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Mitsumasa Yonai, a former Premier and well-known Navy moderate.

Despite the cabinet change, however, a fundamental political shake-up such as was required to pave the way for any real peace endeavor had not been effected. In the first place, although the Emperor had charged Koiso and Yonai with joint leadership of the new Government, Koiso was given the premiership. The hope was that he would succeed in establishing a national Cabinet, coordinate effectively political and military leaders, and maintain close liaison with the key fighting service.

Furthermore, the Army consented to place its nominee, Field Marshal Sugiyama, in the Cabinet as War Minister on the condition that the new Government would continue the vigorous and determined prosecution of the war. Nevertheless, an initial success had been secured.

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In Admiral Yonai, who was himself a member of their group, the jushin now had a strong sympathizer in the Cabinet. Yonai, in accordance with the Emperor's mandate, took the post of Deputy Premier. More important, he assumed the concurrent post of Navy Minister, which automatically entitled him to first-hand information regarding the war situation and the plans and decisions of the Navy High Command. Although Yonai was the jushin 's greatest hope in the new Cabinet, Premier Koiso himself was not always optimistic about the war.

He believed that the wisest course lay in first attempting to wean China away from the Allied camp by means of a separate peace, and then seeking the mediation of the Soviet Union or some other neutral with a view to a general peace settlement on favorable terms. Before initiating any such move, however, he felt that it was essential to score one substantial military success in the field in order to improve Japan's bargaining position.

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With this end in view, Koiso devoted his first efforts to reinforcing the national war effort. The Council, however, failed to achieve the results which Premier Koiso expected, and he discovered that he was unable to obtain all the military information he desired. Despite the expectations of the jushin, the Koiso Cabinet's official policy continued to be one for all-out prosecution of the war.

An Imperial conference held on 19 August formally adopted a basic policy declaration which emphatically stated that the war would be prosecuted to the end regardless of continued enemy successes or of unfavorable international developments. Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu prevailed upon the conference not to exclude diplomatic action designed to improve Japan's positions, notably by strengthening relations with the Soviet Union.

In the fall of , Koiso hoped that the Sho-Go Operations might bring the victory needed to pave the way for a peace attempt. His hope was soon shattered by events. The all-out effort of the sea and air forces to smash the enemy invasion of Leyte in October ended in failure, and in less than two months General MacArthur's forces had won a secure foothold in the central Philippines. On the diplomatic front, a proffer to dispatch a special mission to Moscow to begin the task of cementing Japanese-Soviet relations had meanwhile been rebuffed by the Soviet Government. Japan therefore faced a darker situation than ever before as the year began.

So gloomy were the prospects that the Emperor himself felt impelled to reveal to the jushin his anxiety for an early peace. Early in February these confidential meetings got under way. Because of fear that any inkling of their purpose might arouse opposition, extreme precautions were taken. No formal audience was granted to the jushin collectively. Instead, they were individually summoned to the Palace at different times, ostensibly for the purpose of paying their normal mid-winter respects to the Throne.

The senior statesmen were unanimous in sharing the Emperor's deep concern over the trend of the war. Tojo, however, was the most optimistic, while Prince Konoye and Admiral Okada were the most pessimistic. Prince Konoye bluntly stated that Japan faced certain defeat and urged the Emperor to take resolute steps toward peace. The audiences marked a significant milestone on the road toward peace. For the first time since the outbreak of the war, the Emperor had held a free exchange of views with the majority of the jushin.

More important, the advocates of peace now had a clear indication that the Emperor himself was strongly sympathetic towards their views. With this encouragement, they quietly waited for a fresh opportunity to advance the cause of peace. During the next two months the Koiso Cabinet continued to fare badly on both the military and diplomatic fronts.


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While General MacArthur's forces made rapid headway on Luzon, the Pacific prong of the enemy's offen sive swiftly overwhelmed Iwo Jima and then, on 1 April, thrust at Okinawa in the Ryukyus. On the diplomatic front, relations with Soviet Russia tended to worsen rather than improve, and Premier Koiso's hopes of winning China away from the Allies through peace overtures to Chungking remained unrealized. In spite of serious efforts, the Koiso Cabinet was unable to show any positive achievement.

The Cabinet as a whole was unpopular. The war situation failed to improve and the Premier himself was unable to coordinate the political, diplomatic and military fronts. By the latter part of March, he had decided that it was useless to remain in office unless this situation was promptly remedied. Koiso promptly decided upon a final effort to strengthen his position and proposed that, instead of substituting Anami, the Army agree to his own assumption of the war portfolio concurrently with the premiership.

Convinced that his position was no longer tenable, Premier Koiso tendered the collective resignation of the Cabinet on 5 April.

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Even as he did so, the complete failure of the diplomatic policies pursued by his Government was being underlined in Moscow by a blunt notification to the Japanese Ambassador, Naotake Sato, of the Soviet Government's intention to abrogate the Soviet Japanese neutrality pact because it had "lost its significance.

In relinquishing the premiership, Koiso made it plain that, under the circumstances confronting the nation, he considered it absolutely essential to install " an Imperial General Headquarters Cabinet. Obviously, however, the idea of installing an "Imperial General Headquarters Cabinet" did not conform to the ideas of the peace proponents among the jushin, nor did it conform to the wishes of all elements in the Japanese Army and Navy.

