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Deception can be defined broadly as the manipulation of appearances such that they . Trying to build a scientific psychology on the basis of folk psychology.
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The reason these first impressions of cross-cultural differences are disheartening is because of the assumption that a deceiver will only leak his or her intentions when knowingly deceiving and violating a social taboo. Thus, one faces the task of finding out what is considered a socially unacceptable fabrication within various cultural groups.


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Once such contexts have been discovered, then interrogations could be arranged so as to put informants, for example, in a situation in which they would be violating a cultural taboo if they lied when presenting information to interrogators. Our reading of the literature indicates that if a socially unacceptable deception for a given informant has been identified, then circumstances can be created that will lead to leakage if the informant is willfully lying. Our focus has been on a folk psychology of deception because it seems to offer the best way to achieve a general theory of deception.

The leakage hypothesis assumes that a given individual will display potentially detectable signs when he or she is in a certain psychological state. As we have noted, a key issue is the extent to which these diagnostic cues are universal—that is, to what extent they show the same pattern across cultures and situations—and the evidence to date suggests the possibility that there may be both universal and culturally specific aspects to leakage displays. Presumably, the underlying psychological state that gives rise to leakage corresponds to what is ordinarily labeled guilt, shame, humiliation, disgrace, or dishonor—terms that refer to how people feel when they violate a social taboo.

Everyone is raised within family and cultural settings that teach which acts are socially unacceptable. This socialization process is considered to impart a relatively permanent tendency to experience guilt or a similar state whenever a person commits, or even considers committing, social transgressions. Such tendencies may persevere even when an individual, as an adult, consciously rejects many of the values within which he or she was raised. One assumption, then, is that for all cultures people will react with a guilty state when they believe they are violating a cultural norm.

Knowing the folk psychology for various cultures becomes important if one wants to know what constitutes a cultural taboo for a given individual. That is why the techniques used by Hopper and Bell and by Coleman and Kay have been discussed in some detail. By properly refining and adapting their methods, information can be gathered on how individuals from various cultures and subcultures conceive of deception and lying.

This information, in turn, might lead to determining what sorts of stories or actions constitute socially unacceptable behaviors.

A Study in Deception: Psychology's Sickness - The Atlantic

Such findings could then be used to create appropriate stimuli that may elicit leakage if the individual is, in fact, trying to deceive. This model assumes people have been socialized. What about individuals who have not been socialized? In the past, psychologists and psychiatrists diagnosed some individuals as psychopaths or sociopaths. A few experiments have been carried out with such persons using the polygraph; all of them are controversial and the results are contradictory.

It is doubtful, for example, that an intelligence agent would want to trust a person so diagnosed, even if such a person could successfully deceive the enemy. The discussion in this chapter and in Chapter 9 deals with the simplest situation in which deception occurs, a face-to-face confrontation between two individuals, in part because this situation has been the context of most of the research. Another reason is that such a situation.

The typical dyadic situation is one in which the two individuals interact and each adapts his or her behavior in the light of what the other person says and does. In contrast, all the research on the leakage hypothesis has been conducted within a relatively static, noninteractive mode. Typically, the detector makes judgments in response to a videotaped presentation. The detector cannot continue and ask further questions, nor can the deceiver adjust his or her behavior on the basis of feedback from the detector. But this is just the context in which ordinary dyadic communication occurs.

It is possible that a detector can do better than the dismal performances so far reported if he or she is allowed to actually interact with the sender. However, the sender might actually do even better at hiding deception in an interactive mode, because the deceiver can use feedback from the victim to adjust both the content and mode of presentation so as to be more acceptable to the victim. The detector's challenge is to determine the significance of a cue when he or she knows that the sender is managing his or her expressions.

The detector must anticipate what the subject expects him or her to look for and then focus attention on other cues. The sender is challenged by the need to fool the detector when he or she knows that the detector is assessing his or her moves. The sender must anticipate the cues likely to be used by the observer and then control them. The objective for each is to minimize his or her vulnerability under difficult circumstances. This assessment dilemma renders the expression game a highly sophisticated art form.

The dynamics of the expression game pose an analytical problem. Both senders encoders and receivers decoders determine the outcome of the communication process. The problem is one of disentangling effects of senders and receivers. Accurate detection may be the result of encoding skill, decoding skill, or both.

Consequently, an analyst does not know whether detection is due to style of presentation or astute observation. One solution is to control part of the interaction, either the. By so doing, however, one may lose the essential features of an interactive situation. This problem illustrates the difficulties in making the transition between laboratory and field settings. Theories of deception, such as those outlined in Epstein , often assume deception works best when it can be tailored to the expectations and desires of the victim.

Intelligence agencies attempt to do this tailoring by using feedback about which parts of the disinformation are being accepted and which parts are being rejected by the victim.

The Atlantic Crossword

One source of such feedback is provided by information gained in face-to-face communication between informant and interrogator. In the world of spying, however, the most effective form of feedback comes from an inside person or mole who has penetrated the target agency. The deception loop includes several layers of an organization.

