schend ist allerdings, dass gerade diejenige Problematik nicht eingehender un- .. stances idealized version of the data we gain from immediate observation, Reiner, Richard und Pierson, Robert: “Hacking's Experimental Realism: An defined by ordinary language; one needs to refer neither to the grammatical sur-.
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However little we talk about it, though, there is pleasure also plays an integral role in cognitive life, in both our sensory perception of the world and our intellectual understanding. This previously important but now neglected philosophical understanding of pleasure is the focus of the essays in this volume, which challenges received views that pleasure is principally motivating of action, unanalyzable, and caused, rather than responsive to reason. Like other books in the Oxford Philosophical Concepts series, it traces the development of the focal idea from ancient times through the 20th century.
The essays highlight points of departure for new lines of inquiry rather than attempting to provide a full picture of how the idea of pleasure has been explored in philosophy. The volume begins by showing how Plato, Aristotle, early Islamic philosophers, and philosophers in the Medieval Latin tradition, such as Aquinas, honed in on the challenge of unifying the variety of pleasures so that they fall under one concept. In the early modern period, philosophers shifted from understanding the logic of pleasure to treating pleasure as a mental state. As the studies of Malebranche, Berkeley and Kant show, the central problem becomes understanding the relation of pleasure to other sensory experiences, and the role of pleasure in human cognition and knowledge.
Short interdisciplinary reflections interspersed between essays focus on art of 16th and 17th century textbooks and the difficult music of composers like Bach, which demonstrate translation of these concerns to cultural production in the period. As the essay on Mill shows, the 19th century development of scientific psychology narrowed the definition of pleasure, and so its philosophical focus. Contemporary accounts of pleasure, however, in both philosophy and psychology, are now recognizing the limitations of this narrow focus, and are once again recognizing the complexity of pleasure and its role in human life.
H36 P54 Unknown. July 18, []. Summary This Element considers Kant's account of the sublime in the context of his predecessors both in the Anglophone and German rationalist traditions. Since Kant says with evident endorsement that 'we call sublime that which is absolutely great' Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: The Element takes account of the difference between respect and admiration as the two main varieties of sublime feeling, and concludes by considering the role of Stoicism in Kant's account of the sublime, particularly through the channel of Seneca.
This Element considers Kant's account of the sublime in the context of his predecessors both in the Anglophone and German rationalist traditions. S89 M47 Unavailable In process. Suffering and virtue []. Summary Suffering, in one form or another, is present in all of our lives. But why do we suffer? On one reading, this is a question about the causes of physical and emotional suffering.
On another, it is a question about whether suffering has a point or purpose or value. In this ground-breaking book, Michael Brady argues that suffering is vital for the development of virtue, and hence for us to live happy or flourishing lives. After presenting a distinctive account of suffering and a novel interpretation of its core element - unpleasantness - Brady focuses on three claims that are central to his picture. The first is that forms of suffering, like pain and remorse, can themselves constitute virtuous responses. The second is that suffering is essential for four important classes of virtue: His third and final claim is that suffering is vital for the social virtues of justice, love, and trust, and hence for the flourishing of social groups.
Suffering, in one form or another, is present in all of our lives. S79 B73 Unknown. Taedong minju yuhak kwa segi sirhak: C65 N32 Unknown. C C Unknown. Summary Introduction-- Part I. The instant of their debt: Derrida and the psychoanalysis of culture Andrea Hurst-- 3. Derrida and sexual difference Ginette Michaud-- 4.
Derrida queries De Man: Derrida as literary reader Derek Attridge-- 6. Broken singularities Derrida and Celan Joshua Schuster-- 7. Derrida and the essence of poetry Yue Zhuo-- 8. From Mallarme to the event: Deconstruction, collectivity, and world literature Jen Hui Bon Hoa-- The documental revolution and the archives of the future Maurizio Ferraris. Nielsen Book Data This collection of essays explores the main concepts and methods of reading launched by French philosopher Jacques Derrida who died in Derrida exerted a huge influence on literary critics in the s, but later there was a backlash against his theories.
Today, one witnesses a general return to his way of reading literature, the rationale of which is detailed and explained in the essays. The authors, both well-known and younger specialists, give many precise examples of how Derrida, who always remained at the cusp between literature and philosophy, posed fundamental questions and thus changed the field of literary criticism, especially with regard to poetry.
The contributors also highlight the way Derrida made spectacular interventions in feminism, psychoanalytic studies, animal studies, digital humanities and post-colonial studies. D A55 Unavailable In process Request. Summary Among the philosophical traditions that seem most at odds with Gilles Deleuze's project, two stand out: Kantianism and Normative Ethics.
Both of these traditions represent for Deleuze forms of moralism that he explicitly rejects. In this book, Cheri Lynne Carr explores the very real potential Deleuze's clandestine use of Kantian critique has for developing a new ethical practice. This new practice is built on an idea implicit in much of Deleuzian thought: This new concept of a critical ethos is a powerful form of moral pedagogy directed at developing in us the wisdom to perceive unanticipated features of moral salience, evaluate the principles we presuppose, affirm the limits those presuppositions impose, and create concepts that capture new ways of thinking about moral problems.
Among the philosophical traditions that seem most at odds with Gilles Deleuze's project, two stand out: D C Unavailable In process Request. C48 A5 Unavailable In process. Karl Popper, science and enlightenment []. P64 M39 Unavailable In process Request.
