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If you connect the power supply and adapter incorrectly, leaving one leg of the power plug unprotected by the adapter, you can have an electrical shock, if you touch the unprotected leg. The wooden rings on the hammer can crack and thus possibly result in small parts that could be hazardous to small children. There are no reports of anyone being harmed by the product, but all in possession of a Soft Hammer Rattle are encouraged to return it to their local retailer or where they have purchased the product to receive a full refund.

We would like to apologize for the inconvenience this may have caused and thank you in advance for helping us in our safety work. Small parts may fall out of the rattle chamber. The small parts are a choking hazard for children below 3 years. Oball Rattles Rattle Ball sold to consumers after January 1 st containing one chamber with only orange beads and the following traceability numbers: T, T, T, T and T The traceability number is located on a small triangle on the inside of the ball.

Consumers should immediately remove the recalled rattle balls from children and contact Kids II for a full refund. As a consequence of this we have decided to stop selling the product. It is essential to us that our customers trust the quality and safety of our products. Consequently, we react as quickly as possible when we discover products that are not compliant with the legal regulations. Then you should return it in a store from the chain you bought it in and get your money back.

We have received inquiries from customers who have experienced that the rope of the swing can slide if the weight is pushed ahead of the swing, e. At worst, the child can tip over and hang upside down. Therefore, we have taken our precautions and asked the supplier to recall the product from our stores. We have sold a total of of these swings in the Nordic countries between April 1 and May 31 From till early Spin Master has sold about 65, units in the EU and about , units globally. No injury whatsoever has been reported in the EU, nor worldwide.

It is essential to us that our customers trust our products quality and safety. Consequently, we react as quickly as possible when we discover products that are not complaint with the legal regulations or our own strict requirements. Our spot check has showed that a production of the wig does not meet the self-extinguishing requirement in the Toy Safety Standard EN It burns significantly longer than permitted thus increasing the risk of an accident if a child wears the wig in the vicinity of candles or open fire. The recall of the Rapunzel wigs is for the above production lot only, delivered to our customers in January and February Previous lots have been tested and found in accordance with the Toy Safety Standard.

But Doug Frantz, then the investigations editor in New York, felt that he had to sneak it onto Page 1. Then-Executive Editor Howell Raines was believed by many at the paper to prefer stories that supported the case for war. But Raines now says he was not pro-war, and that he did not object to putting my Prague story on the front page.

Her stories were helping to set the political agenda in Washington. Miller and I were friends — in fact, I was probably one of her closest friends in the Washington bureau at the time. I kept hearing quiet complaints that the White House was pressuring CIA analysts to cook the books and deliver intelligence reports that followed the party line on Iraq. But when I pressed, few were willing to provide specifics.

Intermediaries would sometimes tell me that they were receiving anguished calls from CIA analysts, but when I asked to talk to them, they refused. But after I filed the first story, it sat in the Times computer system for days, then weeks, untouched by editors. Finally, the story ran, but it was badly cut and buried deep inside the paper. I wrote another one, and the same thing happened. I tried to write more, but I started to get the message. I grew so sick of this that when the Washington Post reported that Iraq had turned over nerve gas to terrorists, I refused to try to match the story.

One mid-level editor in the Washington bureau yelled at me for my refusal. In March , I flew to Dubai to interview a very nervous man. It had taken weeks of negotiations, through a series of intermediaries, to arrange our meeting. We agreed on a luxury hotel in Dubai, the modern capital of Middle Eastern intrigue. Just before we were scheduled to meet, however, the source imposed new demands.

That also made it impossible for me to take notes until after our meeting. But it was worth it. He told me the story of how Qatar had given sanctuary to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in the s, when he was wanted in connection with a plot to blow up American airliners. I was later able to confirm the story, which was especially significant because Qatar was home to the forward headquarters of U. Central Command, the military command in charge of the invasion of Iraq. After the story ran , I felt revitalized. That spring, just as the U. The idea was that the CIA would give the Iranians flawed blueprints, and Tehran would use them to build a bomb that would turn out to be a dud.

