Guide Lonsome Canyon: Ridge Creek and Cheyenne War Chief Pretty Nose (Ridge Creek Series Book 4)

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Table of contents

This resulted in a series of conflicts known as the Sioux Wars , which took place from — While some of the indigenous people eventually agreed to relocate to ever-shrinking reservations , a number of them resisted, at times fiercely. On May 7, , the valley of the Little Bighorn became a tract in the eastern part of the new Crow Indian Reservation in the center of the old Crow country. The battlefield is known as "Greasy Grass" to the Lakota, Dakota, Cheyenne, and most other Plains Indians ; however, in contemporary accounts by participants, it was referred to as the "Valley of Chieftains".

Among the Plains Tribes , the long-standing ceremonial tradition known as the Sun Dance was the most important religious event of the year.

It is a time for prayer and personal sacrifice on behalf of the community, as well as making personal vows. Towards the end of spring in , the Lakota and the Cheyenne held a Sun Dance that was also attended by a number of "Agency Indians" who had slipped away from their reservations. They were accompanied by teamsters and packers with wagons and a large contingent of pack mules that reinforced Custer. Companies C, D, and I of the 6th U. They were later joined there by the steamboat Far West , which was loaded with tons of supplies from Fort Lincoln.

The 7th Cavalry had been created just after the American Civil War. Many men were veterans of the war, including most of the leading officers. Six other troopers had died of drowning and 51 in cholera epidemics.

Material Information

In November , while stationed in Kansas, the 7th Cavalry under Custer had successfully routed Black Kettle 's Southern Cheyenne camp on the Washita River in the Battle of Washita River , an attack which was at the time labeled a "massacre of innocent Indians" by the Indian Bureau. By the time of the Little Bighorn, half of the 7th Cavalry's companies had just returned from 18 months of constabulary duty in the Deep South , having been recalled to Fort Abraham Lincoln , Dakota Territory to reassemble the regiment for the campaign.

A sizable number of these recruits were immigrants from Ireland, Britain and Germany, just as many of the veteran troopers had been before their enlistments. Archaeological evidence suggests that many of these troopers were malnourished and in poor physical condition, despite being the best-equipped and supplied regiment in the Army. Of the 45 officers and troopers then assigned to the 7th Cavalry including a second lieutenant detached from the 20th Infantry and serving in Company L , 14 officers including the regimental commander and troopers did not accompany the 7th during the campaign.

The regimental commander, Colonel Samuel D. Louis, Missouri , [31] which left Lieutenant Colonel Custer in command of the regiment.

The Seminoles of Florida

Surprised and according to some accounts astonished by the unusually large numbers of Native Americans, Crook held the field at the end of the battle but felt compelled by his losses to pull back, regroup, and wait for reinforcements. They reviewed Terry's plan calling for Custer's regiment to proceed south along the Rosebud while Terry and Gibbon's united forces would move in a westerly direction toward the Bighorn and Little Bighorn rivers.

As this was the likely location of native encampments, all army elements had been instructed to converge there around June 26 or 27 in an attempt to engulf the Native Americans. On June 22, Terry ordered the 7th Cavalry, composed of 31 officers and enlisted men under Custer, to begin a reconnaissance in force and pursuit along the Rosebud, with the prerogative to "depart" from orders if Custer saw "sufficient reason". Custer had been offered the use of Gatling guns but declined, believing they would slow his command.

After a night's march, the tired officer who was sent with the scouts could see neither, and when Custer joined them, he was also unable to make the sighting. Custer contemplated a surprise attack against the encampment the following morning of June 26, but he then received a report informing him several hostiles had discovered the trail left by his troops. On the morning of June 25, Custer divided his 12 companies into three battalions in anticipation of the forthcoming engagement.

The 12th, Company B under Captain Thomas McDougall , had been assigned to escort the slower pack train carrying provisions and additional ammunition.

Cheyenne and Lakota Women and the Battle of the Little Bighorn

Unknown to Custer, the group of Native Americans seen on his trail was actually leaving the encampment and did not alert the rest of the village. Custer's scouts warned him about the size of the village, with Mitch Bouyer reportedly saying, "General, I have been with these Indians for 30 years, and this is the largest village I have ever heard of. The command began its approach to the village at noon and prepared to attack in full daylight. As the Army moved into the field on its expedition, it was operating with incorrect assumptions as to the number of Indians it would encounter.

These assumptions were based on inaccurate information provided by the Indian Agents that no more than hostiles were in the area. The Indian Agents based this estimate on the number of Lakota that Sitting Bull and other leaders had reportedly led off the reservation in protest of U. It was in fact a correct estimate until several weeks before the battle, when the "reservation Indians" joined Sitting Bull's ranks for the summer buffalo hunt.

The agents did not take into account the many thousands of these "reservation Indians" who had unofficially left the reservation to join their "uncooperative non-reservation cousins led by Sitting Bull". Thus, Custer unknowingly faced thousands of Indians, including the non-reservation "hostiles". All Army plans were based on the incorrect numbers. Although Custer was criticized after the battle for not having accepted reinforcements and for dividing his forces, it appears that he had accepted the same official government estimates of hostiles in the area which Terry and Gibbon had also accepted.

Historian James Donovan notes, however, that when Custer later asked interpreter Fred Gerard for his opinion on the size of the opposition, he estimated the force at between 1, to 2, warriors. Additionally, Custer was more concerned with preventing the escape of the Lakota and Cheyenne than with fighting them.