R M33 V. Never the twain shall meet? Latins and Greeks learning from each other in Byzantium []. B97 N49 Unavailable In process Request. Deleuze's reading of Leibniz []. Summary Alex Tissandier argues that an understanding of Deleuze's relationship to Leibniz is essential for a full understanding of his philosophy. Throughout Deleuze's work we find two opposing characterisations of Leibniz.
On the one hand Deleuze presents Leibniz as a conservative theologian committed to justifying the order and harmony of a God-governed world. On the other, Leibniz appears as a revolutionary thinker credited with "the most insane concept creation we have ever witnessed in philosophy. Alex Tissandier argues that an understanding of Deleuze's relationship to Leibniz is essential for a full understanding of his philosophy.
D T57 Unknown. Trout exemplifies the power of science in the hands of a philosopher, and the result is a timely and urgent argument about the future of philosophy. Based on his Phi Beta Kappa Romanell Lectures, Trout here presents a novel and positive view of intellectual advancements with respect to traditional topics in philosophy, and explains why these achievements occurred despite the archaic and often retrograde influence of philosophical doctrine and method.
Together, these lines of inquiry lead to a conclusion that while foundational reflection remains as necessary as ever philosophy, as it is conceived in the halls of academia, no longer adds anything distinctively useful. At its best, philosophy is a place to grow new ideas. But many other disciplines can provide such incubation.
The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy
At the same time, however, Trout argues that we don't have to kill philosophy; we just have to figure out what is worth preserving from it. Following a spirited introduction, the first lecture takes stock of the growing field of evidence-based approaches to reasoning, and in light of these scientific developments, criticizes important failures in epistemology as it is currently practiced in the English speaking world. The second lecture examines the psychological impulse to explain, the resulting sense of understanding, and the natural limits of cognitively appreciating the subject we have explained.
The final lecture presents the proper reaction to the idea that scientific evidence matters to responsible governance. In All Talked Out J. Summary Why Ayn Rand is important Rand's life and writings A timeline of Rand's life and work Outline of Rand's worldview Rand on the nature of reality How we understand the world Rand on morality Politics and economics Rand on public issues The nature and importance of art Rand's novels Rand's critics Quotations by and about Rand.
Why Ayn Rand is important Rand's life and writings A timeline of Rand's life and work Outline of Rand's worldview Rand on the nature of reality How we understand the world Rand on morality Politics and economics Rand on public issues The nature and importance of art Rand's novels Rand's critics Quotations by and about Rand. R B88 Unknown. A4 J36 Unavailable In process. Kant on evil, self-deception, and moral reform []. Summary The self of self-love Evil and the subordination of the moral law Kantian self-deception Self-deception, the necessary conditions of evil, and the entrenchment of evil Self-deception, dissimulation, and the universality of evil in human nature Kantian self-cognition Kant's two-stage model of moral reform Moral misunderstandings and the ethical community.
Throughout his writings, and particularly in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant alludes to the idea that evil is connected to self-deceit, and while numerous commentators regard this as a highly attractive thesis, none have seriously explored it. Working with both Kant's core texts on ethics and materials less often cited within scholarship on Kant's practical philosophy such as Kant's logic lectures , Papish explores the cognitive dimensions of Kant's accounts of evil and moral reform while engaging the most influential - and often scathing - of Kant's critics.
Her book asks what self-deception is for Kant, why and how it is connected to evil, and how we achieve the self-knowledge that should take the place of self-deceit. She offers novel defenses of Kant's widely dismissed claims that evil is motivated by self-love and that an evil is rooted universally in human nature, and she develops original arguments concerning how social institutions and interpersonal relationships facilitate, for Kant, the self-knowledge that is essential to moral reform.
In developing and defending Kant's understanding of evil, moral reform, and their cognitive underpinnings, Papish not only makes an important contribution to Kant scholarship. Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform also reveals how much contemporary moral philosophers, philosophers of religion, and general readers interested in the phenomenon of evil stand to gain by taking seriously Kant's views.
The self of self-love Evil and the subordination of the moral law Kantian self-deception Self-deception, the necessary conditions of evil, and the entrenchment of evil Self-deception, dissimulation, and the universality of evil in human nature Kantian self-cognition Kant's two-stage model of moral reform Moral misunderstandings and the ethical community. P Unavailable In process Request. Summary Imagine you are sitting at Starbuck glancing at the blue coffee mug in front of you. The mug is blue on the outside, white on the inside. It's large for a mug. And it's nearly full of freshly made coffee.
In the envisaged case, you see all those aspects of the scene in front of you, but it remains a question of ferocious debate whether the visual experience that makes up your seeing is a direct "perceptual" relation between you and your environment or a psychology state that has a content that represents the mug. If your experience involves an external "perceptual" relation to an external, mind-independent object, it is unlike familiar mental states such as belief and desire states, which are widely considered psychological states with a representational content that stands between you and the external world.
Your belief that the coffee mug in front of you is blue has a content that represents the coffee mug as being blue. Your desire that the coffee in the mug is still hot has a content that represents a state of affairs that may or may not in fact obtain, namely the state of affairs that the coffee in the mug is still hot. In this book, Brit Brogaard defends the view that visual experience is like belief in having a representational content. Her defense differs from most previous defenses of this view in that it begins by looking at the language of ordinary speech. She provides a linguistic analysis of what we say when we say that things look a certain way or that the world appears to us to be a certain way.
She then argues that this analysis can be used to argue for the view that visual experience has a representation content that mediates between you and the world when you visually perceive. Imagine you are sitting at Starbuck glancing at the blue coffee mug in front of you. B76 Unavailable In process Request.