The problem was with the execution of the secret plan. The CIA had taken Russian nuclear blueprints it had obtained from a defector and then had American scientists riddle them with flaws. He was supposed to pretend to be trying to sell the documents to the highest bidder.

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But the design flaws in the blueprints were obvious. The Russian who was supposed to hand them over feared that the Iranians would quickly recognize the errors, and that he would be in trouble. To protect himself when he dropped off the documents at an Iranian mission in Vienna, he included a letter warning that the designs had problems. So the Iranians received the nuclear blueprints and were also warned to look for the embedded flaws. Several CIA officials believed that the operation had either been mismanaged or at least failed to achieve its goals.

By May , I confirmed the story through a number of sources, wrote up a draft, and called the CIA public affairs office for comment. Rice stared straight at me. I had received information so sensitive that I had an obligation to forget about the story, destroy my notes, and never make another phone call to discuss the matter with anyone, she said. She told Abramson and me that the New York Times should never publish the story.

I tried to turn the tables. The only point he disputed was that the operation had been mismanaged. Rice argued that the operation was an alternative to a full-scale invasion of Iran, like the war that President George W. Bush had just launched in Iraq. After the meeting, Abramson and I stopped for lunch.

We were both stunned by the full-court press we had just endured. But I also recognized that I had just gotten high-level confirmation for the story — better confirmation than I could ever have imagined. Just after Abramson and I met with Tenet and Rice, the Jayson Blair scandal erupted, forcing Raines into an intense battle to save his job.

Blair may have been the immediate cause of the crisis, but among the staff at the Times, Blair was merely the trigger that allowed resentment that had built up against Raines over his management style to come out into the open. Boyd died in Raines left the paper in early June Joe Lelyveld, the retired executive editor, briefly came back to run the Times on an interim basis. When Bill Keller was named executive editor in the summer of , he agreed to discuss the story with Abramson and me. After I went over the story with him, Keller decided not to publish it.

The spiking of the Iran story, coming so soon after the internal fights over WMD coverage, left me depressed. Critics claimed that the Bush White House had sold her out to the press as retribution against her Iraq war critic husband, former U. Without thinking about the long-term consequences, many in the media cheered Fitzgerald on, urging him to aggressively go after top Bush administration officials to find out who was the source of the leak.

Anti-Bush liberals saw the Plame case and the Fitzgerald leak investigation as a proxy fight over the war in Iraq, rather than as a potential threat to press freedom. Fitzgerald, an Inspector Javert-like prosecutor whose special counsel status meant that no one at the Justice Department could rein him in, started subpoenaing reporters all over Washington and demanding they testify before a grand jury.

Are You an Author?

There was hardly a murmur of dissent from liberals as Fitzgerald pressed one prominent reporter after another for information. Only Judy Miller went to jail rather than cooperate.


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She eventually testified after she received a waiver from her source, I. The Plame case eventually faded away, but it had set a dangerous precedent. He had demolished the political, social, and legal constraints that previously made government officials reluctant to go after journalists and their sources. He became a role model for career prosecutors, who saw that you could rise to the top of the Justice Department by going after reporters and their sources. The decades-old informal understanding between the government and the press — that the government would only go through the motions on leak investigations — was dead.

In the summer of , the New York Times named a new Washington bureau chief: Taubman and I developed a friendly relationship. He had covered national security and intelligence matters earlier in his career, and he seemed eager for scoops. But by , I began to disagree with some of his decisions. That was a huge betrayal by the man some senior Bush administration officials had once considered installing as the leader of Iraq.

Hayden argued that even though Chalabi had told the Iranians that the U. Taubman agreed, and we sat on the story until the CIA public affairs office called and told him that someone else was reporting it, and that we should no longer feel bound not to publish. In the spring of , just as the Plame case was heating up and starting to change the dynamics between the government and the press, I met with a source who told me cryptically that there was something really big and really secret going on inside the government.

