Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification

Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification by Jeffrey S. Lantis. Donald P. Kommers. University of Notre.
Table of contents

I t is here that the history of Prussia and Germany has something to teach us: If one also takes into account the enormous appeal - for many different reasons - that Germany has for a growing number of people, countries and regions, then Germany, following the dramatic and radical changes of , undoubtedly now finds itself in the position of a potential great power. This also applies if one compares the situation with traditional European great powers such as France and the United Kingdom, and even if one takes into account the fact that Germany, unlike France and the UK, has no permanent seat on the UN Security Council, nor is it a nuclear power.

B ut the collapse of the Soviet empire, the destruction of Yugoslavia, the breakup of Czechoslovakia, as well as other developments, inevitably mean a further relative increase in the weight of Germany within the European community of nations, even if the problems of the unification process and the onset of a recession would at times seem to paint a different picture. Here, the dramatic nature and speed of the radical changes on the international scene of the late s and early s become particularly apparent. If the division of Germany after was one of the causes of the Cold War with its dangerous crises and decades of tension, then the united Germany - the major power in the middle of Europe - now represents for many people, a guarantee of the continent's political and economic stability.

Germany's foreign policy must be based on this new situation and on the risks and opportunities it entails, but also, and above all, on the responsibility that it brings with it. I t is true, however, that this new Germany is firmly bound together with the European and Atlantic communities and, as such, is still unable in some respects to take decisions and actions in isolation.


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Equally, we cannot tell for the time being whether, when, how and to what end Germany will deploy and use its power. For that, the country's new status arrived too unexpectedly and too quickly: More importantly, the debates concerning a German immigration law or the future role of the Bundeswehr reveal considerable insecurity, even impotence.


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T he ability to adopt great-power policies is there, however, provided the given preconditions for a targeted display of power are met; but such a demonstration does not necessarily need to be belligerent. This is a fact that seems to be well known to those near and far-flung neighbours who, through the division of Germany and the implementation of other measures, dismantled this potential after because they wanted to prevent, for all time, the re-emergence of a German great power.

T here are therefore hidden dangers in the new role, but also, and not least, opportunities; the role is primarily, however, bound up with expectations and demands from outside the new greater Federal Republic. But one thing is certain: Federal German politicians had consistently pointed out that the German people had not forfeited the right "to bring to completion the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination".

These politicians may or may not have believed this, even wanted it or striven for it. But then, suddenly, it was there: Germany will have to come to terms with this and it must be a conscious act. The opportunities G erman foreign policy has much to do, but can also achieve much in counteracting the re-emergence of old images of Germany. This includes for the new greater Germany the recognition of the fact that a German great power may not always, and only, do what others perceive to be 'normal' and which for them is a matter of course.

The political leaders of the German Reich, which had been united since , had already been confronted by this same problem, particularly in the years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War, and they, too, had been unable to deal with it. There are economic, political, geographic, military and historical reasons for this problem which should be recognized. A country that, to a large extent, owes its existence and the achievement of its most important aim - unification after decades of separation - to the development of peace since , should not refuse to participate in the defence or restoration of that peaceful world order, if that is what the international community demands.

In the final analysis, Germany, too, has a vital interest in combatting the causes of mass migration - systematic genocide, the expulsion of large numbers of people, or mass starvation - where this is possible using economic or humanitarian means or, in extreme cases, by taking joint military action. A bove all, Germany's new status means that cooperative efforts in Europe must be continued and intensified to achieve European integration, where this is meaningful and possible.

The Federal Republic of Germany, since the beginning, has supported European Union because such a Union promised, on the one hand, to make a major contribution to resolving the problem of the division of the country, while, on the other, it held out the prospect of economic prosperity. As Germany shared this second goal with all its partners, it was and remains important to draw attention to the most notable successes in the field of economic integration.

In this respect, the European Community has had some difficulties, but it is in general a convincingly effective community, and, as has been shown by the creation of the European Economic Area EEA , a highly attractive one.

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W hether, when and in what form 'monetary union' can be achieved, including the setting up of a Central European Bank or the introduction of a currency acceptable to all member states, is unclear. The same applies to 'political union', the creation of which has been of particular interest to German foreign policy since the early s.

Just how little has been achieved in terms of a common European foreign policy since this obligation was first laid down on 1 July is demonstrated by the lack of a coordinated plan in the build-up to, and during, the war in the Persian Gulf as well as the failure of a European policy in the war in the former Yugoslavia. U ltimately, both wars have reawakened thoughts of a European Defence Community which failed back in , but which, since that time, has continued to exist albeit in a rudimentary form, in the Western European Union.