A33 E75 Unavailable In process Request. Summary Jacinto Rivera de Rosales: Erfahrungen und Theorien wirtschaftlichen Handelns um in Deutschland oder die Abwesenheit "marktwirtschaftlicher" Begrifflichkeit Douglas Moggach: Ideen zu einer spekulativen Politik: Fichtes rechtsphilosophische Alternative zu einem neuzeitlichen Dogma Gesamtbibliographie Personenregister Sachregister.
Jacinto Rivera de Rosales: F Unavailable In process. Siglen Legende Vorwort Einleitung Was passiert hier eigentlich? L49 G73 Unavailable In process. Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages: Rudavsky presents a new account of the development of Jewish philosophy from the tenth century to Spinoza in the seventeenth, viewed as part of an ongoing dialogue with medieval Christian and Islamic thought. Her aim is to provide a broad historical survey of major figures and schools within the medieval Jewish tradition, focusing on the tensions between Judaism and rational thought.
This is reflected in particular philosophical controversies across a wide range of issues in metaphysics, language, cosmology, and philosophical theology. The book illuminates our understanding of medieval thought by offering a much richer view of the Jewish philosophical tradition, informed by the considerable recent research that has been done in this area. Plato's forms, mathematics and astronomy []. M3 K67 Unknown. Political philosophy and the Republican future: Summary Reflections on the tradition of Republicanism Initial reflections on political philosophy Who was Cicero?
Cicero on the nature of philosophy Cicero on cosmology and natural philosophy Cicero on natural theology Cicero on ethics Cicero on oratory and the language arts Cicero on politics A brief reflection on Nietzsche Political philosophy and the Republican future. Are we moving inevitably into an irreversible era of postnationalism and globalism? In Political Philosophy and the Republican Future, Gregory Bruce Smith asks, if participation in self-government is not central to citizens' vision of the political good, is despotism inevitable?
Smith's study evolves around reconciling the early republican tradition in Greece and Rome as set out by authors such as Aristotle and Cicero, and a more recent tradition shaped by thinkers such as Machiavelli, Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Madison, and Rousseau. Gregory Smith adds a further layer of complexity by analyzing how the republican and the larger philosophical tradition have been called into question by the critiques of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and their various followers.
For Smith, the republican future rests on the future of the tradition of political philosophy. In this book he explores the nature of political philosophy and the assumptions under which that tradition can be an ongoing tradition rather than one that is finished. He concludes that political philosophy must recover its phenomenological roots and attempt to transcend the self-legislating constructivism of modern philosophy. Forgetting our past traditions, he asserts, will only lead to despotism, the true enemy of all permutations of republicanism.
Cicero's thought is presented as a classic example of the phenomenological approach to political philosophy. A return to the architectonic understanding of political philosophy exemplified by Cicero is, Smith argues, the key to the republican future. Reflections on the tradition of Republicanism Initial reflections on political philosophy Who was Cicero?
The basic writings of Josiah Royce [electronic resource] []. Culture, philosophy, and religion v. Logic, loyalty, and community. Now back in print, and in paperback, these two classic volumes illustrate the scope and quality of Royce's thought, providing the most comprehensive selection of his writings currently available. They offer a detailed presentation of the viable relationship Royce forged between the local experience of community and the demands of a philosophical and scientific vision of the human situation.
The selections reprinted here are basic to any understanding of Royce's thought and its pressing relevance to contemporary cultural, moral, and religious issues. Poetics of imagining [electronic resource]: Summary "Analyzes and assesses the decisive contributions made to our understanding of the imaginary life of phenomenology Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Bachelard , hermeneutics Heidegger, Ricoeur , and postmodernism Vattimo, Kristeva, Lyotard. Summary This collection of essays examines the issue of norms and social practices both in epistemology and in moral and social philosophy.
The contributors examine the issue across an unprecedented range of issues, including epistemology realism, perception, testimony , logic, education, foundations of morality, philosophy of law, the pragmatic account of norms and their justification, and the pragmatic character of reason itself. This collection of essays examines the issue of norms and social practices both in epistemology and in moral and social philosophy.
Pragmatism with purpose [electronic resource]: Summary Contents Acknowledgments Introduction: Present at the End? Ethics of Belief 1. The empiricist doctrine of causality will be examined rather closely in the course of this book, especially as it is a widespread belief that Hume gave the final, or almost final, solution of the causal problem. For the time being we shall merely state the opposite thesis, namely, that causation is not a category of relation among ideas , but a category of connection and determination corresponding to an actual trait of the factual external and internal world, so that it has an ontological status — although, like every other ontological category, it raises epistemological problems.
Toward a General Concept of Determination i. Causation and Determination , Causalism and Determinism 7 equivalent 9 although some philosophers have acknowledged their difference. In this sense, that is determinate which has definite characteristics and can consequently be characterized unambiguously; when applied to descriptions and definitions, 'determinate 5 is used as an equivalent of precise or definite, in contradistinction to vague.
Thus Locke 11 called determinate or determined the ideas which Descartes had described as clear and distinct; and Claude Bernard 12 termed indetermines the facts collected without precision, those ill-defined facts "constituting real obstacles to science But in science the most frequent use of the word ' determina- tion 5 that is relevant to our concern seems to be that of constant and unique connection among things or events, or among states or qualities of things, as well as among ideal objects.