The disinformation lying from a presumed informer makes its way from the controlling agent up through the various layers of the bureaucracy.

The inside person sees how this information is being accepted and interpreted and informs the enemy agency. The enemy agency, in turn, adjusts the disinformation being provided by the informant to better fit with the expectations and desires of the enemy.

Psychology and Commerce in America

As this example illustrates, deception can and often does involve several levels of organizational complexity. A complete understanding of how deception operates in most real-world situations often requires considerations at several levels of analysis such as the international scene, the relation between states, governmental structures, internal special interest groups, and the like Handel, ; Mauer et al.

Much of this complexity deals with how information is accepted and used or not. This, in turn, relates to the problem of detecting deception because it is possible that even when cues to deception should be obvious to an interrogator, the disinformation being provided may so fit in with preconceptions and desires of superiors that the interrogator subconsciously ignores all the signs to the contrary.

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As many have pointed out, an interrogator case officer who controls an informant has much of his esteem and pride invested in this informant. A symbiotic relationship exists between a case officer and an informant. The informant requires the trust of the case officer so that the information being provided will be accepted. The case officer needs to believe that the informant is trustworthy because his or her reputation depends on controlling this important source of information.

In fact, even when an informant is a plant, he or she will make sure to provide. In this way the case officer becomes even more dependent on the trustworthiness of the informant. Once a case officer and his or her superiors have decided that an informant is trustworthy, the dynamics of the situation are tilted toward maintaining the belief in the reliability of the informant. Careers can be made, or broken, if the agency ultimately decides that an informant was a true defector or a plant. A variety of institutional and psychological factors come into play to maintain the belief, even in the face of subsequently strong information to the contrary, in the trustworthiness of the agent.

Striking cases of such institutional self-deception have been documented by Epstein , Handel , Watzlawick , and Whaley Such institutional self-deception typically involves accepting or rejecting the content of information.

The Science of Deception

At the level of face-to-face communication, we have been focusing on the nonverbal cues rather than the content of what is being communicated. The two bases for judging the credibility of information obviously interact. When the content of the information is consistent with the beliefs and desires of the receiver, then the tendency to accept the information as accurate is strong.

As noted above, the relationship between suspicion and detection accuracy —how much a tendency to believe or disbelieve can override the ability to pick up deception cues—is important for research. From the discussion in the chapter we draw four conclusions. The first conclusion is based on the assumption that leaked cues to deception occur when an individual's psychological state reflects the experience of guilt. However, the situations that produce guilt may vary with an individual's cultural background and experience. Therefore, detection of deception would be improved if one could anticipate the sorts of settings that constitute social transgression or a guilt-producing state for particular individuals.

The research on the folk psychology of deception and on the prototypical structure of lying are examples of methods for assessing perceptions of socially unacceptable deceptions within subcultural groups. With suitable refinements, those methods can be used to discover what stories and deceptive acts might induce leakage for particular individuals. Once discovered, the stories could be varied systematically to determine whether leakage occurs or is enhanced when an individual deceives under conditions that violate his or her cultural norms. The analysis would compare the reactions of various cultural groups to the.

Our second conclusion about cultural differences has practical implications. An interrogator can arrange a situation that will violate a cultural taboo if deception occurs. One possible way of doing this is to use an interrogator of the same cultural background as that of the informant. If the folk psychology of the informant holds that deceiving is immoral only when the victim is a member of one's own culture, then this setting should produce leakage clues if the informant is, in fact, lying. The third conclusion concerns extending and modifying the laboratory research paradigm as a technique for studying deception clues.

In order to examine complex interactions between individuals operating in organizational contexts, it would be necessary to supplement classical laboratory experiments with modern quasi-experimental methods, careful surveys, and detailed case histories. Moving between experimental and field studies also entails the development of statistical procedures that enable an investigator to make the comparisons of interest. The fourth conclusion is a recommendation for the use of videotapes for research and training.

Ongoing face-to-face interactions pose a problem for detecting subtle deception clues. Videotaped exchanges between interrogators and informants can be replayed for details easily overlooked in the course of an ongoing conversation. Independent observers can analyze the interactions, providing judgments that may be free from the biases possessed by participants. Moreover, taped discussions can provide baseline data on cues emitted from a number of communication channels.

Such information can serve as a basis for evaluating deviations from past behavior. They can also be used to train individuals to code nonverbal behavior for leakage clues. Coleman and Kay obtained confidence ratings along with the judgments of whether a statement was a lie. They were able to use these ratings to construct a more refined rating scale. For the sake of simplicity, only the simple judgments of lying are discussed here. Robin-Ann Cogburn, a doctoral student at the University of Oregon, is currently conducting research with antisocial persons who are in the state prison system.

She is using a variation of the classic laboratory paradigm to test the leakage hypothesis with them. Chisholm, R.

Feehan The intent to deceive.