggestion, but this is in part a political process about a five-part deal, if you will.

And I think the dignity of the House would be upheld if something like that were to be approached, and everybody could perhaps get on more easily with attending to the public's business. As I'm sure all members of the panel know, the last impeachment took place nine years ago, in , against Judge Walter Nixon of Mississippi.

And in that impeachment, the House of Representatives, by a vote of to nothing, declared that making false statements to a grand jury were impeachable offenses. The Senate apparently agreed with the House's judgment, because Judge Nixon was removed from office on a vote on both of those articles of impeachment. I'm wondering if members of the panel think that the House made a mistake nine years ago in unanimously declaring that making false statements to a grand jury were impeachable offenses. One, I think you have to look at the proof. I mean, first of all, I assume that there was proof as to what the perjury that took place.

I assume also that the perjury, as I recall, went to the core issue in the matter in which the perjury took place. So you had certain important factual differences. I also think that there's an important difference when one is considering the issue of a judge versus the president; that judges, as others have testified, sit in terms of good behavior, and so the standard is not precisely the same as would be in removing a president who's elected by the public and sits for only four years. And finally, I think that in terms of perjury, I do think that one has to look a bit about what the underlying events are.

And I do think that since what we're talking about is a private consensual relationship as being at the core of it, that that affects the impeachability. But the bottom line is, as I said in my statement, I don't think there's really the proof, particularly as to grand jury perjury. Well, just by way of background, the events that led up to the Judge Nixon impeachment, which is contrasted to the President Nixon impeachment--you've got to be very particular here--involved a private affair, a financial affair, where Judge Nixon allegedly accepted an illegal gratuity of a sweetheart deal in an oil and gas lease.

He was acquitted of that charge by the jury at a criminal trial. So while there are some differences, there are also some similarities in that private misconduct was alleged as a part of the grand jury investigation. I am concerned with the answers to your question, in that you seem to be implying that the standard of truthfulness for the president of the United States is less than a federal judge someplace in the country because the president is elected and the judge is appointed and holds office for good behavior.

No, I'm not saying Rep. You know, am I wrong on that? I'm not really saying that. I'm saying that the standard for truthfulness is really the same. I'm saying that here I don't think there's the proof, particularly as to the grand jury, that you can make the case of perjury. And second, what I'm saying is the standard for impeachment, not the standard for truthfulness, but there are differences in the standard of impeachment for a judge as opposed to the president. And I think there's a lot of scholarship for that?

Well, yesterday many of the president's defenders were troubled about the alleged false statements to the grand jury. And at least one of the witnesses that the White House brought up here, former Congressman Owens, flat out said that the president lied before the grand jury. That's what the House found in terms of Judge Nixon. And, you know, I'm concerned that if a judge lies to the grand jury, we all agree that it's impeachable, and if the president lies before the grand jury, then there is a huge debate about whether or not that's impeachable.

Now, who's going to stand up for the truth here? Well, respectfully, I don't think that the evidence supports the perjury in the grand jury, as articulated in my statement. I yield back my time. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Gentlemen, I want to pay my highest commendations to all of you here because you have now put on the record, once and for all, all of these pestering questions that have been tempting to be dealt with for so many weeks and months now.

You should, Ron, feel proud to go back to your evidence class. You can hold your head high. And I thank you all. Now, the important thing about this was that, unless I missed something, none of you contradicted each other-- nobody. And it seems to me that this testimony of you five gentlemen ought to be bound up and delivered, which I would elect to do. Buchanan, Pat's sister, not because they object to all of this, but because they are the ones that in the media continue--with many others, of course--this nonsensical debate about obvious legal questions that a first-year law student could dispose of.

And so what you've done here is of signal importance, from my point of view. This should be studied carefully by everybody that makes public utterances about the questions of perjury and obstruction and how and when materiality figures into the prosecutorial role. Now, this question has come up.

I think I called it the Scott question. Is there any case on record for a prosecution, based on a case in which it was dismissed? It was an immaterial statement. There was a settlement to boot. I mean, we are going through everything--has anybody ever heard of a case like this?

We need the citation right away if there is, because I'll stop making this assertion. I can't guarantee you that there is no such case, but I doubt it. As I said in my remarks, the--well, the thrust of what I'm saying is that the federal criminal process is simply not used to determine truth or falsity in statements in civil litigation.

And it's particularly true--I mean, that's true, and it's also even more true when you take a situation, as you have here, that the testimony is even peripheral to the civil case involved. The federal criminal justice system is not designed or intended to enforce a code of moral conduct. That's not what we do, or what I used to do and what the good federal prosecutors do. I'm not saying you can't find an errant one somewhere that will bring charges.

But so far as I know, this would be totally unprecedented, if such a case were brought. Noble, Governor, any other comments on this, this matter? I mean, I do not disagree with any of the statements that have been made by my colleagues here on the panel. I have not considered the suggestions that Governor Weld had made with regard to possible political disposition of the matter. But I think that it's fairly clear and that if a poll were taken of former U.

Well, thank you, Mr. I think that this is one of the most important panels that we've had before us in the course of these proceedings. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Sullivan, have you had an opportunity to review the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decision regarding the question of materiality and the issue before us, you know, and the question of the independent counsel and Lewinsky? I have read about it in the Starr report.

I don't think I read the opinion of Rep. Well, it's--the decision just is unsealed and available to us in the last week. That's why I have not. And you may not be aware that the District Court of Appeals opinion squarely addressed that issue of materiality, and it found that her false sworn statement would be material for the purposes of perjury law. In other words, a false statement by the President in that case would have been material. So I think we can put that materiality question to rest that Mr.

I also want to make a comment to you, Governor Weld. But in this case, we're not dealing simply with false statements or fornication or adultery, we're dealing with potentially perjury, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, things of that nature. And there's where you and I may differ.

And I think it is significant, albeit a civil case. Sullivan, you and Mr. Davis and several others on the panel pointed out how rare you think it for perjury cases to be brought in federal court in civil cases, and yet we just had Mary--Barbara Battalino, I should say, in here last week as a witness, a very recent case in which a perjury case was brought in a civil suit involving the Veterans' Administration psychiatrist. And on August 4, , a former employee of the United States Postal Service, Diane Parker sp , was sentenced to 13 months in prison and three years of supervised release for lying in a civil case regarding a sexual relationship with a subordinate.

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