Thus, for instance, machines that run regular and reproducible — hence fully predictable — courses have been called determinate. If the form of a necessary connection is known, then some features of certain relata will be inferable from the knowledge of certain other relata. As it stands, equation 1. Therefore, probably a better name for such equations would be that of partially determined, or incompletely determinate, in contrast to those of the former type, which are fully determined or completely determinate.
This law is usually regarded as an instance of the causal principle: To test this causal interpreta- tion of 1. In short, while the second member of our relation does represent the effect expansion , the first member does not represent the cause heating , at least not in an equally satisfactory way.
This should suffice, for the time being, to suggest the in- adequacy of the functional view of causation, which will be dealt with at length in Sec. This, too, is a relation expressing a necessary connection among properties of a physical object. One can, and usually does, say that the numerical value of one of the properties is determined by the io A Clarification of Meaning value of the related property. But, clearly, when used in this way, the word 'determination 5 does not convey the activity and productivity inherent in causation.
And it could not be otherwise, as neither temperature nor mass are physical agents, events, or phenomena, but are instead qualities of physical objects. In other words, since qualities and dispositions have by themselves no productive virtue, the laws 1. Hence the word "determination 55 is used in connection with them in a sense which is more restricted than that of causation, namely, in the sense of necessary constant and unique relation between properties. In general, in this restricted sense, 'determination 5 means possibility of calculation and consequently of quantitative forecast.
The same applies to the law 1. The apparent paradox of predic- tion with the help of laws that do not contain time is dissolved as soon as it is recalled that time enters our use of such laws. But the meaning of the laws of nature is not restricted to the possibility of calculation on their basis — contrary to what some Causation and Determination , Causalism and Determinism 1 1 empiricists have maintained. In the sciences dealing with concrete objects we are not interested in calculating for the sake of calculation, but in calculating what we assume to have some relation, even if remote, with real events and processes.
That is, meaningful and useful calcula- tion follows in these sciences as contrasted to mathematics from the assumed factual validity of the law statements with the help of which calculation is carried out. In other words, the current scientific meaning of the word c deter- mination 5 does not overlap with the third acceptation of it which we have recorded, namely, the way act or process whereby an object acquires a property.
This addition may at first sight seem otiose ; but it is not, for, according to indeterminism, there may be determination in senses a and b but not in sense c. When he says that the state E at the time t is determined by the state C at the time t Q , he means that his differential equations his Laws enable him to calculate E, if C and the boundary conditions are known to him. Peirce called it — things do have definite characteristics, but they acquire them in a lawless hence un- predictable way: Among the simplest forms of determination in sense c stands the acquisition, by concrete objects, of quantitative characteristics without the emergence of new qualities but, instead, through continuous evolution.
This is the type of determination envisaged by mechanical determinism, which regards qualities as fixed and consequently takes only quantita- tive changes into account. If the values of these n parameters are known at any given instant, and their time derivatives are also known, then the values of the same parameters at a previous or at a later time can be calculated.
There are in the world qualitative changes besides quantitative variations, so that mechanical determinism is but a subclass of what I shall call general determinism , or determinism lato sensu. Determination need not be effected through quantitative variations only, as mechanical determinism holds; and it need 16 Poincare , Thermodynamique , p.
Causation and Determination , Causalism and Determinism 1 3 not be brought forth by external compulsion alone, as causal determinism claims; nor need it be unique or well defined, as both causal and mechanical determinism hold. All that is needed in order to maintain determinism in a general sense is to hold the hypothesis that events happen in one or more definite determinate ways, that such ways of becoming are not arbitrary but lawful, and that the processes whereby every object acquires its characteristics develop out of preexisting conditions.
The essential components of general determinism will be described more precisely in Sec. Even chance, which at first sight is the very negation of determination, has its laws, and accidents emerge from pre- existing conditions ; consequently chance has a place in what we are calling general determinism. Only, it is not the sole possible result, it is not a unique outcome of a given process ; or, as may also be said, it is not a well-defined result.
Coin throwing is a deter- minate process because: What happens is that games of chance do not follow a certain customary type of law, namely, the Newtonian; they follow instead statistical laws, they are statistically determined. This brings to the fore the question whether the quantum theory has led to the bankruptcy of determinism, as is so often heard.
The answer to the question whether the quantum theory entails the failure of determinism depends not only on the definition of determinism but also on the interpretation of the quantum theory that is chosen — and there are by now quite a number of consistent and empirically equivalent interpretations of quantum mechanics. But this restriction on causality does not entail a breakdown of determinism , since statistical determinacy is definitely retained in that interpreta- tion — not to speak of the obviously nonstatistical laws of quantum mechanics, such as the conservation laws, the selec- tion rules, or the exclusion principle.
Moreover, even the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics restricts the scope of causality without rejecting it entirely. Thus when we write down the probability for a transi- tion of a physical system from state 1 to state 2, we often assign this transition to some force cause , usually represented by an interaction potential Fig.
Only, the cause and the effect are here not tied in the constant and unique that is, necessary way asserted by the causal principle. Scattering of a particle by a field of force. The deflection of the particle is not uniquely determined, for several paths are possible, but at any rate it is caused by the force deriving from the potential V. By calculating and by interpreting such transition probabili- ties P12, we imply a that the transitions are not arbitrary and do not arise out of nothing, but follow from definite states under the action of definite forces, so that, for example, we can ascertain with certainty that an electron will not radiate unless it is accelerated by an external field; b that the transitions are not necessary, in the sense that state 2 does not develop regu- larly and unambiguously from state 1: In short, the usual interpretation of the quantum theory actually does not eliminate determinism in the general sense; moreover, it retains a certain dose of causality.