It was the biggest secret the source had ever heard. But it was something the source was too nervous to discuss with me. A new fear of aggressive leak investigations was filtering down. I decided to stay in touch with the source and raise the issue again. The source told me that the NSA had been wiretapping Americans without search warrants, without court approval.

The NSA was also collecting the phone and email records of millions of Americans. The operation had been authorized by the president. The Bush administration was engaged in a massive domestic spying program that was probably illegal and unconstitutional, and only a handful of carefully selected people in the government knew about it. I left that meeting shocked, but as a reporter, I was also elated. I knew that this was the story of a lifetime. The NSA had lived by strict rules against domestic spying for 30 years, ever since the Church Committee investigations of intelligence abuses in the s had led to a series of reforms.

My source had just revealed to me that the Bush administration was secretly ignoring the law requiring search warrants from the FISA court. As we sat alone in a quiet bar, I told the source what I had heard about the NSA program, and it was immediately clear that the source knew the same secret and was troubled by it. As I worked to find more people to talk to about the story, I realized that the reporter sitting next to me in the Washington bureau, Eric Lichtblau, was hearing similar things. Lichtblau covered the Justice Department.

When he first came to the paper in , I had been jealous of his abilities as a reporter, especially his success at developing sources. I sometimes let my resentment get the better of me; I recall one meeting with Abramson in which I was openly dismissive of an exclusive story Lichtblau was working on.

But he never held it against me, and we struck up a friendship and started working on stories together. Lichtblau had heard from a source that something potentially illegal was going on at DOJ, that officials seemed to be ignoring the law requiring warrants for national security wiretaps, and that Attorney General John Ashcroft might be involved. Lichtblau and I compared notes, and we realized we were probably hearing about the same story. We decided to work together. We both kept digging, talking to more people. We started doing some interviews together and discovered that we had very different reporting styles.

My Life as a New York Times Reporter in the Shadow of the War on Terror

While I liked to let a source talk about whatever was on their mind, Lichtblau liked to get right to the point, and sometimes badgered sources to cough up information. Our approaches were complementary, and we inadvertently developed a good cop-bad cop routine. Lichtblau would often give our sources colorful nicknames, which made it easier for us to talk without revealing their identities.

By the fall of , we had a draft of a story. I felt it was time to go through the front door, so I decided on impulse to try to bluff my way to the top of the NSA. She got Hayden on the phone right away. I was shocked that my bluff had worked, but now that I had Hayden, I had to think fast about what I wanted to ask him.

I decided to read him the first few paragraphs of the draft Lichtblau and I were writing. Lichtblau was sitting next to me, staring intently as I read Hayden the top of the story on the phone. I was sitting in front of my computer, ready to transcribe whatever Hayden would say. After I read the first few paragraphs, Hayden let out an audible gasp and then stammered for a moment. Finally, he said that whatever the NSA was doing was legal and operationally effective.

I pressed him further, but he refused to say more and hung up. Hayden had all but confirmed the story. It seemed obvious from his response that he knew exactly what I was talking about and had begun to defend his actions before deciding to end the conversation. Taubman listened, but was noncommittal. That was the beginning of what turned out to be more than a year of negotiations between the Times and the Bush administration, as officials repeatedly sought to kill the NSA story.

The meeting, the first of many between the Times and the government over the NSA story, was odd. In contrast to my meeting with Tenet and Rice on the Iran story, when they had confirmed the story while asking the paper to kill it, McLaughlin and Moseman refused to acknowledge that the NSA story was true, even as they asked us not to print it. I had now been through this routine with the Bush administration several times, and their dire warnings about national security no longer impressed me.

They had cried wolf too many times to be credible. He also demanded that they warn us if they found out any other news organization was onto the same story. As Lichtblau and I continued to report, we realized that we had to get a better understanding of how American and international telecommunications networks worked. I spent a day in the library at Georgetown University, poring over technical journals and academic works on the telecommunications industry.

