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The great majority who did vote were Serbs; those Serbs who did not being branded as traitors.


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Most non-Serbs regarded the plebiscite as directed only to Serbs. The outcome of the plebiscite purported to be percent in favour. The SDS leadership used this outcome as a basis on which to develop the separate Serb political structure. The plebiscite was cited as justification for all subsequent moves such as the ultimate walk-out of the SDS representatives from the Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly, the various negotiations conducted at the federal and international levels and the proclamation, on 9 January , of the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It was "used as a pretext, as an excuse, explanation, for everything that they did". Also on the basis of the plebiscite, the SDS and military forces in each region including the JNA, paramilitary organizations, local TO units, and special police units, began to establish physical and political control over certain municipalities where it had not already gained control by virtue of the elections.

In these regions, which included opstina Prijedor, the SDS representatives in public office in some cases established parallel municipal governments and separate police forces.

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Physical control was asserted by positioning military units, tanks and heavy artillery around the municipalities and setting up checkpoints to control the movement of non-Serbs. This Assembly session was transmitted live on television, as were the final declarations. Crisis Staffs were formed in the Serb Autonomous Regions to assume government functions and carry out general municipal management.

The ARK Crisis Staff, which had jurisdiction over opstina Prijedor, was established in April or May as an organ of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, the statute of which provided for the creation of Crisis Staffs in the case of war or immediate danger of war.

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In early May, after the official decision on its establishment was taken by the Executive Council of Krajina, the ARK Crisis Staff took over all powers of the government and other agencies. It was the highest-level decision-maker in the Autonomous Region of Krajina and its decisions had to be implemented throughout the Autonomous Region of Krajina by means of municipal Crisis Staffs. In the course of this Opinion and Judgment there will be other references to the JNA as acting as a hostile force so far as Bosnian Muslims were concerned.

B of this Opinion and Judgment. It is perhaps best expressed, if not explained, by General Veljko Kadijevic, in the early s the Yugoslav Federal Secretary for Defence, who in published his own description of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in his book My view of the break-up: an Army without a State. Of the JNA he writes that by it was no longer an army with a cohesive state to defend; the state which it was its duty to defend was disintegrating and just as its ranks were now substantially filled with ethnic Serbs, so its task in the immediate future would be to regroup its forces and equipment, scattered throughout the former Yugoslavia including the seceding Republics, back into what was left of the nation and then to concentrate upon the protection and defence of those ethnic Serbs who in the course of this disintegration found themselves outside Serbia and Montenegro.

This, it was envisaged, would lead ultimately to the creation of a new, substantially Serb, Yugoslavia with its core in Serbia and Montenegro but including also parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, principally but not exclusively those parts presently having a majority Serb population.

Until the late s the armed forces of Yugoslavia were typical of many national defence forces, unexceptional in composition or character save, perhaps, that they had a specific constitutional role under the Constitution not only to protect against external threat but also to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and social system established by that Constitution. The JNA had also a right of representation, equal to that of an autonomous province, on the central committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, then the key body within the governing system of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The totality of Yugoslav armed forces included the regular army, navy and air force, collectively known as the JNA, consisting of an officer corps, non-commissioned officers and conscripts, together with a reserve force, and, as well as and distinct from the JNA, the TOs. Whereas the JNA was an entirely federal force, with its headquarters in Belgrade, there was a distinct TO in each Republic, funded by that Republic and under the control of the Minister of Defence of that Republic.

The JNA was a powerful national army, equipped with all the conventional weapons and equipment that modern European armies possess; the TOs, on the other hand, were equipped with essentially infantry weapons; rifles, light machine-guns, some small calibre artillery, mortars, anti-personnel mines and the like; they had no tanks and their transport would vary depending on the adequacy of a particular Republic's funding of its TO and on how much each received by way of JNA cast-offs.

In July , on instructions from headquarters in Belgrade, the JNA seized from the Republic's Secretariat for Defence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and from municipalities all the documentation relating to conscription including all the registers of conscripts. In consequence, thereafter the conscription process was exclusively in the hands of the JNA and no longer in those of the Republic's Ministry for Defence.

This done, it was ensured that only ethnic Serbs were recruited into the armed forces. Then in the second half of military units were formed in Serb-populated villages in Bosnia and Herzegovina and supplied with weapons and with uniforms. General Kadijevic in his book describes how "naturally we used the territorial defence the TO of Serb regions in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in tandem with the JNA" to paralyse territorial defence where it might provide a basis for creating the armies of secessionist republics.