But it does drastically restrict the Newtonian form of determinism, ac- cording to which all physical processes boil down to changes of position determined by both the previous state of motion and externally impressed forces, the paths of the point masses con- cerned being precisely defined fully determined trajectories in space-time. It may also be said that Newtonian determinism is sublated in quantum mechanics in its orthodox interpreta- tion, since it is found to obtain on the average.
On the other hand, the positivistic philosophy built on and partially built into the usual interpretation of the quantum theory, eliminates determinism — but, then, also indeterminism — in the ontological sense, that is, in connection with the behavior 1 6 A Clarification of Meaning of the things themselves, as they exist whether observed or not. It asserts, instead, a kind of empirical indeterminacy — which, how- ever, does not exclude definite statistical laws. In point of fact, the logical-empiricist interpretation of quantum mechanics 19 declares that the quantum indeterminacy refers exclusively to results of observation, not to matter itself — a term which it regards as a meaningless metaphysical fiction.
The root of this empirical indeterminacy is easy to see: In other words, the behavior of the observer is regarded, in this interpretation, as independent of the object of observation, but not vice versa: In the absence of direct objective connections between the con- secutive states of a physical system it is no wonder that every form of scientific determinism in the ontological sense is lost, with the sole exception of statistical determinacy. This sort of indeterminism is clearly a consequence of the subjectivistic doctrine about the almost arbitrary intervention of the observer, who is regarded as the very conjurer of atomic-scale pheno- mena.
Quantum indeterminacy is, then, a consequence of the idealistic hypothesis inherent in modern positivism. In some recent interpretations of quantum mechanics, not even the causal principle is entirely forsaken. A force equation is derived, according to which the accelera- tion of a cc particle 5 5 is the effect of the joint action of the ex- ternal forces and of a new, internal, force depending on the 19 See Frank , Foundations of Physics , pp.
And the statistical distribu- tion of the results of a measurement is not regarded as an unintelligible ultima ratio , but is explained as the outcome of a definite interaction between the physical system in question and the measuring device a further physical system. In this way quantum jumps cease being elementary unanalyzable Urphanomene ; chance at the quantum level ceases to be an ultimate and is instead analyzed into further categories of determination. But the statistical determinacy peculiar to quantum mechanics is not thereby eliminated or explained away; it is shown to be the outcome of lower-level processes.
More on the recent revaluation of the causal problem in connection with quantum mechanics will be found in Secs. Whether we accept some causal interpretation of quantum mechanics or not, we see that this physical theory, in either of its interpretations, does not dispense with determinism in general but at most forsakes the Newtonian type of determinism.
We also realize that, whether chance is regarded as a radical ultimate as Peirce and Eddington thought or not, statistical determinacy has to be accounted for by every philosophy of modern science ; it is no longer possible to state dogmatically that chance is but a name for human ignorance, or to declare the hope that it will ultimately be shown to be reduced to causation. Chance is a peculiar type of determination, and its relations to other categories of determination are worth investigating. The Spectrum of Categories of Determination Since we wish to characterize causal determination as neatly as possible, we have to point out its place in general deter- minism.
As here conceived, causation is only one among several categories of determination. A surely incomplete list of such categories appearing in the ontology of modern science is the following: Quantitative self-determination is the category of determination prevailing in the continuous unfolding of states that differ from one another in quantitative respects only; in some cases, notably in thermodynamics, quantitative self- determination may be shown to emerge from processes charac- terized by other categories of determination, among them causation.
Causal determination , or causation: The causation category is particularly conspicuous when the main changes are produced by external factors. Interaction or reciprocal causation, or functional inter- dependence: As in the case of other categories of determination, statistical determinacy may emerge from processes on deeper levels, in which still other categories of determination are involved.
But, of course, the whole, far from being prior to its members, is in turn determined by them. Needless to say, goal-directed structures, functions, and behaviors need not be purposefully planned by anybody. Dialectical determination or qualitative self-determination: In opposi- tion to quantitative self-determination, internal dialectics involves qualitative changes. And, needless to say, it has nothing to do with logical contradiction. Further types of determination would certainly be recog- nized as a result of deeper- analysis. At any rate, causal deter- mination appears as only one among various ways of determination, as one of the types of lawful production or nomogenesis.
Hence causal determinism, or causality, which is placed between the two extremes of fortuitism and fatalism, is but one variety of determinism; along with other types of determinism, causality is subsumed under general determinism. Connections Among Different Types of Determination Any clear-cut distinction among types of determination involves the assumption that they are irreducible to one another, that is, that none of them can be regarded as a mere mixture of other forms of lawful production, every one of them being 20 A Clarification of Meaning characterized by a peculiar newness of its own.
That this is the case can be seen from the respective definitions of the categories of determination, and will be shown with the help of more detailed analysis as occasion arises. At this point I only wish to point out, first, that the above-mentioned determination categories, however mutually irreducible they are, are also connected with one another, con- stituting a hierarchy of types of determination and second, that, as a consequence of this connection, no type of determina- tion is found to operate in all purity, to the exclusion of all others, save in ideal cases. To illustrate my first contention, take mechanical determination, which is a peculiar combina- tion of purely quantitative self-determination in this case, inertial motion and reciprocal action, which can often be polarized into cause and effect.