I did not tell the spokesperson why I was taking an interest in such an arcane issue, other than that it was for a story in the New York Times. But I never heard from him again. Bush and John Kerry. With a week or two to go before the election, Lichtblau and I, along with Corbett and Taubman, went to New York for a meeting with Keller and Abramson to decide whether the story would be published. It was a comfortable, book-lined nook that I had visited once before, when I had tried to get Keller to change his mind and publish the long-spiked CIA-Iran story.

A key issue was the legality of the NSA program. There were some tense exchanges. I told Keller I thought this was the kind of story that had helped make the New York Times great in the s, when Seymour Hersh had uncovered a series of intelligence abuses. As the meeting wore on and Keller was unconvinced by each reason we gave for running the story, I grew more desperate to find some argument that might change his mind.

That was exactly the wrong thing to say to Keller. He got his back up, wondering aloud whether the source had a political agenda. I pointed out that if he decided not to run the story before the election, that would also have an impact, but he seemed to ignore my comment. By the end of the meeting, he said he had decided not to run the story.


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In a recent interview, Keller acknowledged that my telling him that a source might go elsewhere with the story influenced his decision. Keller now also says that the overall climate in the country in provides important context for his decision not to run the story. It was not a kind of patriotic rapture. It was an acute sense that the world was a dangerous place. But after the election, Lichtblau and I convinced the editors to let us start working on the story again. Within the small group of people in the government who knew about the NSA program, many also knew by now that we were investigating it and were afraid to talk to us.

On a snowy night in December , we drove to the home of one official who Lichtblau believed knew about the NSA program. When the official opened the door, he recognized Lichtblau and quickly realized why we were there. He started berating us for showing up unannounced, told us to leave immediately, and shut the door. He seemed worried that someone might have seen us outside his house.

The paper once again began meetings with top administration officials who wanted to stop us from running the story. Ashcroft had just resigned, and while it had not yet been announced, it was clear that Gonzales was about to replace him as attorney general. Now it was up to Gonzales to convince us to kill the story. But once the meeting started, Gonzales barely said anything; it seemed that the administration was temporarily happy to have gotten through the election without our story being published, and the tone in the room was more relaxed than usual. Comey did most of the talking.

Comey did not reveal that he and several other top Justice Department officials, along with then-FBI Director Robert Mueller, had nearly resigned over certain aspects of the program earlier in Meanwhile, Hayden, who clearly had decided to make Taubman the focus of his lobbying campaign to stop the Times from publishing the story, invited him, but not Lichtblau or me, to NSA headquarters and allowed Taubman to talk with NSA officials directly involved in the domestic spying program. When somebody gives you that kind of access and says lives will be at risk, you take them seriously.

Taubman recalls telling either Hayden or Rice that the Times needed to hear from the leaders of the congressional intelligence committees who knew about the program. She told me that she and her colleagues, Democrat and Republican, strongly supported the NSA effort and requested that the [Times] not disclose it. By mid-December , the story had been re-reported, so Lichtblau, Corbett, and I began pushing again to get it into the paper. Instead of traveling to New York this time, we held a series of closed-door meetings with Taubman in his office in Washington.

The additional reporting and rewriting did not sway him. He killed the story. This time, Keller was not directly involved in our meetings. The NSA story now seemed permanently dead. I was about to start a long-scheduled leave to write a book about the CIA and the Bush administration. I was furious that the Times had killed both the Iran and the NSA stories, and angry that the White House was successfully suppressing the truth.

I decided to put the Iran and the NSA stories in my book. I was pretty sure that meant I would be fired from the Times. It was nerve-wracking, but my wife, Penny, stood firm. That sealed my decision. After I wrote the chapter about the NSA domestic spying program, I called Lichtblau and asked him to come to my house. When he arrived, I told him to sit down, read the chapter, and let me know whether it was OK to put the story in my book. After he finished reading, he joked that I had buried the lede, but I sharply reminded him that writing a book was different from writing a news story.