Traditionally all TO weapons were stored locally, within each municipality, but in late and early the JNA removed all local stocks of weapons from TO control, at least in Muslim-populated areas. This left those local TO units virtually disarmed whereas units which were drawn from Serb-populated areas, and only those, were substantially re-equipped. A particular point had long been made, enshrined in Yugoslavia's Constitution, of ensuring that the JNA, at conscript level, should accurately reflect the overall Yugoslav population mix.

However, at officer level, Serbs including Montenegrans had traditionally been over represented; some 60 percent of career officers were ethnic Serbs whereas Serbs formed only 34 to 36 percent of the total Yugoslav population. In the early s this predominance of Serb officers swiftly increased so that very soon very few non-Serb officers remained in the JNA. The change that overtook the JNA in the early s is best illustrated by the change in the ethnic mix of conscripts between pre-June and early During that time, the Serb component rose from just over 35 to some 90 percent.

Similarly, whereas in an army in which Serbs had formerly made up some 40 percent of the total of officers and other ranks, by early that percentage had risen to some 90 percent. These increases were in large measure attributable to the departure from the federation of both Slovenia and Croatia and, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the substantial failure of non-Serbs to perform their compulsory military service or respond to mobilization calls.

However, other factors were also in operation. Several witnesses, non-Serbs, have told of being discriminated against and being encouraged or indeed obliged to leave the JNA during ; they were no longer regarded as reliable members of an army that was ceasing to be Yugoslav and was becoming an instrument of Serb nationalist policy. By many senior officers of the JNA, rejecting this transformation of the force in which they had long served, left the service or were retired.

From this and other causes, including transfer to other armed forces, the number of officers of the rank of General in the JNA fell from in mid to only 28 after March One consequence of all this was that the JNA experienced a shortage of manpower, especially when it came to play the role of an occupying force in hostile territory, as was the case in Croatia and, during , in non-Serb parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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In consequence, increasing reliance was placed on Serbian paramilitary forces, recruited in Serbia and Montenegro and much employed in control of non-Serb communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Membership in them was attractive to those Serbs who wished to aid the Serb cause in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina but who regarded the JNA as retaining to a degree a Yugoslav, as distinct from Serb, character and accordingly as being insufficiently single-minded in the Serb cause.

These paramilitary forces operated in conjunction with the JNA and were used as infantry shock troops to make up for declining numbers in the regular army. They included Zeljko Raznjatovic's Serbian Volunteer Guard later known as "Arkan's Tigers" and Vojislav Seselj's Chetniks, both of which came to be particularly feared by the Muslim population for their brutality and indiscipline. The JNA and in particular its air force arm actively cooperated with and assisted these paramilitary units during and in operations in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and liberally supplied them with arms and equipment.

With the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in June and the subsequent disintegration, republic by republic, of the federation, the way seemed to nationalists open for both a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia. Slovenia, containing very few Serbs and playing no part in the history and traditions of the Serb nation, was allowed to secede with relatively little intervention from Belgrade.

The JNA was mainly intent on securing the successful withdrawal of JNA units and equipment once it became clear that Slovenia, having retained substantial supplies of arms and equipment for its TO units, would not readily succumb to such JNA forces as Belgrade was prepared to venture in an effort to retain it within the federation.

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It was a different story with Croatia; it too had retained for its own TO substantial weaponry but Croatia, unlike Slovenia, had a large Serb population and what were regarded as Serb lands, which were not to be allowed to remain unchallenged within the boundaries of the now independent Republic of Croatia. War ensued between the JNA and the Croatian Serbs on the one hand and, on the other, the forces that the Croatian government could rally.

The outcome of the initial phase of that conflict was substantial success for the Serbs. By the end of those portions of the old Republic of Croatia in which large numbers of Serbs lived had been occupied by the JNA, including, of course, the two self-declared autonomous Serb territories.

The JNA, although by now a substantially Serbian and Montenegran force, had its constitutional function of ensuring the integrity of the federation and its attack on Croatia could be represented in that light. With the secession of the non-Serb Republics and the recognition by Serbia and Montenegro that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no longer existed, the JNA could no longer function as a national army.

At a meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the European Community on 6 October alarm had been expressed at the reports that the JNA had "shown itself to be no longer a neutral and disciplined institution" Prosecution Exhibit Yet it remained in substantial force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the secession of that Republic. This posed a problem: how was the JNA to be converted into an army of what remained of Yugoslavia, namely Serbia and Montenegro, yet continue to retain in Serb hands control of substantial portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina while appearing to comply with international demands that the JNA quit Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On 15 May the Security Council, by resolution 26 , demanded that all interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina by units of the JNA cease immediately and that those units either be withdrawn, be subject to the authority of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed. The solution as far as Serbia was concerned was found by transferring to Bosnia and Herzegovina all Bosnian Serb soldiers serving in JNA units elsewhere while sending all non-Bosnian soldiers out of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This ensured seeming compliance with international demands while effectively retaining large ethnic Serb armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This new army thus inherited both officers and men from the JNA and also substantial arms and equipment, including over tanks, armoured personnel carriers and over pieces of heavy artillery. This was so whether or not they were in fact in origin Bosnian Serbs. This applied also to most other officers and non-commissioned officers.