Or take statistical determina- tion, which emerges, with characteristics of its own, as a result of the interplay of a large number of elements that are indi- vidually determined in accordance with other types of deter- mination mechanical, or teleological. The various types of determination are genetically connected with one another, and the higher types are dependent on the lower without being entirely reducible to them.
No type of determination can be assigned a territory where it operates to the complete exclusion of other types of lawful production. True, one might try to characterize different sectors of reality according to the relative predominance of the various categories of determination; but no clear-cut stratifica- tion would result from this. Take, for instance, the domain of life processes, which vitalists claim is unambiguously and exclusively characterized by final causes. Thus the entire spectrum of categories of determination seems to be used by biology — and, a fortiori, by the cultural sciences, which ontologically not historically presuppose biology even if they are not reducible to it.
A detailed investigation of the interconnections among the various forms of determination would show more clearly that they can be ordered according to their increasing complexity, in such a way that all but the first two quantitative self- determination and causation can be rooted to the lower types. We would thus have a scale of degrees or levels of determina- tion, each characterized by a peculiar trait of its own, but grounded on the lower levels. Hence it is not a question of choosing one type of determina- tion at the expense of others, by decreeing that the chosen category shall reign undisputed in all sectors of reality; like all monistic solutions, this one is too simple to be adequate.
Unlike dogmatic philosophies, the philosophical examination of modern science requires us to realize that a rich assortment of types of lawful production, or determination, is actually employed in the description and explanation of the world, that they all have an ontological counterpart, though not necessarily in the same sectors of reality or to the same extent in all sectors. This rather proofless sketch of a theory of levels of determina- tion was only meant to point out the modest but as yet in- dispensable place of causation in the wider context of general determinism. Productivity and Lawfulness 1.
The Principle of Lawfulness or Orderliness If the philosophic concept of determination is wider than both the usual acceptation of this word in science and the causation concept, then causal determinism can only be a special type of determinism in the broad sense — although most authors 22 identify them. But what are the essential marks of determinism in the broad sense?
If conditionalness is regular , i. Now, the principle of lawfulness may be worded as follows: There are laws , 26 And the principle of universal lawfulness, a stronger postulate, may be taken to read thus: Every single event is lawful, i. Or, again, Every single fact is the locus of a set of laws, 26 Note that, in this wording, the principle of universal lawfulness does not assert that facts are determined by laws, but in accordance with laws, or simply lawfully.
Thereby the idealistic doctrine is avoided, according to which natural and social laws are not the immanent form of facts, but prescribe them ab extrinseco. Unfortunately Hartmann, who met science late in life, disowned statistical lawfulness. Its Scope and Limits, p. The principle of lawfulness, however, does not require that every individual phenomenon should always occur in the same way whenever certain conditions are fulfilled; universal lawfulness is consistent with individual exceptions, with occur- rences in a given low percentage of cases.
Individual irregu- larity in some respects is consistent with collective regularity, i. Statements of statistical law apply to situations in which there are several alternatives, and exceptions are nothing but the least frequent alternatives. Moreover, the property of being exceptionless or, rather, almost exceptionless belongs not so much to facts as to statements about facts; indeed, statements of statistical law are often made with a high accuracy and the probability of their being true can be increased almost indefinitely.
Finally, the principle of lawfulness is not committed to a specific form of determinism, such as causal determinism, or mechanical determinism — contrary to what Peirce 28 stated in a famous paper which is still held in awe in some quarters. It is an inescapable consequence of the empiricist principle according to which things can be said to exist solely to the extent to which they can be experienced, for instance, observed, or measured.
The whole of his celebrated criticism of legality relied on the erroneous identification of scientific law with mechanical law. Still, lawfulness is in- sufficient. In order to build a definition of determinism both elastic enough to admit new categories of determination and strict enough to exclude irrational and untestable notions such as creation out of nothing , I propose to combine the principle of lawfulness with that of productivity, that is, the ancient principle according to which nothing comes out of nothing or passes into nothing. There are neither absolute beginnings nor absolute terminations , but everything is rooted to something else and leaves in turn a track 29 Le Chatelier , De la methode dans les sciences experimentales , p.
Curiously enough, Dingle objects to continuous creation rather than creation. The very first principle that nature teaches us is, that not even divinity can produce something out of nothing: And nothing goes over into naught I, Causation and Determination , Causalism and Determinism 25 in something else. For the sake of brevity, this old materialistic principle will be called the genetic principle.
The genetic principle is consistent with the principle of lawfulness, on which it puts a restriction, but is independent of it. In fact, everything might be the outcome of a process and might in turn give rise to other events, yet not in a lawful way. Thus, if we were to believe intuitionists, the processes of artistic and intellectual creation are lawless, even though every stage in them is the outcome of a preceding state of the individual and has in turn definite consequences. That is, both transcendentalism and sub- jectivism may grant that events follow one another, but not that they are produced by one another.
They may deny lawfulness, as Plato did, or grant it, as Hume did; what they cannot accept is the hypothesis that there is, in the external world, a power of originating anything. Transcendentalists and subjectivists tend therefore to reduce determination to succession, whether uniform or not, without production. The Principle of Determinacy Our definition of general determinism will then be the following: Determinism in the large sense is that ontological theory whose necessary and sufficient components are the genetic principle , or principle of productivity, according to 32 Many who would not dispute that the chief aim of scientific research is the discovery and application of laws, w r ould, on the other hand, be prepared to admit the intuitionistic thesis that research itself, and particularly the process of scientific creation, is at least partially lawless — and this on the bare grounds that a we still know very little about the psychology of intellectual work, b there are no golden infallible rules for scientific discovery, and c the principles of scientific methodo- logy that assist or hinder discovery and invention are far from sufficient to ensure success or failure.