ONCE THEY MOVED LIKE THE WIND: COCHISE, GERONIMO,

From his own observation, as reported by his bugler John Martin Martini , [40] Custer assumed the warriors had been sleeping in on the morning of the battle, to which virtually every native account attested later, giving Custer a false estimate of what he was up against. When he and his scouts first looked down on the village from the Crow's Nest across the Little Bighorn River, they could only see the herd of ponies. Later, looking from a hill 2. Custer's Crow scouts told him it was the largest native village they had ever seen.

When the scouts began changing back into their native dress right before the battle, Custer released them from his command. While the village was enormous in size, Custer still thought there were far fewer warriors to defend the village. Finally, Custer may have assumed when he encountered the Native Americans, his subordinate Benteen, with the pack train, would provide support. Rifle volleys were a standard way of telling supporting units to come to another unit's aid.

Custer had initially wanted to take a day to scout the village before attacking; however, when men went back looking for supplies accidentally dropped by the pack train, they discovered that their track had already been discovered by Indians. Reports from his scouts also revealed fresh pony tracks from ridges overlooking his formation. It became apparent that the warriors in the village were either aware of or would soon be aware of his approach. Custer's field strategy was designed to engage noncombatants at the encampments on the Little Bighorn so as to capture women, children, and the elderly or disabled [44] : to serve as hostages to convince the warriors to surrender and comply with federal orders to relocate.

Custer's battalions were poised to "ride into the camp and secure noncombatant hostages", [45] and "forc[e] the warriors to surrender". Connell observed that if Custer could occupy the village before widespread resistance developed, the Sioux and Cheyenne warriors "would be obliged to surrender, because if they started to fight, they would be endangering their families.

Indians contemplating a battle, either offensive or defensive, are always anxious to have their women and children removed from all danger For this reason I decided to locate our [military] camp as close as convenient to [Chief Black Kettle's Cheyenne] village, knowing that the close proximity of their women and children, and their necessary exposure in case of conflict, would operate as a powerful argument in favor of peace, when the question of peace or war came to be discussed.

Lonsome Canyon: Ridge Creek and Cheyenne War Chief Pretty Nose

On Custer's decision to advance up the bluffs and descend on the village from the east, Lt. Edward Godfrey of Company K surmised:.

He must have counted upon Reno's success, and fully expected the "scatteration" of the non-combatants with the pony herds. The probable attack upon the families and capture of the herds were in that event counted upon to strike consternation in the hearts of the warriors, and were elements for success upon which General Custer fully counted.

The Sioux and Cheyenne fighters were acutely aware of the danger posed by the military engagement of noncombatants and that "even a semblance of an attack on the women and children" would draw the warriors back to the village, according to historian John S. Yates' E and F Companies at the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee Minneconjou Ford caused hundreds of warriors to disengage from the Reno valley fight and return to deal with the threat to the village. Some authors and historians, based on archaeological evidence and reviews of native testimony, speculate that Custer attempted to cross the river at a point further north they refer to as Ford D.

According to Richard A. Fox, James Donovan, and others, Custer proceeded with a wing of his battalion Yates' Troops E and F north and opposite the Cheyenne circle at that crossing, [44] : —77 which provided "access to the [women and children] fugitives. The Lone Teepee or Tipi was a landmark along the 7th Cavalry's march. It was where the Indian encampment had been a week earlier, during the Battle of the Rosebud on June 17, The Indians had left a single teepee standing some reports mention a second that had been partially dismantled , and in it was the body of a Sans Arc warrior, Old She-Bear, who had been wounded in the battle.

He had died a couple of days after the Rosebud battle, and it was the custom of the Indians to move camp when a warrior died and leave the body with its possessions. The Lone Teepee was an important location during the Battle of the Little Bighorn for several reasons, including: [53] [54] [55]. William W. Cooke , as Custer's Crow scouts reported Sioux tribe members were alerting the village.

Ordered to charge, Reno began that phase of the battle. The orders, made without accurate knowledge of the village's size, location, or the warriors' propensity to stand and fight, had been to pursue the Native Americans and "bring them to battle. They immediately realized that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were present "in force and not running away.

Reno advanced rapidly across the open field towards the northwest, his movements masked by the thick bramble of trees that ran along the southern banks of the Little Bighorn River. The same trees on his front right shielded his movements across the wide field over which his men rapidly rode, first with two approximately forty-man companies abreast and eventually with all three charging abreast.

The trees also obscured Reno's view of the Native American village until his force had passed that bend on his right front and was suddenly within arrow-shot of the village. The tepees in that area were occupied by the Hunkpapa Sioux. Neither Custer nor Reno had much idea of the length, depth and size of the encampment they were attacking, as the village was hidden by the trees.

He ordered his troopers to dismount and deploy in a skirmish line , according to standard army doctrine. In this formation, every fourth trooper held the horses for the troopers in firing position, with five to ten yards separating each trooper, officers to their rear and troopers with horses behind the officers.

This formation reduced Reno's firepower by 25 percent. With Reno's men anchored on their right by the protection of the tree line and bend in the river, the Indians rode against the center and exposed left end of Reno's line. After about 20 minutes of long-distance firing, Reno had taken only one casualty, but the odds against him had risen Reno estimated five to one , and Custer had not reinforced him. Trooper Billy Jackson reported that by then, the Indians had begun massing in the open area shielded by a small hill to the left of Reno's line and to the right of the Indian village.

This forced a hasty withdrawal into the timber along the bend in the river. After giving orders to mount, dismount and mount again, Reno told his men within earshot, "All those who wish to make their escape follow me," and led a disorderly rout across the river toward the bluffs on the other side. The retreat was immediately disrupted by Cheyenne attacks at close quarters. Later, Reno reported that three officers and 29 troopers had been killed during the retreat and subsequent fording of the river.

Another officer and 13—18 men were missing.