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EU Relations with Russia: Partnership or Asymmetric Interdependency? dominated by negotiations over how to realise this concept not only as a long term.
Table of contents

This means that Germany supports the self-determination of the eastern countries and is of the opinion that the EU should create autonomous relations with its eastern partners. Lang also said that Germany considers interdependency between the countries of the region important, but the context of interdependence has changed. Originally, by interdependency Germany meant the deepening co-dependency that led in the end to a change for example in Russia: interdependency was seen as an engine of change and as a stabiliser of the mutual relations. Now rather than fully engaging Russia, Germany engages it only partially.

According to Lang this means that Germany moves from a paradigm of partnership to a more minimalistic a realistic model of cooperation. To conclude, Lang said that Germany maintains diplomatic channels with Russia, applies sanctions if necessary and also supports Ukraine.

According to Lang Germany has not a specific strategy in the current situation but rather a flexible way to handle crisis. According to him, in recent years analysts have too often focused on the empty institutional summits between the EU and Russia or they have reflected on the nature of these two actors and their identities. When looking at EU and Russia from this perspective, it can be seen that most of these actions are first and foremost about themselves.

Cadier then reflected on the situation in Ukraine and on EU policies. Cadier argued that the Ukrainian crisis has first and foremost to do with the internal situations of Russia and Ukraine; the free-trade agreement offered by the EU to Ukraine was the spark that ignited the crisis. Now the EU should for example push the elections in Eastern Ukraine in medium-term, as they would truly reveal the degree of legitimacy of the separatists among the population in Eastern Ukraine.

Cadier also reflected on the internal structural limitations of EU policies and on divergences among member states. He argued that this cooperation will not lead to a permanent and overarching Franco-Russian alliance in world politics. The cooperation can be only fragile because their strategic visions and long-term objectives in Syria are different. Their cooperation has already faced limitations — even if ISIS is a common enemy, Russia and France have no common allies in Syria, Cadier highlighted. Sir Andrew Wood began his presentation by arguing that there has never been a strategic partnership between the EU and Russia, because the partnership requires equal aspirations, equal assumptions and clear markers, and these requirements have never been fulfilled.

He also stressed that for Ukraine, the EU has shown an example of the possibility of open government and of progress in which the people are part of the action. According to Wood, the Ukrainian crisis is not over, and what will happen in Ukraine is decisive for Russia. He argued that even though the world seems to be concentrating on Syria at the moment, Syria is only a distraction in EU-Russia relations. Secondly Wood said that the EU would like to see Russia in peace with itself and with its neighbours, with a growing economy, securely integrated to the global economy, and Russia reviving its cultural and intellectual heritage as a confident actor in the European framework.

Wood highlighted that the previously mentioned aspirations are aligned with an assumption, that there will be a way in which Russia will be integrated in the common European structures. The problem, according to Wood, is the present Russian government that does not share these aspirations. According to him, Russia is moving away from the purpose of achieving the normality in the sense Europe understands it, and also has succeeded in alarming its neighbours.

To conclude, Wood said that the objectives of the West and Russia are not aligned. Also, President Putin is very conscious about the vulnerabilities of the West but at the same time he knows that Russian economy is in trouble and he himself is in trouble.

Wood said that trust was an empty word too easily brandished as a requirement for the West to pursue as a policy in itself in dealing with Russia.


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Only concrete steps with accountable outcomes could work in developing a viable relationship between Russia and the West. Mere platitudes would not do that. Dr Kristi Raik opened the discussion by stating that economic relations play an important role in EU-Russia relations, even though the realist view of international relations considers military power as a dominating force in the world. In these terms there is an asymmetry between the EU and Russia, since Russia is strengthening and using its military power, whereas the EU does not have the military muscle to counter Russia in this field.


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However, the EU is a major economic power and is applying its economic power in the form of sanctions. However, she noted that the direct effects of sanctions are hard to evaluate even though there is a large literature on the impact of economic sanctions. The fact that Russian economy is highly politicised makes this assessment even more difficult. There have been both financial sanctions and sectorial sanctions.

The financial sanctions are targeted at Russian state banks and key companies in energy and defence like Rosneft and Uralvagonzavod. The aim of these sanctions is to limit access to international capital markets. The sectorial sanctions — that is the export bans — have targeted advanced oil exploration equipment and weapons and other military equipment. The effects of sanctions are filtered through several factors in both the domestic and international spheres.

General factors that can be considered as having an enhancing impact on the effects of sanctions are the costs for the target state, trade dependence between the target and the sender, and support for sanctions from international organisations. A factor that can have either and enhancing or mitigating effect on the impact of sanctions is the political resource allocation in the target country. If resource allocation is inefficient, then this factor can have an enhancing effect on the sanctions.

However, there are also factors that can weaken the impact of sanctions.