See Bunge , Metascientific Queries , chap. The two principles can be conjoined to yield the following sentence: Everything is determined in accordance with laws by some- thing else , this something else being the external as well as the internal conditions of the object in question. This statement may be termed the principle of determinacy.
It is a philosophical assumption of science confirmed by the results of scientific re- search; it clearly cannot be refuted, since future investigation is expected to confirm it wherever it may now seem to be falsified. Any theory of structure or change or both respecting the principle of determinacy will hereafter be called deterministic. The causal principle is a particular case of the principle of determinacy; it essentially obtains when determination is effected in a unique or unambiguous way by external conditions. General determinism, as here conceived, allows for causal, mechanical, statistical, teleological, and other kinds of deter- mination, such as the qualitative change brought about by the increase or decrease in quantity, the so-called 4 4 struggle of opposites, etc.
The sole kind of determinism excluded from our definition is fatalism, because it violates the principle of lawfulness, since the alleged determination by virtue of some fatum is presumed to occur no matter what the prevailing conditions are, and entails moreover a transcendent agent see Sec.
The richer kind of determinism outlined in the foregoing description requires only productivity or genetic connection and legality or conditionalness and regularity. General determinism does not restrict a priori the various forms that change and the scientific laws of change may assume. Main Views As is well known, the most diverse stands have been taken with regard to the causal problem, from the flat rejection of the causation category to the assertion of its coinciding with determination.
All of them belong to one of the following Causation and Determination , Causalism and Determinism 27 classes: Although we shall examine them all in detail in the course of this book, it will be convenient to give here a brief characterization of each of these groups of theories and of their main varieties. This is the opinion of Leibnizians, to whom the causal principle is nothing but a form of the principle of sufficient reason.
Schopenhauer took this belief over from Leibni- zianism. It is also the belief of Kantians, 37 who assert that the 35 Aristotle, Metaphysics, book I, chap, i, b. Another characteristic statement of Bernard is this: The causal principle is then not a result but a pre- supposition of experience — it renders experience possible B, p.
See also Cassirer , Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik, pp. Also Nagel , Logic Without Metaphysics, p. This nomic pluralism is quite widespread among physicists. This opinion is typical of romantics and is shared by most dialectical materialists. See also Ostwald , Grundriss der Naturphilosophie, p.
Einstein himself adopted some features of the Kantian doctrine of causality when he stated that, even if the causal principle is not found to hold de facto in the domain of experience, it does hold de jure in the realm of ideas, so that it should be possible to build a presentation of quantum mechanics in which the initial state of a system determines entirely its later states. See the debate on determinism and causality in contemporary physics in the Bulletin de la Societe Frangaise de Philosophie, No.
Acausalism a The empiricist theory reduces causation to external conjunction or succession of events — or, rather, to the concomitance or the temporal sequence of experiences ; it may grant the lawfulness of phenomena but asserts the contingency of qualities and of the laws themselves, regarding the latter as nothing but rules of scientific procedure. This extreme development of empiricism does not seem to have been systematically defended by anybody.
Conclusions As may be gathered from what has been said in the foregoing, the target of my arrows will not be the causal principle but only the claim that causation is the sole category of determination and that, as a consequence, the causal principle enjoys an un- limited validity.
I will not argue against the notion of causation but against causalism. It is specifically characterized by the following theses, which it will be my purpose to substantiate in the course of the present work: Causation efficient and extrinsic is only one among several categories of determination; there are other types of lawful production, other levels of interconnection, such as statistical, teleological, and dialectical determinacy. In real processes, several categories of determination concur.
Purity in types of determination such as purity of causation is as ideal as any other kind of purity. The causation category, far from being external to other categories of determination, is connected with them. Thus multiple causation leads to statistical determinacy, the latter may in turn lead to quantitative self-determination, and reciprocal causation is interaction or interdependence. The causal principle holds approximately in certain domains.
The degree of approximation is satisfactory in connection with certain phenomena and very poor with regard to others. Causal determinism, without being altogether erroneous, is a very special, elementary, and rough version of general determinism. Before examining in more detail the pros and cons of the doctrine of causality, and before suggesting how to repair it, we shall have to recall and analyze some of the statements of the causal principle.
Formulations of the Causal Principle In the present chapter we shall be concerned with listing and analyzing some typical definitions of causation, that is, we shall examine various statements of the causal principle. Such an examination of definitions is indispensable in every rigorous approach to the causal problem — although it is entirely over- looked in many works on the subject 1 — and, indeed, in every scientific treatment of philosophic questions.
For, although philosophizing is not restricted to framing and discussing definitions, the lack of precise — that is, sufficiently precise — definitions facilitates wild speculation. Definitions of Cause 2. The Aristotelian Teaching of Causes Almost every philosopher and scientist uses his own defini- tion of cause, even if he has not succeeded in formulating it clearly.
According to the Stagirite 2 and to the peripatetic schoolmen, a single kind 1 For example, Cassirer , Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik, an otherwise highly stimulating treatise. Four kinds of cause were instead needed, namely: The first two were causes of being; the efficient and the final causes were causes of becoming. The Aristotelian teaching of causes lasted in the official Western culture until the Renaissance. Some of the grounds for the Renaissance reduction of causes to the causa efijiciens were the following: See also book V, chap, ii, and Physics, book II, chaps, iii and vii.