Although then formally members of the VRS rather than of the former JNA, they continued to receive their salaries from the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Serbia and Montenegro and the pensions of those who in due course retired were paid by that Government. General Kadijevic, writing of the role of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, recounts how "the units and headquarters of the JNA formed the backbone of the army of the Serb Republic Republic of Srpska complete with weaponry and equipment" and adds that "first the JNA and later the army of the Republic of Srpska, which the JNA put on its feet, helped to liberate Serb territory, protect the Serb nation and create the favourable military preconditions for achieving the interests and rights of the Serb nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by political means.

In the early months of , after hostilities against the Mostar area of Bosnia and Herzegovina in , the JNA undertook a number of attacks against other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Throughout April these attacks resulted in the capture of a number of cities and towns. That Corps, from Montenegro, remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout the summer and autumn of as late as September of that year. Excluding the Rear Base troops, it numbered some , men, expanded from a peacetime strength of 4, men.

These units were all supplied with food and ammunition by that Rear Service Base, the same logistics base from which the Corps had been supplied when part of the JNA. The formation of Serb Autonomous Regions and all that followed was only possible because of the military power of Serbia. The conflict between Serbia and Croatia played a significant part in the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines, paving the way for all the events that were to occur later.

That conflict, taking formal shape following the declaration of independence by Croatia in June , served greatly to exacerbate the tension between Bosnia and Herzegovina's three ethnic groups, with Bosnian Serbs and Croats sympathetic to their warring fellow nationals across the border and with very many Bosnian Muslims entirely unsympathetic to what they saw as an aggressive Serbian invasion of Croatia, in which the JNA supported the Croatian Serbs. The Muslim-dominated government of Bosnia and Herzegovina instructed the Bosnian population not to comply with the JNA's mobilization order, regarding the war as an act of aggression by Serbia in which Bosnia and Herzegovina wanted no part.

In consequence, whereas many Bosnian Serbs responded to the mobilization, very few Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats did so. It will be noted later how, combined with similar incidents elsewhere, this resulted in the JNA, which had in the s been a truly national, federal army, rapidly becoming one that was almost exclusively Serb at all levels. By its incursion into Croatia, the JNA, which the Government of the Republic of Croatia declared in October to be an invading force, intended to safeguard the integrity of the Serb people by protecting Serbs in predominantly Serb areas of Croatia and, if possible, by defeating Croatia in the field and toppling the Croatian government.

That second objective proved beyond its capability although it did succeed in supporting the autonomous Serb regions within Croatia and in extracting the bulk of its weapons and troops from the now independent Croatia. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina thus found itself in with Serb-dominated regions on its western and northern borders in what had hitherto been Croatian territory and with large, heavily-armed JNA forces stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina itself.

The entry of large JNA forces into Bosnia and Herzegovina retiring from Croatia brought with it an atmosphere of high tension. By early there were some , JNA troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina with over tanks, 1, armoured personnel carriers, much heavy weaponry, planes and helicopters, all under the command of the General Staff of the JNA in Belgrade. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, still nominally representative of its three ethnic groups and which had not yet declared itself independent, faced two major problems, that of independence and that of defence, involving control over the mobilization and operations of the armed forces.

In April with independence came the setting up of its own defence staff and in July it officially established its own army.

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The SDS disassociated itself from the legislature and government of the independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and formed the independent Serb government of Republika Srpska. Moreover, between March and May , there were several attacks and take-overs by the JNA of areas that constituted main entry points into Bosnia or were situated on major logistics or communications lines such as those in Bosanski Brod, Derventa and Bijeljina, Kupres, Foca and Avornik, Visegrad, Bosanski Samac, Vlasencia, Brcko and Prijedor.

At the same time, there were clashes at Derventa. There was some non-Serb resistance quickly squelched by the arrival of JNA tanks and armoured cars.

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All vital functions of the town were taken over by JNA forces, including the town hall, bank, post office, police and courthouse, and there were present very many uniformed men as well as some local Serbs with arms. In general, the military take-overs involved shelling, sniping and the rounding up of non-Serbs in the area. These tactics often resulted in civilian deaths and the flight of non-Serbs. Remaining non-Serbs were then forced to meet in assembly areas in towns for expulsion from the area.

Large numbers of non-Serbs were imprisoned, beaten and forced to sing Chetnik songs and their valuables seized.