He gave his approval to include it in the book, since he knew the story was dead at the Times. While I was on book leave, Lichtblau was in an agonizing position. Barred by his editors from working on the NSA story, he was instead assigned to cover the debate in Congress over the reauthorization of the Patriot Act. Bush had already secretly decided what that balance would be. The Remaking of American Justice. While covering one congressional hearing, Lichtblau listened as Harman called for tighter restrictions on the Patriot Act to prevent abuses of civil liberties.

Lichtblau knew that Harman had been briefed on the NSA program and had called the Times to kill our story, so he followed her out into the hall to talk about it. But when he asked her how she could square her demands for limits on the Patriot Act with what she knew about the NSA program, Harman chided him for raising the matter.

I returned from book leave in May and finished my manuscript later that summer. In the late summer or early fall, after I turned in the last chapters to my publisher and the editing process at Free Press was virtually complete, I decided to let the Times know what I was doing. The reaction was swift. Within minutes, Taubman was standing near my desk, grimly demanding to talk. We went into his office.

He said firmly that I was being insubordinate and rebelling against the editorial decisions of the Times. Taubman also recalls that he was angry because he believed I had misled him before I went on book leave into thinking I was going to write a biography of George Tenet. He wanted me to take the NSA story out of my book. We began to talk almost every day about how to resolve our impasse. Initially, I suggested the paper run the NSA story when my book came out, under the kind of arrangement that the Washington Post seemed to have with Bob Woodward. That proposal went nowhere.

Eventually, Taubman countered that the paper would only consider running the NSA story if I first agreed to remove it from my book and thus, give the paper the chance to reconsider its publication without any undue pressure. While researching this personal account, I was surprised to learn that Abramson recalls that my email to her was not what started a debate among the Times senior editors about what to do about the NSA story and my book.

Abramson says that by the time I emailed her, she already knew that I was putting the NSA story in my book. She says that another reporter in the Washington bureau had told her earlier that I was going to do it, and she had already told Bill Keller about my plans. So what could possibly be the point of continuing to hold it? That fall, I became so concerned that the Times would not run the NSA story and that I would be fired that I secretly met with another national news organization about a job. I told a senior editor there that I had a major story that the Times had refused to run under pressure from the White House.

The senior editor replied that their publication would never run a piece if the White House raised objections on national security grounds. I left that meeting more depressed than ever. After a long series of contentious conversations stretching over several weeks in the fall of , I finally reached an uneasy compromise with the editors. They would let Lichtblau and me start working on the NSA story again, and the paper would resume talks with the Bush administration over whether to publish it.

But if the paper once again decided not to run the story, I had to take it out of my book. I agreed to those conditions, but I secretly knew that it was already too late to take the chapter out of my book, and I had no intention of doing so.

Administre su negocio mientras lo reinventa

I was gambling that the Times would run the story before the book was published. Curiously, the Times editors seemed to shrug off the Iran story, even though they knew it was going to be in the book too. Maybe the NSA story was fresher in their minds. The editors began a new round of meetings with Bush administration officials, who were apparently surprised that the Times was resurrecting the NSA story. I was excluded from these conversations.

The meetings dragged on through the fall of Michael Hayden, now the principal deputy director of the Office of National Intelligence, often took the lead, and continued to meet with Philip Taubman. In one meeting, Taubman and Bill Keller received a secret briefing in which officials described the counterterrorism successes of the program. Lichtblau and I eventually realized that Bush administration officials had been misleading Keller and Taubman.

They had insisted that the agency was only vacuuming up metadata, obtaining phone calling logs and email addresses. That was not true, but the government had been trying to convince Keller and Taubman that Lichtblau and I had been exaggerating the scope of the story. It took time, but Lichtblau and I were finally able to persuade Keller and Taubman that they had been misled.

In our recent interview, Keller said that once he realized the administration had been disingenuous with him, he started to change his mind about publishing the story. It was also critically important that Lichtblau had developed a new source who said that some Bush administration officials had expressed fears that they might face prosecution for their involvement in the secret NSA spying operation. There had also been an intense debate at the highest levels of the Bush administration about the legality of some aspects of the program.