Europe in Dialogue 1/2013

If the targeted regime is authoritarian, then the state elites are likely not to be harmed by the sanctions, and the target state might have the capacity to manage the effects of sanctions. If the conflict is considered important, this may weaken the effect of sanctions. As to the impact of the sanctions, they have caused a drop in Russian GDP in the last year, and a quick recovery is unlikely. The factors strengthening the impact of sanctions in Russia are the political economic system that leads to suboptimal economic resource allocation, the fall in oil prices, the increasing budget deficit and high military spending, inflation, currency fall and the substitution of imports, and finally the fact that the EU has stuck together with regard to the sanctions.

On the other hand, the factors that have weakened the impact of sanctions are the authoritarian Russian regime that is able to protect economic and other elites, the strong anti-western propaganda in Russia, the opportunities to trade with other countries, and attempts to split the EU. In conclusion, Dr Oxenstierna stated that the economic sanctions have hurt the Russian economy. In the short run, especially the financial sanctions have been effective. However, the high costs of sanctions are not enough to make Russia change its policy.

The EU-Russia relations have been seriously damaged and this will last for a substantial period. In her remarks Ms Yulia Zhuchkova looked into the unfolding of the economic crisis in Russia.

Barroso on Russia's energy partnership with EU

Therefore the EU should prepare to face a hugely stagnating Russian economy in the coming years. At the moment the Russian economy is hit by several deteriorating factors that are caused by ineffective governmental management and not by the EU sanctions. However, the current economic crisis in Russia may not be causing as much damage to the economy as the crises in and At the same time, the Russian people do not feel as much deprivation, since the Russian regime explains the economic problems by blaming external actors.

The current crisis in Russia was caused by domestic factors that were made worse by sanctions. The sources of GDP decline in in Russia include too much consumption spending and the lack of any real measures to tackle the problems of Russian economy by the current government. There are major risks for the economy in One of these risks is that the consumers will cut spending faster than real incomes fall.

All the currently unfolding political events will not change these basic problems of the Russian economy. However, the support for Mr Putin is still very high, even close to record levels. At the moment the Russian people do not know who will gain power after Putin is gone. However, according to Ms Zhuchkova the EU still remains an important investment and trade partner for Russia. China is not interested in partnership and Russia is still dependent on European investment and technology. In his remarks, Mr Tony van der Togt stressed that in dealing with Russia the EU should learn to act more strategically, even though such an approach is not popular with politicians.

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When looking at the EU-Russia economic relations before the Ukraine crisis, there seemed to be prospects for more economic integration and cooperation. However, Russia has gradually abandoned the transition and EU-led integration, and has set up the Eurasian Economic Union as a competing union to the EU. Before the Ukraine crisis the EU-Russia relations included ever closer cooperation in areas such as the Common Spaces of cooperation, and it was believed that this would work.

Back in there were a lot of positive expectations of the prospects of cooperation. This helped in building a certain constituency that was willing to see this cooperation grow, and according to Mr van der Togt part of this will is still there. The Ukraine crisis was an end point in a longer development. Russia was not buying into the modernisation process. The political transition has not happened, and Russia is gradually withdrawing from the international rules-based system. The economic transition is not happening either, instead there is growing protectionism or challenging of the Western-dominated economic and financial world order.

The Eurasian Economic Union is characterised by a holding together form of regionalism and top down integration with weak implementation of common rules. But these concerns turned into panic by fall when Kremlin realized that the Ukrainian leadership was about to sign an Association Agreement with EU at the Vilnius EaP summit on November.

The former President Yanukovitch used negotiations with the EU and Russia in order to improve his position on both sides. But it was Moscow, not Brussels, which was able to deliver low gas prices and loans for the presidential elections. And it was the EU-Russia battle over Ukraine that led eventually to a conflict. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia — saw the ultimate goal as EU membership.

Like Belarus, Azerbaijan snubbed political reform, as well as EU membership. In fact, Azerbaijan is much better suited to the format of the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements. But the main miscalculation of EaP architects was the lack of an ultimate goal for those countries that have embarked on the path of painful reforms. There may be some truth in that, but this regime requires only two hours a day, not six. The Mirror Cracked The Ukrainian conflict has brought the Russia-West relations to the edge of confrontation for the first time since the end of the Cold war.

However, deep divides have appeared not only in the Russia-West relations but in the European space at large affecting relations between the EU countries and within them as well as with the EU eastern partners and the CIS region at large. Figuratively speaking, the European mirror has cracked. As for the cracks in Eastern Partnership, the last Eastern Partnership summit in Riga has become the most vivid evidence of this reality. The summit was primarily of a symbolic nature.

The conception of EU-Russia strategic partnership. Reasons of its failure

Its goal was to keep the project afloat and show to participating countries that Brussels has not lost interest in EaP. However, the conflict over Ukraine has shown that Russia still has a potential to oppose those projects which it perceives as a threat to its own national interests.

Hence today, in contrast to the Vilnius summit, the EU and some partner countries have to act with one eye on the Kremlin.