Download e-book No Treason, Vol. VI. The Constitution of No Authority

Free download. Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device. You can download and read online No Treason, Vol. VI. The Constitution of No Authority file PDF Book only if you are registered here. And also you can download or read online all Book PDF file that related with No Treason, Vol. VI. The Constitution of No Authority book. Happy reading No Treason, Vol. VI. The Constitution of No Authority Bookeveryone. Download file Free Book PDF No Treason, Vol. VI. The Constitution of No Authority at Complete PDF Library. This Book have some digital formats such us :paperbook, ebook, kindle, epub, fb2 and another formats. Here is The CompletePDF Book Library. It's free to register here to get Book file PDF No Treason, Vol. VI. The Constitution of No Authority Pocket Guide.
VI. the Constitution of No Authority book online at best prices in India on leondumoulin.nl Read No Treason, Vol. VI. the Constitution of No Authority book reviews.
Table of contents

• Your IP Address in Germany is Blocked from www.gutenberg.org
• No Treason The Constitution Of No Authority - Lysander Spooner - - leondumoulin.nl
• Posts navigation
• Chapter number:

The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware.

The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill, which shall have passed the two branches of the legislature, for reconsideration; and the bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon that reconsideration, it be approved by two thirds of both houses. The king of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute negative upon the acts of the two houses of Parliament. The disuse of that power for a considerable time past does not affect the reality of its existence; and is to be ascribed wholly to the crown's having found the means of substituting influence to authority, or the art of gaining a majority in one or the other of the two houses, to the necessity of exerting a prerogative which could seldom be exerted without hazarding some degree of national agitation.

The qualified negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign; and tallies exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of this State, of which the governor is a constituent part.

In this respect the power of the President would exceed that of the governor of New York, because the former would possess, singly, what the latter shares with the chancellor and judges; but it would be precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts, whose constitution, as to this article, seems to have been the original from which the convention have copied. The President is to be the "commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States.

The most material points of difference are these:. The President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union. The king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions.

In this article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor.

The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. But the constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief, as well of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States.

The governor of New York may pardon in all cases, even in those of impeachment, except for treason and murder. Is not the power of the governor, in this article, on a calculation of political consequences, greater than that of the President?

Posts navigation

All conspiracies and plots against the government, which have not been matured into actual treason, may be screened from punishment of every kind, by the interposition of the prerogative of pardoning. If a governor of New York, therefore, should be at the head of any such conspiracy, until the design had been ripened into actual hostility he could insure his accomplices and adherents an entire impunity. A President of the Union, on the other hand, though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law, could shelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of impeachment and conviction.

Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps be a greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise against the public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design, upon an actual appeal to arms, should miscarry? Would this last expectation have any influence at all, when the probability was computed, that the person who was to afford that exemption might himself be involved in the consequences of the measure, and might be incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired impunity?

It is plain, in the first place, that this language, as an agreement , purports to be only what it at most really was, viz: a contract between the people then existing; and, of necessity, binding, as a contract, only upon those then existing. In the second place, the language neither expresses nor implies that they had any intention or desire, nor that they imagined they had any right or power, to bind their posterity to live under it. It does not say that their posterity will, shall, or must live under it.

It only says, in effect, that their hopes and motives in adopting it were that it might prove useful to their posterity, as well as to themselves, by promoting their union, safety, tranquillity, liberty, etc. This agreement, as an agreement , would clearly bind nobody but the people then existing. Secondly, it would assert no right, power, or disposition, on their part, to compel their posterity to maintain such a fort. It would only indicate that the supposed welfare of their posterity was one of the motives that induced the original parties to enter into the agreement.

When a man says he is building a house for himself and his posterity , he does not mean to be understood as saying that he has any thought of binding them, nor is it to be inferred that he is so foolish as to imagine that he has any right or power to bind them, to live in it. So far as they are concerned, he only means to be understood as saying that his hopes and motives, in building it, are that they, or at least some of them, may find it for their happiness to live in it. So when a man says he is planting a tree for himself and his posterity , he does not mean to be understood as saying that he has any thought of compelling them, nor is it to be inferred that he is such a simpleton as to imagine that he has any right or power to compel them, to eat the fruit.

So far as they are concerned, he only means to say that his hopes and motives, in planting the tree, are that its fruit may be agreeable to them. So it was with those who originally adopted the Constitution.

Whatever may have been their personal intentions, the legal meaning of their language, so far as their posterity was concerned, simply was, that their hopes and motives, in entering into the agreement, were that it might prove useful and acceptable to their posterity; that it might promote their union, safety, tranquillity, and welfare; and that it might tend to secure to them the blessings of liberty.

The language does not assert nor at all imply, any right, power, or disposition, on the part of the original parties to the agreement, to compel their posterity to live under it. If they had intended to bind their posterity to live under it, they should have said that their object was, not to secure to them the blessings of liberty, but to make slaves of them; for if their posterity are bound to live under it, they are nothing less than the slaves of their foolish, tyrannical, and dead grandfathers.

It cannot be said that the Constitution formed the people of the United States, for all time, into a corporation.

Chapter number:

It does not speak of the people as a corporation, but as individuals. He describes government as a group of dishonest robbers who will not rob you directly, but will secretly appoint one of their member to come and rob you in their name, going on to describe a typical protection racket.

He then describes a scenario in which people who resist subjugation might be killed, even by the hundreds of thousands. Spooner was an outspoken abolitionist writing The Unconstitutionality of Slavery in and advocate of universal freedom and natural rights, but had been horrified by the brutality of the war, and the lack of legitimate constitution basis for violently conquering people who wanted to leave a federation that had been consensually joined only by their ancestors. The Unconstitutionality of Slavery. Essay on the Trial By Jury. An Essay on the Trial by Jury.

No Treason, Vol.