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If the sense of insignificance was an expression of metaethical nihilism, then it could hardly be cause for despair. Nihilism says that nothing matters. This, however, would include the truth of nihilism: if nothing matters, this also doesn't matter. If anything is a muddle, it is to respond with despair to the supposed truth of nihilism.

It is thus implausible that these metaethical issues are really at the heart of the experience of insignificance. But if this experience doesn't express a metaethical worry, then it must express a substantive worry—not a metaethical challenge to our evaluative scheme, but a first-order move within it. In its simplest form, the idea would be that we possess no, or little value, because we are so small and the universe so vast.

This suggestion, however, also makes little sense. If something possesses intrinsic value, value in virtue of its intrinsic properties, then how could the size of the universe, or indeed anything about the surrounding universe, affect its value in any way?

Why Arjuna Fell and Why Rick Drinks so Much

Our intrinsic value is also independent of whether we are located at the centre of the universe or on its margins, or on whether and when humanity will one day go extinct. Consider for example pain. If pain is bad in virtue of what it's like, then a given instance of pain would be just as bad—and bad to exactly the same degree—whether it occurs in a Gulliver or in a Lilliputian, whether it occurs in a tiny or in a vast or even infinite universe, whether it occurs in the centre or the corner, to the left or to the right.

Now not all things we value in themselves are also intrinsically valuable. Some things have value that is final but extrinsic 15 —final value can depend on extrinsic properties, including the fact that one is so small and the universe so vast.


  1. Arkansas Governors and United States Senators.
  2. Our Cosmic Insignificance.
  3. Surviving during a terrorist attack.

So the above argument might be too quick. It is true that the final value of something might in principle depend on the size of the universe, or our comparative size, or, really, on any fact or relation. This, however, is no more than an uninteresting logical possibility. To start with, the paradigm cases of final value, such as the badness of pain, or the moral significance of persons, are also cases of intrinsic value.

Philosophical skepticism

As we saw, if pain is intrinsically bad, then it is bad even if the universe is infinite, even if time goes on without limit. But even if some central instances of value were of final value that is extrinsic, it is still obscure how we are to cash out the logical possibility that this value is diminished by the size of the universe.

It's often argued that spatial location and distance are morally irrelevant properties. Cosmological facts about the dimensions of the universe seem similarly axiologically irrelevant. If something possesses value, why should it matter whether that thing is located in a tiny cabinet or in a vast chamber?

It's generally absurd to think that size matters in itself. It is hard to think of a religion that worships an infinitesimally tiny deity, and monuments typically aspire to, well, be monumental. But this is merely because the large is more psychologically impressive than the small, and because it's a greater achievement to build a pyramid or cathedral than an equivalent miniature. Still: few would prefer an immense dung heap to a diamond. We could conclude that worries about our cosmic insignificance are confused.

But it would be better to conclude that they don't express metaethical worries about the objectivity of value, or the first-order worry that we posses no value.

Rick and Morty and the Meaning of Life - By Daniel Jeffries

Claims about significance are indeed first order-claims, and are related to claims about value. But it's implausible that they are no more than claims about value. For something to be significant, it needs to possess or at least bring about some value. But it is clear that possessing some value isn't sufficient for being significant.

For something to be significant, it needs to be important , to make a real difference. When we describe something as insignificant, we rarely mean to deny that it possesses any value. We are just denying its importance.

The Wormhole at the Center of You

I will not try to offer a complete analysis of importance. Conversely, if something is insignificant , then it's not noteworthy, not important enough to care about. We cannot be concerned about everything that has value. This is in part because that would be impossible. Just think of all the vast amount of suffering happening in the world right now; pain is bad, but we couldn't possibly pay attention to, let alone care about, each and every instance of pain on the planet. But the gap between value and what we have reason to care about isn't due only to our profound cognitive and emotional limits.


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    • Seen alongside the horrific or the wonderful , many things become simply insignificant—worthy of no attention at all. If you witness a terrible tragedy, it would be inappropriate to obsess about a stain on your suit. Because, unlike value, significance is relative to point of view, it can vary in this way even as value stays fixed. What attention and concern is merited by something is a function not only of its own value, but also of what else of value is in view.

    Why Arjuna Fell and Why Rick Drinks so Much

    The intrinsic value of something cannot be changed by its surrounding. But its significance can. And when it is seen in an ever broader perspective, the significance of a thing can decline until it simply no longer matters. It is thus a mistake to confuse worries about our significance with worries about whether we, or anything at all, possess value. To be sure, if nihilism is true, then nothing is really significant—whether on the cosmic scale or on any other scale. But to worry about our significance in that context is a bit like complaining you didn't win the lottery when you don't even have a ticket.

    More importantly, even if nihilism is false, and our lives are valuable it still wouldn't follow that we are significant. We might still be utterly unimportant, our existence might make no real difference. We can tell how significant something is by asking what attention it deserves, all things considered.

    We can consider the significance of things at different scales: around now, in Logic Lane; in London, on September ; in the Holocene, on Earth… The cosmic significance of a thing simply refers to its importance, and thus to what attention is deserves, when it is viewed from an impartial standpoint, all things considered— when literally all things are considered.

    The cosmic standpoint is the most encompassing evaluative perspective, the standpoint that considers everything, everywhere, without exception. It isn't the peculiar perspective of the cosmos, whatever that might mean. It is not so much a view from nowhere as a view of everywhere. The cosmic standpoint is often conflated with the notion of objective value, or even taken to be a kind of metaethical device. The cosmic standpoint does transcend our parochial, anthropocentric perspective.

    It is true that on many antirealist views, value and thus significance would ultimately be explained by reference to our subjective concerns, themselves the product of a contingent terrestrial process. Cosmic significance may ultimately have an Earthly source. But if such an anthropocentric view is correct, we can still talk about value, and, presumably, of significance, on different scales.

    It is hard to see what stops us from also talking about significance on the grandest, cosmic scale. If you find it odd to say that cosmic significance ultimately arises from our own subjective attitudes, you should find it equally odd that the badness of the agony of a dying prehistoric mammal is due to our own attitudes millions of years later.

    If there is a problem here, it is for these forms of antirealism, not for their compatibility with the cosmic standpoint. It is common for non-philosophers to confuse antirealism with relativism. Value might have its source in our subjective attitudes without this implying that things possess value only relative to Westerners, or Easterners, or Holy Romans, let alone that we should be especially tolerant of others cultures, however outrageous.

    But it's equally a mistake to think of antirealism as implying that value is in some way terrestrial—as if the value of things begins to fade away as we leave the Earth's atmosphere. Or is it wrong for antirealists to find the starry skies beautiful? Many antirealists about value are also antirealists about other things, such as mathematics.

    BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL

    But it would be absurd to think that if we are antirealists about maths, then it's somehow wrong for us to try to calculate, say, the age or size of the universe… So why should the idea of cosmic significance present any special problem? We can ask, and worry, about our cosmic significance even if our own point of view is the source of all value. And if antirealism is true, this in no way guarantees that the answer will be favourable.

    This point also offers an answer to the objection that nothing is simply important—that things are always important, or matter, to someone. To the extent that this objection is an expression of an antirealist understanding of value, then I believe I have already answered it: there is actually no tension between antirealism and the idea of cosmic significance, even if on some forms of antirealism value is ultimately to be explained by reference to our subjective concerns.

    And even on these views, we can make mistakes about value: what is valuable isn't simply what we happen to value. In a similar way, what is significant couldn't just be what we take to be significant, or actually attend to or care about; it's a truism that the profoundly trivial often attracts obsessive attention.