Formulations of the Causal Principle 33 of nature, which was the sole aim of the instrumental prag- matic conception of science advocated by Bacon and his followers. As has been usual since the beginnings of modern science, we shall hereafter restrict the meaning of the term c cause 5 to efficient cause , or extrinsic motive agent, or external influence producing change — in contrast to other kinds of cause, such as final, internal or causa sui , etc.
The classical definition of efficient cause was, of course, put forward by Aristotle: Galileo's Definition of Cause Modern thought, while retaining the externality of causa- tion, has preferred other definitions of the efficient cause. One of the clearest of them all was given by Galileo, who defined the efficient cause as the necessary and sufficient condition for the appearance of something: Note the modern conception of causation couched in scholastic terminology agent, patient, accident.
But a closer inspection shows its inadequacy in the following respects. First, the definition involves an indefinite number of factors, as it includes in the cause any thing or event that could make some difference to the result or effect; and, since in- determinateness or haziness is inconsistent with causal deter- minacy, the above definition of cause does not look adequate. But this would render the concept of cause practically worth- less, for causal analyses would then be impossible owing to the infinity of factors all of about the same importance pre- sumably constituting the cause. And the empirical test of causal hypotheses would be equally impossible, since the removal of any of the infinite factors would make some dif- ference, hence would require the control of an infinity of parameters.
The vagueness of the definitions of causal bond current until Formulations of the Causal Principle 35 about one century ago has prompted the framing of more precise, and consequently more schematic and abstract, formulations of the causal principle. Let us examine some of them; but let us begin by stating the general conditions that any adequate formulation should meet.
General Features of Any Formulation of the Causal Principle The following sentences are sometimes regarded as correct formulations of the causal principle: C, therefore E , 1 or E because C. T These forms are not, however, adequate to pour causation into. First, they have the forms of explanatory statements: In the second place, they assert not only a bond between C and E but suggest also the existence of both: Now scientific laws — and, a fortiori, principles of scientific ontology — are not singular factual statements in the sense that they refer to matters of fact ; they are, on the other hand, general hypotheses , and, moreover, of the conditional form.
It was recognized long ago that a scientific law "does not express what happens but what would happen if certain condi- tions were met In other words, the referent of a nomological statement may be real, but its range of exact validity consists of a set of ideal cases only approximately 8 Meyerson , Identite et realite, p. For an analysis of this problem, see Braithwaite , Scientific Explanation, pp.
Consider, for instance, the most general physical law, namely, the principle of conservation of energy, which can be stated in the following way: These propositions are deemed to be universally true except perhaps in the case of quantum virtual transitions even if perfect isolation in every respect is nowhere to be found; the principle does not assert the existence of isolated systems, and consequently it does not contradict the assertion of their factual inexistence.
It follows, then, that an adequate statement of the causal principle should not involve the assumption that C actually exists but should instead say that, if C is the case, then E will also be the case; in short, the statement must be a conditional. The emphasis should be on the relation rather than on the relata — as Russell 9 has untiringly insisted — and on the condi- tions for the occurrence of facts of a certain class, rather than on the facts themselves.
And the conditionalness peculiar to scientific lawfulness renders the use of hypotheticals desirable — whether in the indicative or in the subjunctive moods. In short, law statements in the nonformal sciences should begin with if Let us then try the following form: If C, then E , 2 or simply: Every specification of the class of facts will, of course, lead from the empty scheme 2 to a specific law statement. But only the relation of logical equivalence reciprocal implication can be used to denote necessary and sufficient conditions ; in this case we would have: If, and only if, C, then E.
In the former case, 2 is an incomplete framework, whereas in the latter it is just a compound proposition. This will now be done. Now, with regard to a relation there are the following possibilities: The usual interpretation of the causal principle is obviously inconsistent with the former alternative ; the causal connection is supposed to hold universally, hence 38 A Clarification of Meaning the causal principle must assert the exceptionless repetition of E whenever C y is the case. Consequently the word 'always 5 the all-operator must be added to 2 if it is to become a statement of the causal principle.
Needless to say, the word 'always 5 in 3 must not be taken as meaning forever, but in all cases, or without exception in the given universe of discourse, or generally. The time concept is ex- cluded from 3: An analysis of 3 must now be performed, in order to as- certain whether, and to what extent, it does convey the core meaning usually attached to the causal principle. It turns out that the following concepts are contained in 3: Let us treat them separately. From an ontological point of view, the terms IfC state the clause s or condition s for the occurrence of E; in other words, they assert that E occurs provided C happens.
But conditionalness is not peculiar to causal lawfulness; it is a minimum requirement to be fulfilled by any kind of law, whether of the causal type or not. Lawfulness may, indeed, be defined as regular conditionalness see Sec. Formulations of the Causal Principle 39 Asymmetry , or existential succession. The effect E will appear only provided the conditions summarized by C have been fulfilled — not however necessarily after C.
To employ a term of which traditional philosophers are fond, the cause is existen- tially prior to the effect — but need not precede it in time. Indeed, so far nothing has been said of a time delay between C and E: If C is the case, E will ensue invariably: Our statement does not assert that the existence of C may entail that of E or that, given 7 , E will ensue in a certain percentage of cases: Now, constancy and uniqueness make up necessity as defined in Sec. Yet — should the concept of necessity be included in an adequate formulation of the causal principle?
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