Some of the jushin, notably Okada and Konoye, had already laid their plans for an attempt to install a cabinet which would offer greater possibilities for the realization of peace. In this delicate undertaking, they had the powerful support of Marquis Kido, the Emperor's closest advisor, who henceforth was to play a leading role in the struggle to attain the peace objective.

At on 5 April, less than seven hours after Premier Koiso had formally tendered the Cabinet's resignation to the Emperor, the jushin met in conference with Marquis Kido to deliberate on whom they should recommend to the Throne as head of the next Government. Six former Premiers, among them General Tojo, assembled at the Imperial Palace to attend this crucial meeting. The conference also included the president of the Privy Council, Admiral ret. Baron Kantaro Suzuki. The choice before the conference was both grave and delicate. With Okinawa already invaded and German resistance in Europe nearing complete collapse, it was certain that the Allies would soon begin massing their concerted forces for the final assault upon Japan itself.

It was imperative in view of the complex and serious military and political problems that faced Japan that the proper man be chosen. Since the collapse of the Koiso Cabinet was foreseen in advance, the leaders of the peace group had ample time to consider all aspects of the question. By 5 April, when the conference of senior statesmen convened, they had not only reached an understanding among themselves concerning their choice for Premier but they had also obtained assurance of the approval of Kido himself.

Their unanimous decision was that only one man filled the exacting requirements essential to the success of their plans. That man was Admiral Suzuki, the 77 year old president of the Privy Council. Admiral Suzuki's background unquestion ably fitted him for the role which the peace group wanted him to play.


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His active naval career had ended in when, at the specific request of the Emperor, he had stepped down as Chief of Navy General Staff to become Grand Chamberlain, a post of advisorship to the Throne second only to that of Lord Privy Seal. After seven years in this position, he had barely escaped death by assassins' bullets in the abortive military uprising of 26 February , one of the aims of which was the elimination of moderate influences around the Throne.

The Emperor had then relieved him of his duties as Grand Chamberlain, and Suzuki had subsequently held no post other than membership of the non-political and largely inactive Privy Council. He had risen to its presidency late in The important thing about Suzuki's record was that, while it generally stamped him as a man of moderate ideas, it contained nothing which put him in the camp of the peace advocates.

Thus, although some extremist elements were bound to regard him with suspicion, they could find few concrete charges to level against him. There was no doubt, moreover, that Suzuki possessed the full confidence and trust of the Emperor. In spite of this understanding among the members of the peace group and Marquis Kido, the conference of the senior statesmen on 5 April lasted three hours and was marked by weighty discussion of the problem of peace or war as well as the premiership.

At the very outset, General Tojo demanded that the conference first decide on the basic issue of peace or continuation of the war: "The next Cabinet must be the last Cabinet in this war," he said. It is necessary that we settle this question first. The suggestion brought up by Tojo is beyond the scope of this conference.

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If we should propose peace now, it is clear that our ultimate fate will be unconditional surrender. Hiranuma on the other hand agreed with Tojo in principle: "The selection of the new Premier had an intimate and important bearing on the question of peace or continued resistance. The new Premier must be a man who will fight to the end. We cannot nominate an end-the-war peace advocate. Suzuki, himself, unaware that he was being considered by the peace group, agreed, before his own name had been placed in nomination, that the next Premier must possess the "will to fight to the last.

Underlying the deliberations of the conference, however, was the well-phrased remark voiced earlier by Admiral Okada, that the next Cabinet might have to "shoulder the nation's destiny to the end.

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This remark by a leading member of the jushin peace group was a veiled clue to the group's real intent, the installation of a cabinet oriented toward the earliest possible termination of the war. Admiral Okada and his associates. The main opposition they had to face within the conference of senior statesmen itself was that of General Tojo. Far more important, Army popularity, under the impact of successive military reverses overseas and mounting war suffering at home, had reached its lowest ebb since the outbreak of hostilities.

There was consequently less probability that the Army would insist upon installing a candidate of its own for premiership. Still, the leaders of the peace group realized that they must play their hand with the utmost caution. No one could yet advocate peace openly. Moreover, if the peace group aggressively advocated a Premier who was obviously from their own camp, there was danger that some extremist elements would either block the formation of such a cabinet or sabotage its efforts once it was installed.

The problem of the peace advocates, therefore, lay in finding a candidate who would fulfill all the difficult requirements for the premiership. From their own viewpoint, he must be essentially a moderate whom they could influence toward accepting their thesis that the nation's best interest lay in seeking an early peace.

On the other hand, he must be a person who would minimize the possibilities of inviting suspicion from the extremist elements; lastly and very important, he must be someone free of political ties or past commitments which would brand him as an opponent of the war. These three basic requirements were absolutely essential, but there were others almost equally as vital. It was important too that the next Premier possess the stature necessary to restore public confidence in the national leadership and secure united obedience to the decisions of the Government.

On this, perhaps, the civilian peace group and the military were in full agreement, with different objectives, however, in mind. It was also of particular importance to the plans of the peace faction that the Premier be someone whose loyalty to the Throne was outstanding and in whom the Emperor reposed implicit trust. The reason for this lay in the fact that the peace group clearly saw the necessity of making the Emperor's will for peace a decisive factor in the realization of their objective.

It was not until the discussions were well along that Baron Hiranuma finally proposed Suzuki.

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The latter protested that he did not want the nomination, but the peace group unitedly backed Hiranuma's suggestion, as did Marquis Kido. General Tojo, supported only by Hirota, strongly insisted that the fighting of the homeland battle required an Army man as Premier and stated that he considered Marshal Hata the best choice.