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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MORAL FEELINGS [JOHN ABERCROMBIE] on leondumoulin.nl *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. AN INTRODUCTORY.
Table of contents
In an attempt to understand the basis for the Kantian position three supporting postulates are offered. It is argued that Kant's stance on these postulates in large part explains why he believed as he did. The first is that the intentional structures of maxims motivated by compassion and respect for the moral law are compatible.
Therefore, the will has no need to choose whether to act from one motive rather than the other, when both encourage the same objectively moral act; the second is that freedom is inoperative in non-moral decisions and the last is that, in order for moral worth to accrue to our actions, inclinations opposing moral law must be stronger than those complementing it and moral value is proportionate to the strength of the opposing inclinations overcome in acting morally. It is argued that Kant is in substantial agreement with these postulates and that these foundational positions make his statements on feelings more intelligible.
Neubauer, John Joseph, "The role of feelings in Kant's moral philosophy" Advanced Search.
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This perception of pleasure has a specific moral flavor and causes us to feel moral approbation. We feel this pleasure when considering what is good or beneficial to others as a part of our natural instinct of benevolence. The things pursued for this pleasure are wanted because of our self-love and interest in the good for others. So first there is a sense of pleasure; then there is the interest in what causes the pleasure. From there, our experience or reason can tell us what objects have and may continue to give us pleasure or advantage Hutcheson , For Hutcheson, the moral sense thus described is from God, implanted, not like innate ideas, but as an innate sense of pleasure for objects that are not necessarily to our advantage—and for nobler pleasures like caring for others or appreciation of harmony Hutcheson , I.
VIII, Evaluating what is good or not—what we morally approve of or disapprove of—is done by this moral sense. The moral sense is not the basis of moral decisions or the justification of our disapproval as the rationalists claim; instead it is better explained as the faculty with which we feel the value of an action. It does not justify our evaluation; the moral sense gives us our evaluation.
The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings
The moral faculty gives us our sense of valuing—not feeling in an emotional sense as that would be something like sadness or joy. There is feeling, but the feeling is a valuing type of feeling. Like the other internal senses of beauty and harmony, people are born with a moral sense.
We know this because we experience moral feelings of approbation and disapprobation.
Moral Sentimentalism
We do not choose to make moral approvals or disapprovals; they just happen to us and we feel the approvals when they occur. He continued that in spite of the fact that it is a pleasurable experience to approve of actions, we cannot just approve of anything or anyone when we want to. The point is that moral approvals and disapprovals done by our moral sense are specific in nature and only operate when there is an action that can be appropriately judged of by our moral sense ibid. Another way to make this point is to compare the moral sense to the olfactory sense.
I can put my nose to this ceramic cup in front of me but my nose will not smell anything if there is nothing to smell. The moral sense operates when an idea touches it the same way a nose smells when there is an odor reaching it. No odor, no smell; no moral issue, no moral sentiment. So when an action has consequences for others, it is more likely to awaken our moral sensibility.
Reasoning and information can change the evaluation of the moral sense, but no amount of reasoning can or does precede the moral sense in regard to its approval of what is for the public good. Reason does, however, inform the moral sense, as discussed below. The moral sense approves of the good for others.
This concern for others by the moral sense is what is natural to humankind, Hutcheson contended. Reason gives content to the moral sense, informing it of what is good for others and the public good Hutcheson , I. Some may think Hutcheson a utilitarian and certainly no thorough accounting of historical utilitarianism is complete without a mention of Hutcheson.
So it is our moral sense that evaluates goodness and evil and does seem to evaluate much like a utilitarian, but it is not bound by the utilitarian rule—moral sense evaluations are normatively privileged and prior to moral rules of any kind. In Illustrations upon the Moral Sense , Hutcheson gives definitions of both the approbation of our own actions and those of others. Consider what happens when someone picks up and returns something that another person drops.
In response to the action, the person who picked up the dropped item would have feelings of approbation toward their own action. This person would be happy with what they did, especially after giving it some thought. Further, they would be pleased if their own intentions were ones with which they could also be pleased. The intention could possibly be that they just wanted to help this person; however, if the intention was to gain advantage with the other person, then they would not be as pleased with themselves.
Again Hutcheson:. There is a distinction, Hutcheson claimed, between choosing to do an action or wanting someone else to do an action and our approbation of the action. According to Hutcheson, we often act in ways we disapprove of ibid. All I have to think of is the extra cookie I have just consumed: upon reflection I am not pleased with my choice; I disapprove of eating the cookie.
In this same discussion, Hutcheson, borrowing from Aristotle, explained that reason and the intellect help determine how to reach an end or goal. Yet the desire for that goal is the job of the will. The will is moved by the desire for that end which, of course, for Aristotle, was happiness ibid. There has to be a desire for the will to choose something. Something is chosen because it is seen as a possible fulfillment of a human desire. For Hutcheson, there is a natural instinct and desire for the good of others.
Without this natural desire, Hutcheson claimed, no one would care whether an action benefits or harms one person or many. Information may be sound and true about the dangers of an action, yet without the instinct to care about those who would be benefited or harmed the information would not move our passions ibid.
The only reason to care about a natural disaster 1, miles away where we do not know anyone and we are not affected even indirectly is that we care about others in general and do not wish harm on them. A person can only want something if the desire for it is connected to or understood to be satisfying a certain natural instinct or affection ibid. This instinct or desire for the welfare of others is what influences our moral sense to approve or disapprove of an action.
Reasons and discussions that excite and motivate presuppose instincts and affections ibid. To be moved means there is an instinct that is moved. It is not the proposition that a certain act will produce lots of money that excites a person, but rather the instinct toward happiness and the belief that money will bring the desired happiness. So reasoning that leads a person to believe that money will bring happiness presupposes an instinct that values happiness.
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Reasons that justify or explain something as being moral or immoral presuppose a moral sense ibid. If there are reasons for something and those reasons are considered, a moral sense must exist that cares about and utilizes the information. So not only are the moral passions calm, they naturally respond positively to behaviors that benefit the public good. Hutcheson did not claim that this should be the case and, therefore, it is not the normative claim utilitarianism makes; rather, what Hutcheson argued is that his experiences and moral sense find this to be the case.
So a person cannot have a morally evil moral sense even if this person disagrees with another. Hutcheson did see that people may differ in taste—and various people could and do—and that the moral sense can be silenced or ignored ibid. He contended, however, that these differences in taste and evaluation do not indicate evil in the moral sense itself. Hutcheson did address the issue of uniformity in moral sentiments by answering whether or not we can know others will also approve of that which we approve ibid.
Though there is no certainty of agreement, the moral sense as natural to humankind is largely uniform. Hutcheson added that God approves of benevolence and kindness and so he created human nature with the capability to make the same types of approvals, and this is done by the moral sense.
Diagnostic information:
Our moral sense naturally, according to Hutcheson, approves of kindness and caring for others, and unless there is a prejudiced view of whether the action is truly kind and publicly useful, it is not probable that a person would judge incorrectly ibid. So, yes, there is disagreement sometimes, but the disagreement is not rooted in self-interest. For Hutcheson, the foundation of our moral determinations is not self-love. What is basic to morality is our inclination for benevolence—an integral part of our moral evaluations which will be more fully examined in the following section.
In response to the Hobbesian doctrine of egoism as advanced by authors like Bernard Mandeville, Hutcheson set out to prove the existence of natural feelings like benevolence in order to show that not every action was performed out of self-interest.