Russian language translation of the preface and summary from Beyond the A Phased Approach for Improving Nuclear Safety and U.S-Russian Relations.
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Write a customer review. There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later. It was really repetitive I felt as if I kept reading the same paragraphs over and over. Some interesting ideas on improving relations and cutting back on proliferation of nuclear weapons, but what the aurthors are proposing are highly unrealistic.
One person found this helpful. Amazon Giveaway allows you to run promotional giveaways in order to create buzz, reward your audience, and attract new followers and customers. Learn more about Amazon Giveaway. Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: Set up a giveaway. Feedback If you need help or have a question for Customer Service, contact us. An extension in itself, however, will not resolve their underlying skepticism about bilateral arms control. Both also should focus explicitly on the implications of alternative futures for their strategic relationship after the New START deadline, from more to less cooperation, from more to less strategic dialogue and engagement among military and defense officials, and from continuation of efforts to regulate cooperatively their strategic decisions and deployments to a breakdown of the arms control process in a new unilateralism.
Put starkly, if the decadeslong process of cooperative regulation of their strategic postures ends with New START, do they care, why, and how much? All issues should be discussed: In seeking to strengthen strategic stability and nuclear risk reduction, both countries should be prepared as well to contemplate major departures from current positions, including by U. At best, this discussion of first principles would take place officially, led by senior officials in the White House and the Kremlin.
Alternatively, Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin could create a special joint commission of retired senior political and military officials from their defense and foreign policy communities with governmental observers. In either case, the mandate would be to report on what is at stake should the bilateral arms control process collapse and, more importantly, possible cooperative ways forward after New START. The result will be a costly arms race, greater risk of miscalculation if a crisis or confrontation cannot be avoided, and worsening political relations.
If not prevented, a North Korean nuclear and missile threat to the United States will further increase the likelihood of strategic competition by triggering many U. Chinese reluctance is perhaps explained by uncertainty about what such a process of reassurance and restraint would require of China and what it would get in return. Trump administration views remain to be determined, although with its emphasis on setting the U.
Yet, it could remain out of reach. Instead, Washington and Beijing should consider two more limited ways to test that broader concept. The newly initiated reviews of the U.
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As those reviews advance, the Trump administration should propose that the United States and China hold an official-level experts exchange to allow for Chinese input. Of course, there would be limits on what either country would say, but the results still would prove valuable to both sides. Any later decisions that run counter to Chinese objections would be made at least with some insight into those positions. For each country, this dialogue would be a valuable political signal to the other of its desire for a more cooperative, less competitive overall relationship. It also would be one way to begin to explore the concept of mutual reassurance and restraint.
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There also would be insights into Chinese strategic thinking, posture, and decision-making to the extent that Chinese arguments were buttressed by setting out the strategic logic behind specific concerns. For China, there again would be an opportunity to influence U. For both countries, such exchanges would enable their officials to identify and explore mutually acceptable options to manage the spillovers of U.
Multilaterally, a deadlocked Conference on Disarmament CD has been unable for over two decades to begin negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty FMCT. An FMCT designed only to halt production of such material for nuclear weapons, however, is a treaty whose time has passed.
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Even if the CD deadlock ends, the payoffs of a production cutoff alone will be minimal. India and Pakistan will not adhere to such a prohibition, choosing instead to protect their options to produce more nuclear weapons materials; the five NPT nuclear-weapon states most probably have ceased production; and most non-nuclear-weapon states reject a production cutoff as an important Article VI step. Henceforth, a treaty placing limits on fissile material should be crafted explicitly as a nuclear disarmament building block.
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Specifically, any future treaty should encompass wide-ranging transparency measures, including declarations of nuclear weapons material production, utilization, and storage facilities; flows of fissile material for permitted military purposes; flows and sites related to the disposition and storage of nuclear weapons material from dismantled nuclear warheads; flows of surplus material placed under international safeguards; and best estimates of past production and existing stocks of nuclear weapons materials. At this stage, such transparency measures still would stop short of provisions for the required elimination of previously produced nuclear weapons materials.
In addition, with the CD deadlocked, fissile material limits should be pursued elsewhere. The negotiation of the Mine Ban Treaty, known as the Ottawa Convention, and the current negotiations for a nuclear weapons prohibition treaty provide alternative models: This approach would be one way for U. In turn, for U. NPT interests, it would signal readiness to cooperate with other countries to put in place such building blocks for sustained Article VI progress.
Among other NPT nuclear-weapon states, China most certainly would be uncomfortable, given its traditional uneasiness about transparency, but it also could prove reluctant to stand aside from negotiations outside of the CD. Using an FMCT to provide vital ground truth on nuclear-weapon-state activities would offer critics among non-nuclear-weapon states a treaty that clearly would advance nuclear disarmament goals.
Four years after the first of three conferences on the humanitarian impact of use of nuclear weapons, the five NPT nuclear-weapon states still lack a credible response to the humanitarian impact movement and the legitimate concerns it raises about the risk of use of nuclear weapons. This failure has been costly to their own interests and remains so. That outcome is not in the interests of the NPT nuclear-weapon states or, for that matter, the non-nuclear-weapon states. In turn, although the magnitude of nuclear risk can be debated, it is increasingly possible to craft credible scenarios for a next use of nuclear weapons.
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For both reasons, the interests of the United States and the other NPT nuclear-weapon states would be served by acknowledging the concerns of virtually all nations about the risk of use of nuclear weapons and demonstrating their commitment to reduce that risk to an absolute minimum.
With that goal, the NPT nuclear-weapon states should announce that nuclear risk reduction will become part of their ongoing exchanges as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Those exchanges could be carried out in the so-called P5 Process of annual meetings and interim discussions linked to the NPT or on the margins of the Security Council itself. An initial focus could be potential pathways to a next use of a nuclear weapon, whether by a nonstate actor or a state; by accident, intention, or miscalculation; limited or more extensive.
Possible areas then could be explored for cooperation among the NPT nuclear-weapon states to prevent a next use. Cooperation could focus, for example, on how to defuse an escalating crisis between India and Pakistan under the nuclear shadow, perhaps the most plausible immediate pathway.
Another focus could be cooperation to head off a terrorist nuclear attack. Actions by the NPT nuclear-weapon states to provide humanitarian assistance should a nuclear detonation occur is another area for cooperative response. Going beyond these elements, the NPT nuclear-weapon states could seek agreement on a so-called code of nuclear conduct comprised of basic principles to govern their activities and derivative undertakings to implement those principles.