Crises and war in Yugoslavia have shown that here, too, progress must be made. It was in this context, in the summer of , that a few European countries - France and Germany for example - began calling for the creation of the political conditions for the formation of a European intervention force. The joint initiative of 14 October by the German Chancellor and the French President was intended to be an initial step towards this goal.

The proposals, which included intensification of Franco-German military cooperation and creation of a "Eurocorps", were aimed at creating a coordinated security and defence policy for Europeans within the framework of the WEU. W hat was remarkable, and indeed characteristic of the situation, were the perceptions and reactions of Germany's partners with regard to this initiative. Some partners, including Italy and the UK, immediately voiced their reservations, seeing among other things, the danger of an erosion of the NATO Alliance and thereby an effective, disproportionate strengthening of Germany - in the long term - at the expense of some of its European partners.

The prevention of just such a development with a simultaneous strengthening of Europe under French control at the expense of the Atlantic Alliance could, on the other hand, have been France's motivation for the initiative. This is somewhat reminiscent of the situation in the early s and the then insoluble German dilemma of having to choose either the Gaullist, French option or the Atlantic, American option, while being unable to do without either. I t was, and is, no coincidence that the main objective of France's German policy has been firmly to link the Federal Republic to a multi-dimensional European community.

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French initiatives to found European institutions that included Germany were also attempts to bind Germany permanently and thus to prevent it from ever again becoming a great power. Even today, Europe still signifies a form of protection against Germany - and not just in the view of the French. The developments of , i. A mong the conclusions which can be drawn from these facts is, first of all, that Franco-German cooperation, which was laid down in the January Franco-German Treaty, and ultimately considerably expanded with the creation in of a joint Defence and Security Council, will remain a central pillar ofGerman foreign policy even after unification.

However, this is likely to prevent the Germans from adopting those special political initiatives and national profile-enhancing actions in which major powers tend to engage. This applies to German foreign policy in general but to Ostpolitik in particular.

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Of course a country such as Germany, especially now that it is united, is unable to forgo an active Ostpolitik; it is part of this country's destiny because of its geographical proximity tothe countries of Eastern Europe, the long tradition of good political, economic and cultural relations, as well as by the moral obligation imposed by the legacy of major conflicts, deep crises and costly wars. History moulds our future, affecting Germany's relations with the Czech and Slovak Republics and the new states on the territory of the former Soviet Union; it also has a particular bearing on Germany's relations with its neighbour to the East, Poland, which are likely to prove just as important as its relations with France, its neighbour to the West.

Cooperative approach to Ostpolitik I n the future, Germany should avoid going it alone as far as Ostpolitik is concerned, even if this possibility is open to it. There are four reasons for this: The strong economic support required by the countries of Eastern Europe, in particular the new states on the territory of the former Soviet Union, can only be organized at an international level. Here, Germany - acting quite understandably in its own self-interest - must press for a concerted aid programme, evenly spreading the burden to all the leading industrial countries, including the US and Japan.

And then there is the memory of the past which, particularly in the case of Germany's allies, continues to raise the question of German-Russian relations. These memories may seem anachronistic from a German viewpoint, but they do exist and perceptions influence policy. For some Western observers, these relations are all linked to the so-called 'Rapallo Complex'.

It was on 16 April in Rapallo that, to the surprise of the Western powers, the German Reich and Soviet Russia, the two losers of the First World War, signed treaties on such vital issues as reparations and pre-war debts. Contrary to some of the opinions expressed even to this day, no secret military alliance was agreed upon and there were no secret discussions on a joint attack on Poland.

From a Western perspective, however, the secret supplementary accord in the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 23 August seemed, once it became known, to justify the existence of the 'Rapallo Complex'. This then became a preoccupation of the Western media, particularly in France, most recently on the occasion of the July German-Soviet Summit meeting of Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev in the Caucasus. It would seem reasonable to suppose that, in future, the new Germany's contacts with Russia will be viewed even more closely from this historical perspective than was the case with the contacts established by the old Germany with the Soviet Union.

In addition, the CSCE provides a forum that makes bilateral contact possible, even on issues that traditionally are viewed with mistrust by others. To date, the CSCE represents the only available, and to some extent proven, framework for resolving disputes that encompasses all European countries.

A country such as the Federal Republic of Germany, lying as it does so close to areas of crisis, must have a special interest in the future development of the CSCE process.

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This fact is particularly important - and will continue to be so - because it will prevent the US from becoming isolated. It should be remembered that originally, it was primarily Germany that made American participation in a European security conference a condition of its own participation. It is also for this reason that any thought of going it alone in terms of Ostpolitik must be avoided. What role do national interests play in the formulation of national and European-level defence policies? Heisbourg, Francois, European defence: Institute for Security Studies,.

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