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St. Thomas Aquinas discusses Sacred Doctrine, the One God, the Blessed Trinity​, Creation, the Angels, the Six Days, Man, and the Government of Creatures.
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• Summa Theologica
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• Summa Theologica (22 vols.)
• The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas. Part I. 10 vols. - Online Library of Liberty

D, 1 that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly De Trin. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent. Reply OBJ 2: Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above. Reply OBJ 3: Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power.

OBJ 1: It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect.

For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect. But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power. OBJ 3: Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man, whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense.

Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual.

On the contrary, Augustine says Gen. I answer that, Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says Div. But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational.

Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understoodnamely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found.

Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power. Reply OBJ 1: That enumeration is made according to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book is not of great authority. Reply OBJ 2: The answer is clear from what we have said.

For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable.

And thus Boethius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time. Reply OBJ 3: Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know.

Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus fro that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect. OBJ 1: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers.

OBJ 2: Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it.

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Therefore the higher reason is another power from the lower. And he proves this from the principle that for those things which are "generically different, generically different parts of the soul are ordained. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher calls the "scientific" part must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine De Trin.

I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them.

But he calls the lower reason that which "is intent on the disposal of temporal things. For by way of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the Apostle Rm. But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another sciencefor example, perspective.

But the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another.

But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower. Reply OBJ 1: We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers.

Reply OBJ 2: The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason. Reply OBJ 3: The "scientific" part, of which the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics treat.

And the "opinionative" and "ratiocinative" part is more limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the same objective aspectnamely, under the aspect of being and truth.

Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves.

And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soulnamely, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative," not because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect.

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Reply OBJ 4: That distinction given by Damascene is according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For "opinion" signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" or "measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word "mens" [mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to adhere to the formed judgment with approval. OBJ 1: It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence.

Therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct. Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense. But intelligence is an act separate from others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says De Fide Orth. On the contrary, The Philosopher says De Anima iii, 6 that "intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false.

Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect. I answer that, This word "intelligence" properly signifies the intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that such substances are always actually understanding.

But in works translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or "minds.

And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four intellectsnamely, the "active" and "passive" intellects, the intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect.

Reply OBJ 1: If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as act against power. Reply OBJ 2: Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things without any investigation.

Reply OBJ 3: All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one powernamely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence. And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of "interior speech," from which proceeds "external speech. OBJ 1: It would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3.

But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers. OBJ 2: Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is "truth," and of the practical is "good"; which differ in nature.

Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers. OBJ 3: Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above Q[78], A[4].